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There is concern that the current approach to the peacetime medical mission of 
Navy Medicine does not adequately address the need to provide its personnel with the 
skill sets necessary for the surgically intensive environment associated with the wartime 
mission.  Navy Medicine has shifted its focus on the delivery of health care over the last 
decade from treatment and intervention to prevention, health promotion and population 
health initiatives.  This focus makes good business and clinical sense from the managed 
care and population health perspective.  This thesis examined Navy Medicine’s inpatient 
and outpatient surgical workload and military staffing to determine the level of support it 
provides for the readiness mission.  A trend analysis was performed using workload data 
from the Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System between fiscal year 1999 
and 2002. This analysis shows that there has been an overall decrease in the amount of 
inpatient surgical workload for all surgical specialties. However, not all surgical 
specialties have observed an increase in outpatient workload over this same time period. 
Additionally, an examination and trending of end strength data for the Medical Corps and 
Nurse Corps using primary subspecialty codes was performed for fiscal years 1990 
through 2002. The results indicated that while there have been few changes in overall end 
strength over the last decade, changes in specialties have occurred consistent with an 
emphasis on a medical model that focuses on outpatient primary care.  The evidence 
suggests an emerging gap between the dual missions of Navy Medicine that warrants 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
1. Military Medicine  
When one thinks of military medicine, he conjures up pictures of Navy Hospital 
Corpsman providing aid to the injured Marine on the battlefield of Iwo Jima; the Army 
surgeon performing “meatball” surgery in a MASH Unit in Korea; or the Air Force flight 
nurse caring for critically ill patients on a C-141 between Germany and the United States. 
Military medicine is the healthcare support establishment that is charged with the medical 
care and well being of our nation’s warriors… our soldiers, airman, sailors, and Marines. 
It is a tremendous responsibility that is shouldered by the men and women of the military 
health establishment. It is these operational roles that are the primary drivers for 
maintaining these health care providers in uniform.  
However, over the last decade, the face of the military medical establishment is 
changing to look more like the civilian health care institutions found in the United States. 
This thesis will explore the interwoven competing factors of health care service to the 
nation’s active duty military forces, their families, and retirees and their families by 
looking specifically at Navy Medicine and how or if the day-to-day peacetime work of 
this diverse organization supports the existence of the wartime mission of the sailors and 
Marines through the perspective of basic workload measures and historical staffing 
trends. 
2. National Healthcare  
Before it is possible to fully understand the complexities and challenges facing 
Navy Medicine today, it is important to obtain a broader perspective of the U. S. 
healthcare systems and the forces that drive the way the healthcare industry is operated.  
The national healthcare system provides a backdrop and a framework for understanding 
the Navy’s healthcare system, as there are many similarities between the peacetime 
healthcare provided by the Navy and most of the nation’s largest Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO). Once an appreciation for this national system is gained, it is then 
2 
possible to comprehend the endeavor that Navy Medicine faces in providing healthcare to 
its beneficiaries in both war and peace. 
It would be safe to say that in comparison to many other countries, the costs for 
healthcare in the U.S. can be characterized as excessive. “The United States spends 
considerably more than the developed country average on health care, and the value we 
receive is questionable.”1  In 2000, when compared to the average of all the countries in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)2, U.S. 
expenditures on health as a percent of gross domestic product is over 60 percent higher 
(13 percent in U.S. vs. 8.1 percent for OECD average). Yet there is almost a 50 percent 
higher incidence of cancer (per 100,000 population) in the U.S. and virtually no 
difference in infant mortality rate (deaths per 1000 live births) when compared to the 
average of OECD countries.3 Additionally, the World Health Organization reports that 
some of the leading risk factors in terms of the burden of disease they cause are unsafe 
sex, high blood pressure, tobacco consumption, alcohol consumption, high cholesterol 
and obesity.4 The U.S. has a much higher incidence of diseases as a result of increased 
prevalence of these risk factors.  The U.S. health system, while technologically more 
advanced than most of the rest of the world, has its costs and the return on investment is 
frequently uncertain.   
There are a number of factors that affect the costs of healthcare. Some of these 
include the use of new medical technologies in healthcare,5 cost of prescription drugs6, 
                                                 
1 Ball, M.J., Beaulieu, D., Douglas, J.V., Ramsaroop, P. Advancing Federal Sector Health Care: A 
Model for Technology Transfer, p.5. Springer, New York. 2001. 
2 Countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States. 
3 Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And Development, OECD Health Data 2002 – Frequently 
Asked Data. [http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-684-5-no-1-29041-0,00.html] Accessed 
November 2002. 
4 The World Health Organization. “The World Health Report 2002: Reducing Risks, Promoting Health 
Life”.  [http://www.who.int/whr/2002/Overview_E.pdf].  Accessed December 2002.  
5National Institute of Science and Technology, Advanced Technology Program, ATP Focused 
Program: Information Infrastructure for Healthcare, Advanced Technology Program Web site, 
[http://www.atp.nist.gov/atp/focus/iifhc.htm], February 2002. 
6 Levit, K., Smith, C., Cowan, C., et al. “Trends In U.S. Health Care Spending, 2001”, p.159. Health 
Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1. Jan – Feb 2003.  
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growth of hospital spending (a key driver of growth in total spending),7 and rising 
hospital wages, presumably to address the shortage of nurses8 and rising physician 
incomes.9  Health care spending grew 8.7 percent per capita in 2001.10 “The sharp 
increase in the health share of the gross domestic product (GDP) from 13.3 percent in 
2000 to 14.1 percent in 2001 was due…to slower economic growth resulting from the 
recession that began in March 2001 and that was exacerbated by the September 2001 
terrorist attacks.”11 2001 was the “fifth straight year that growth in spending exceeded the 
previous year’s rate. This long period of accelerating annual spending growth is in stark 
contrast to the mid-1990’s.”12  
It was during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s that the rapid growth of healthcare 
costs saw the evolution of the managed care system and HMOs. An HMO can be defined 
as “an entity that provides, offers or arranges for coverage of designated health services 
needed by plan members for a fixed, prepaid premium.”13 HMOs served to act as both 
the health insurer and the health care delivery system.14  These organizations were able to 
hold down the costs of medical care primarily by getting health care providers to take 
discounted payments, reducing the numbers of hospital admissions, and decreasing the 
lengths of stay while patients were hospitalized. HMO’s were “gatekeepers” to those 
individuals who would seek health care and ideally served to only allow those who truly 
needed care inside the health system.  This system of providing care to the nation seemed 
to have immediate results in terms of reducing expenditures on health care. But “it is 
clear, however, that managed care’s ability to constrain payment rates for and use of 
                                                 
7 Strunk, B. C., Ginsburg, P.B., Gabel, J. R. “Tracking Healthcare Costs: Growth Accelerates Again in 
2001”, Health Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 6. September 2002. 
[http://www.healthaffairs.org/1130_abstract_c.php?ID=http://www.healthaffairs.org/Library/v21n6/s3.pdf] 
8 Strunk, et al. 
9 Ball, et al.  
10 Levit, K., Smith, C., Cowan, C., et al. “Trends In U.S. Health Care Spending, 2001”, p.154. Health 
Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1. Jan – Feb 2003. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Joint Interim Committee on Managed Care, Glossary of HMO Terms 
[http://www.senate.state.mo.us/mancare/terms.htm].  Accessed November 2002. 
14 Wagner, Eric R., “An Overview of Managed Health Care,” In The Managed Care Handbook, edited 
by Peter R. Kongstvedt, M.D., Gaithersburg, Maryland: Aspen Publications, Inc., July 1996. 
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hospital services has diminished.”15  The nation is once again looking for the tools to 
assist in cost containment and also improving the efficiency and effectiveness of our 
delivery methods.  
Using this national context, we begin to explore the health system of the 
Department of Defense. 
3. Department of Defense Health Care Trends   
The Military Health System (MHS) falls under the auspices of the Assistant 
Secretary for Defense–Health Affairs.  This agency is responsible for the organization, 
infrastructure, personnel, readiness, and execution of military health care to all eligible 
beneficiaries. The mission of the MHS states that it will support “the Department of 
Defense and our nation’s security by providing health support for the full range of 
military deployments and sustaining the health of members of the Armed Forces, their 
families, and others to advance our national security interests.”16 These beneficiaries 
include the active duty forces, their family members, retirees, and their family members.  
The beneficiary population of the MHS today numbers roughly 8.2 million men, women, 
and children.17   
The annual budget for the MHS was approximately $23.9 billion dollars in 
2002,18 which includes a one-time charge of $4 billion dollars for the TRICARE For Life 
Initiative. The Defense Health Plan (DHP), which includes military medical care, makes 
up over 10 percent of the DoD’s operation and support costs and represents the fastest-
growing segment of this spending category.19 The Congressional Budget Office projects 
that annual medical spending will almost double from $33 billion to $55 billion between 
2007-2020.20 “Many of the same forces that cause national health expenditures to rise – 
                                                 
15 Strunk, et al.  
16 MHS Strategic Plan. 1999. 
17 Ball, M.J., Beaulieu, D., Douglas, J.V., Ramsaroop, P. Advancing Federal Sector Health Care: A 
Model for Technology Transfer, p.17. Springer, New York. 2001. 
18 Franco, Rich. “MPN 101: Medical Manpower and THCSRR Processes Briefing”. 
[http://www.changearchitect.com/manpower/PlenaryPresentations/THCSRRReadiness.ppt]. Accessed 
December 2002. 
19 Congressional Budget Office Study, “The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans,” p. 
22. January 2003.  
20 Ibid.  
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an increase in the volume of health care services available and expanded use of new, 
high-cost drugs and procedures – translate into higher military medical costs.”21 This 
increasingly high cost of health care is a focal point for decision makers in the military 
and in Congress.  
Adding to the complexity of the largest and most diverse health care organization 
in the world, the MHS has two unique and overlapping missions in the delivery of health 
care.  The first mission, commonly referred to as the “readiness” mission, is the primary 
reason the uniformed medical establishment exists. This mission supports the active duty 
forces in time of war, ideally - where and when that care is needed. They  provide routine 
medical care to the active duty forces who are in the fleet, in the field, or forward 
deployed. 
The second mission, commonly referred to as the “peacetime benefit” mission, is 
where the bulk of MHS’s resources go every year. This operation is accomplished daily 
in both the familiar collection of “brick and mortar” military facilities, known as Military 
Treatment Facilities (MTFs) here in the U.S. and abroad. Additionally, this mission also 
occurs in civilian health care institutions under the oversight of the managed care plan 
called TRICARE, formerly known as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). This peacetime mission is responsible for the care of 
beneficiaries that includes active duty members, their family members, retirees and their 
family members and is codified by Title 10 U.S. Code Armed Forces.  
These two missions, the readiness and peacetime missions, are not mutually 
exclusive nor are they perfect complements of each other for reasons that we will explore 
later. Furthermore, these missions can be competing entities, which add to the labyrinth 
of intra and inter-organizational relationships and increase the challenges of meeting both 
missions simultaneously. To underscore these relationships, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Health Affairs), Dr. William Winkenwerder, Jr. outlines the vision of DoD 
(HA) as “A World-Class Health System That Meets All Wartime and Peacetime Health 
and Medical Needs for the Active Military, Their Families, and Retirees.”22 
                                                 
21 Ibid. p. 23.  
22 Winkenwerder, Jr. William. Briefing “Vision and Priorities 2002.”  
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a. TRICARE and Force Health Protection 
During the 1980’s, many of the same financial pressures and cost 
containment issues that were straining the national health care systems were also 
affecting the Department of Defense (DoD) and the MHS. Since Congressional approval 
in 1943 of maternal and infant care for family members of active duty personnel,23 the 
health care benefits of family members provided by the MHS have increased. The early 
1980’s saw the beginning of the military buildup under the Reagan administration. The 
civilian sector was just beginning to dabble in the managed care arena and the DoD was 
beginning to put pressure on the MHS to tighten its budget. Observing the successes in 
the civilian market with managed care, and in response to these rising costs, 1982 saw the 
implementation of CHAMPUS Reform Initiatives (CRI) 24. These initiatives were a 
series of “experiments” for the MHS to assess the viability of a different health care 
system that emphasized improved access to medical care while behaving in a more 
fiscally responsible way to handle the health care needs of the DoD.  These trials were 
largely successful and by 1992, TRICARE was implemented as the MHS’s HMO to 
provide care for its beneficiary population.  Though there were a number of initial 
problems with TRICARE, the system that is currently in place is largely meeting the 
needs of its beneficiaries through improved access to care, portability initiatives25, and 
cost containment.  
Today, TRICARE is a regionally based managed care system, using Tri-
Service assets (military and contractor assets) and attempts to combine best business 
practices along with innovative and evidence based clinical patient management 
approaches to deliver care to its constituents. TRICARE offers beneficiaries the choice of 
three health plans and is operated through a worldwide network of approximately 91 
hospitals and 374 clinics.26 The MHS employs roughly 106,000 active duty military 
                                                 
23 Barbour, G. Briefing: “The Federal Sector of American Medicine: History & Services, Present and 
Future.” Health Services Administration Web Site. 
[http://hsa.usuhs.mil/pmo526/slides/526.02.GB.02Fed_Prgms.ppt]. Accessed November 2002.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Portability initiatives is the term used to describe a uniform benefit, i.e., no matter where you live in 
the U.S. and no matter what TRICARE contractor is providing your care, the health benefits are the same. 
26 Ibid. 
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personnel and 48,000 civilian personnel to operate and maintain this large medical 
establishment.27 These totals do not include the number of contract employees as a part 
of MHS.  
One of the primary focal areas for the MHS is Force Health Protection 
(FHP). Force Health Protection is the United States military’s medical doctrine. “The 
goal of FHP is to provide a fit and healthy force when and where the mission requires it 
while simultaneously adapting the medical forces to be more technologically advanced, 
smaller, and more mobile.”28  The three pillars of FHP include the development of a 
“healthy and fit force, casualty prevention, and casualty care and management.”29 
Casualty prevention and casualty care and management are two aspects of this thesis that 
will be explored further from a service level perspective.  
A second priority of the MHS is improving the performance of the 
TRICARE health program. The DoD is interested in improving access to healthcare and 
standardizing the use of business practices to optimize the utilization of resources. 
Because of the high costs associated with the delivery of health care, DoD has a 
responsibility to provide high quality health care in a cost efficient manner. In order to do 
so, MHS’s performance must be measured against various metrics and goals that are 
commonly accepted and used in the civilian sector. There is currently a tremendous effort 
underway to improve the efficiency and delivery of medical care by improving the 
business practices of TRICARE. 
One of the cornerstones of efficiency improvement and reforms made in 
access to medical care has been the concept of the primary care manager (PCM). The 
concept of PCM is designed to assign TRICARE beneficiaries a specific medical 
provider (PCM) who will provide primary oversight and continuity of health care and 
ensure that the level of care provided is of the highest quality. The relationship developed 
between patients and their PCM is the basis for successful prevention-oriented, 
coordinated healthcare. The PCM is a part of the military’s optimization initiative for 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Force Health Protection – A Capstone Document. Medical Readiness Division, J-4, The Joint Staff. 
[http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/pdfs/capstone.pdf]. Accessed September 2002. 
29 Ibid. 
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MTFs. Optimization aims to utilize best managed healthcare practices, to include 
preventive measures, clinical practice guidelines and case management. Patients reap 
benefits from consistent healthcare and improved overall health. 
4. Overview of Navy Medical Department 
As a “sub-system” of the Department of Defense MHS, the Navy has its own 
medical department managed by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. This organization 
is commonly referred to as “Navy Medicine”. The Navy Medical Department is a diverse 
and comprehensive worldwide healthcare system that delivers quality care to 
approximately 700,000 active duty Navy and Marine Corps members. The total 
beneficiary population eligible to receive health care in this system, including active duty 
members, is almost 2.6 million strong.30 The Navy states that it provides this care at 
“little more than half the national per capita average cost”31 while maintaining 
capabilities to provide medical care in support of Navy and Marine Corps missions. 
There are over 35,000 men and women who make up the total force of the Navy 
Medicine organization.  Approximately 11,000 active duty personnel make up four 
officer corps: Nurse Corps, Medical Service Corps, Dental Corps, and Medical Corps and 
over 24,000 enlisted personnel that include both Hospital Corpsmen and Dental 
Technicians.  The Navy has three large Naval Medical Centers, 22 Naval Hospitals, 11 
Naval Medical Clinics, and 28 Branch Medical Clinics all over the world to serve their 
beneficiaries.32 Navy Medicine also delivers health care onboard submarines, ships, 
aircraft, and in the field. During contingency operations, the Navy can also man two T-
AH Hospital Ships, six active Fleet Hospitals, and various other Marine and Navy 
platforms. 
The mission statement for Navy Medicine incorporates DoD’s Force Health 
Protection doctrine, indicating its commitment to “promote, protect, and restore the 
health of our sailors and Marines, families, retired veterans and all others entrusted to our 
                                                 
30 Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Home Page. [https://bumed.med.navy.mil/]. Accessed December 
2002. 
31  Ibid. 
32 Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Web Site: Worldwide assignments. 
[http://navymedicine.med.navy.mil/med00nc/duty.htm]. Accessed December 2002.  
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care, anytime, anywhere.”33  Force Health Protection (FHP), as the DoD’s military 
medicine doctrine, is a comprehensive medical strategy that “describes the integrated 
preventive and clinical programs that are designed to protect the ‘total force’.”34 FHP 
provides for a unique change in the conventional methods of combat medicine in that it: 
• Institutes programs to develop and support healthy and fit service 
members and families 
• Emphasizes prevention of injury and illness while maintaining an 
exceptional casualty management system 
• Employs concepts that call for only essential care in the theater and 
evacuation to definitive care outside the theater of operations35 
Figure 1 below, taken from the Navy Medicine Strategic Plan, shows the model 
that Navy medicine uses to illustrate its strategic focus. With FHP being the overarching 
strategy, the three pillars of Readiness, People, and the Health Benefit support this 
strategy.  
 
Figure 1.   Navy Mission is Force Health Protection 
Source: Navy Medicine Strategic Plan 2003 
                                                 
33 Navy Medicine Strategic Plan. [https://bumed.med.navy.mil/ Navy Medicine Strategic Plan 
2003.doc]. November 2002. Accessed December 2002.  
34 Force Health Promotion: Capstone Document. Medical Readiness Division, p. 1. J-4, The Joint 
Staff. No Date. 
35 Ibid.  
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The Readiness pillar represents Navy Medicine’s “readiness to support 
wartime/contingency operations”36 anytime, anywhere. This is no small commitment, 
requiring significant resources to be implemented. The middle pillar represents the 
People of Navy Medicine. The presence of this pillar signifies recognition of the 
importance of and requirement for meeting the career and personal needs of military, 
civilian, and contract personnel in accomplishing Navy Medicine’s mission of FHP. 
Factors that are a part of this pillar include professional development, skill utilization, 
and career progression. Ultimately, the second pillar signifies the importance of job 
satisfaction and training to meet the requirements placed upon Navy Medicine. The third 
pillar represents the Health Benefit of Navy Medicine.  By focusing on improving health 
and avoiding illnesses, improving access to care and effectively communicating with the 
customer, the Health Benefit pillar enables Navy Medicine “to focus on managing the 
health of a defined population of enrollees.”37 
These pillars are supported by the foundation of Navy Medicine’s model as found 
in the Best Business Practices and Readiness – Optimization – Integration (ROI) 
platform. The platform of Best Business Practices recognizes the need to operate an 
organization that uses its resources in an efficient and effective manner. Sound business 
practices will assist in ensuring that Navy Medicine is getting the best value for its 
dollars. As outlined in the previous section, costs are a primary consideration when 
looking at the value an efficient and effective health system provides to its beneficiaries. 
In this era of cost consciousness, Navy Medicine has embraced the importance of 
functioning in a constrained environment and seeks to maximize its effectiveness. 
Ideally, these business practices directly support the entire Navy Medicine enterprise by 
integrating its full spectrum of responsibilities including “clinical care, forward-deployed 
medical care, education and training, research and development, finance, logistics, 
information management, facilities maintenance and administration.”38 
 
 
                                                 
36 Navy Medicine Strategic Plan. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
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5. Navy Medicine’s Dual (Competing?) Mission 
The words “anytime, anywhere” in Navy Medicine’s mission statement hints at 
the complexities and challenges that can underlie a health care system with such a diverse 
mission.  The Navy Medical Department has two unique and somewhat overlapping 
missions in the provision of health care to eligible beneficiaries. In the Strategic Plan 
mentioned above, the statement “the military medical departments exist to support their 
combat forces in war; and in peacetime, to maintain and sustain the well being of the 
fighting forces in preparation for war” highlights the breadth and diversity of obligations 





Figure 2.   Navy Medicine’s Dual Mission 
Source: Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirements Briefing39 
 
The first mission for Navy Medicine is the Readiness Mission. This mission, from 
the broad perspective, stems from the National Security Strategy (NSS). From a more 
focused context, military medicine, and consequently, Navy Medicine, further supports 
the NSS and ultimately the combat forces based upon the National Military Strategy that 
                                                 
39 Melody, B.T. “Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirements (THCSRR) Update Briefing”. 
Sent to author via email. November 2002. 
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outlines a war scenario defined by two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs). 
This activity is primarily a surgically intensive forward deployed mission and includes 
“mobilizing two hospital ships, supporting the fleet and the Marine Corps’ operations 
ashore and afloat, [and] numerous fleet hospitals.”40  
The second mission for Navy Medicine is the Benefit Mission. This mission, 
required by law, is provided to service members, their families, and retirees and their 
families and utilizes the majority of resources that are “consumed” each day in Navy 
Medicine.  This mission most frequently occurs in the familiar MTF’s and clinics here in 
the United States and abroad and most resembles the HMOs described in the previous 
section. The Benefit Mission emphasizes population health initiatives, health promotion 
and wellness programs, and is community, work center, and primary care based.   
Figure 2 illustrates the somewhat overlapping nature and continuum of the two 
missions described above. “Navy Medicine arrives at the ‘right size’ based on the number 
of active duty medical personnel required to meet both the wartime and the day-to-day 
operational requirements of the fleet and Fleet Marine Force.”41  These readiness and 
peacetime roles do not exist in isolation or apart from each other. The degree or extent to 
which these two missions overlap in terms of personnel, financial, training, and material 
resources would indicate possible “savings” and efficiencies within Navy Medicine. 
Ideally, these two missions would work hand in hand and line up directly above 
one another using the Dual Mission model in Figure 2. But because of the diverse nature 
of the mission and budgeting considerations, these missions do not necessarily support 
each other.  Former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Dr. Sue Bailey 
dubbed the MHS as “the only HMO that goes to war.”42  This statement goes a long way 
in explaining the potentially confusing nature, roles, and responsibilities of Navy 
Medicine.  With the advent of managed care, there has been an increased focus on Force 
Health Protection measures that emphasize health promotion and prevention strategies. 
                                                 
40 Weber, Timothy H., “The THCSRR Model – Determining Navy Medicine’s Readiness Manpower 
Requirements.” p. 19. Navy Medicine. September – October 1994. 
41 Savitsky, M.S., LeDonne, D.M., “Maximizing the Mission of Medical Readiness in a Joint 
Environment: A Systems Model.”, p. 21. Navy Medicine, May-June 1995. 
42 TRICARE Region Nine Newsletter. News At Nine, p. 3. Vol. 4, Issue 2. Spring 1999. 
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The MHS Optimization Plan states “Most importantly, our focus will shift from 
providing primarily interventional services to better serving our beneficiaries by 
preventing injuries and illness, improving the health of the entire population while 
reducing the demand for the much more costly and less effective tertiary treatment 
services.”43  
While this focus may have benefits in terms of cost avoidance and improved 
overall health for our military members, there is concern that the day-to-day operations of 
providing peacetime medical care do not adequately prepare the Navy in its ability to 
grant optimal care in the surgically intensive environment a wartime scenario is likely to 
produce.  While peacetime care is vital, it “does little to prepare military medical 
personnel for war.”44 
The vast majority of medical care provided in the Navy is centered on its Primary 
Care portals. Primary Care focuses on promoting healthy lifestyles and providing routine 
clinical preventive services. This focus makes good business and clinical sense from the 
managed care perspective and is the “bread and butter” of military medicine. There is a 
seemingly large disparity between the day-to-day functions of primary care in fixed 
MTF’s as compared to the surgically intensive focus of battlefield medicine in mobile, 
austere environments. The Navy does not possess a single Level I Trauma Center in its 
entire hospital system (a trauma facility  that is accredited and fully staffed by surgical 
and support personnel 24 hours a day). Leitch, et al assert that “we are failing to train 
them [military medicine] in peacetime for the tasks of war, and there is an urgent need to 
address the problem using all available resources.”45   
Further complicating the matter, with new legislative requirements to initiate the 
TRICARE for Life program, the MHS is now responsible to provide medical care for 
Medicare-eligible uniformed service retirees and family members, including 
widows/widowers. Billed as “the most sweeping improvements to the Department of 
                                                 
43 MHS Optimization Plan: Interim Report, p. 1. February 1999. 
[http://www.tricare.osd.mil/mhsophsc/mhs_supportcenter/Library/MHS_Optimization_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 
November 2002. 
44 Leitch, R. A., Moses, G. R., Magee, H. “Simulation and the Future of Military Medicine,” Military 
Medicine, p. 350 Vol. 167, April 2002. 
45Ibid. 
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Defense’s healthcare system in nearly 30 years”46, TRICARE for Life places another 
responsibility and resource consumer on the MHS that from the outset has limited and 
competing obligations.  
The age base of the population that the MHS serves is getting older. One 
implication of this may be a widening disparity between the type of medical care seen in 
the MTFs on a regular basis and that which may be required on the battlefield. Figure 3 




Figure 3.   Beneficiary Population Change FY 1995-2007 
Source: MPN 101: Medical Manpower and THCSRR Processes Briefing47 
 
Previous studies confirm that the clinical experience “at military hospitals is 
essentially non-existent and inadequate for maintaining current clinical competence in 
                                                 
46 TRICARE for LIFE Fact Sheet. [http://www.tricare.osd.mil/tfl/pdf/TFLEnglish.pdf]. Accessed 
January 2002.  




trauma surgery.”48  The Navy has excellent medical centers that serve as first-rate 
training institutions for new physicians and graduate medical education programs. These 
training institutions, as stated by the Surgeons General, help to attract and retain military 
physicians. However, the competing nature of operational medical training (if the 
physician is out in the field training, then he is not in the hospital seeing patients) “makes 
it difficult for many resident and staff physicians to prepare adequately for war-related 
conditions.”49 The overlap between the day-to-day medical care and wartime medical 
care may be decreasing due to the new emphasis on health promotion and prevention 
strategies, thus translating to a decreased ability to meet the medical needs in the 
battlefield environment. This research will attempt to quantify and characterize this 
difference through basic workload measures and staffing data.  
 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the use of unclassified materials. This 
thesis will provide background information on the Navy Medicine force structure related 
to manpower.  This thesis will also include an examination of workload measures as they 
relate to the clinical settings in Navy Medicine.  Additionally, a statistical trending and 
description of Navy Medicine’s clinical workload and force structure over the past few 
years will be reviewed.  Lastly, a discussion of potential medical readiness implications 
based on the findings of this research will be addressed. 
 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps. 
 
• Conduct a comprehensive literature search of books, journal articles, and 
Internet based materials. 
• Conduct a comprehensive review of government reports concerning 
military medicine, force structure initiatives, TRICARE implementation, 
                                                 
48 Knuth, Thomas E. “The Peacetime Trauma Experience of U.S. Army Surgeons: Another Call for 
Collaborative Training in Civilian Trauma Centers”. p. 141 Military Medicine.  March 1996. 
49 Smith, A.M., Petersen, H.V. “Matching Fleet Medical Readiness to the New Naval Strategy”, p. 27. 
Naval War College Review, Winter 1997. 
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optimization efforts, and Department of Defense Directives for the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, among others.    
• Conduct interviews to gain critical insight and understanding of current 
government policy governing the roles of the Department of Defense-
Health Affairs, TRICARE initiatives and Optimization Projects, Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery and other military health care organizations as 
necessary.  
• Evaluate clinical workload data as supplied by the Department of Defense-
Health Affairs, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Naval Medical 
Information Management Center, and others as needed.   
• Analyze the above data, looking for trends, statistical significance, and 
interpreting results to provide implications for changes to manpower/billet 
structure, training needs, and measures of readiness. 
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question: 
• Has there been a change in wartime-relevant medical workload and 
medical staffing over last decade, impacting medical readiness? 
Secondary Research Questions: 
• What is the role of Navy healthcare in peacetime and wartime? 
• How is workload measured and reported in Navy Medicine? 
 
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This research looks only at the Navy Medical Department officer communities. 
The vast majority of personnel in Navy Medicine are enlisted personnel. These 
individuals are a critical element to consider in a comprehensive evaluation and overall 
assessment of medical readiness of Navy Medicine. No attempt was made in this study to 
consider the enlisted force, its training, roles, and responsibilities.  Furthermore, the 
scope of this study is extremely broad and therefore the applicability of the results will 
need further refinement in order to useful. Additionally, this research does not consider 
the significant and vital role that the Reserve Forces play in the augmentation and support 
of the wartime mission for Navy Medicine. Another limitation of this study is that the 
effects of various training programs and exchange initiatives with civilian institutions 
have not been considered. Lastly, medical readiness can be viewed from many differing 
17 
and valid perspectives. Typically, peacetime care is not used as a measure of medical 
readiness for wartime scenarios. This thesis is taking into consideration only two 
measures important in its assessment of readiness: (1) Volume and type of workload and 
(2) military staffing trends.  Conclusions and recommendations are based on these 
measures and should not be construed as a final, prescriptive analysis.  
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II will explore and describe the methodology and systems used to 
measure workload incurred by Navy Medicine’s Benefit Mission and describe these 
measurements. This will include a historical trending of the type of workload over the 
last four years and a statistical description of how this has changed. Additionally, Chapter 
II will do a comparative analysis of the type of workload (e.g., surgical vs. medical) seen 
in Navy Medicine’s MTFs.  
Chapter III will describe and analyze the staffing of Navy Medicine’s Officer 
Corps, focusing primarily on the Medical Corps and Nurse Corps.   A central area of 
examination will scrutinize the surgical specialties and “wartime” critical specialties of 
the various Corps.  This will be contrasted to the more typical “peacetime” specialties 
and manning changes over the last few years. 
Chapter IV will build on the previous two chapters, bringing together a 
comprehensive picture of workload and staffing changes and how they complement each 
other or diverge in the overall mission of preparing the Navy medical establishment for 
wartime. 
Finally, Chapter V will discuss conclusions reached from this study, including 
any recommendations and observations concerning the findings found in previous 
chapters. Lastly, possible future implications for Navy Medicine and its force structure 
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II. CLINICAL WORKLOAD TRENDS IN NAVY MEDICINE 
A. OVERVIEW 
According to the Department of Defense (DoD) Medical Readiness Strategic Plan 
(MRSP) 2001, the definition of Medical Readiness should be stated as…. 
… the ability to mobilize, deploy and sustain field medical services and 
support for any operation requiring military services; to maintain and 
project the continuum of healthcare resources required to provide for the 
health of the force; and to operate in conjunction with beneficiary 
healthcare.50 
While the MRSP is no longer an active document used by the DoD, the above 
definition serves as a starting point for a discussion of medical readiness. The topic of 
medical readiness is an extensive and complicated subject that comes in a variety of 
flavors, mixes and perspectives.  According to Richard Doyle, “Medical readiness cannot 
be considered in a vacuum. It is inextricably linked to broader readiness issues affecting 
the entire force structure and the doctrine, strategy and tactics designed to employ it.”51  
Therefore to discuss medical readiness in a narrow context from the outset is somewhat 
naïve.  
Navy Medicine does not view “medical readiness” through a “peacetime lens,” 
i.e., readiness is not measured using peacetime metrics as an indicator of our ability to 
meet the wartime mission. However, with the increasing cost of medical care, and the 
excess capacity that Navy Medicine maintains to meet wartime scenarios, it seems 
increasingly important that the type of work that Navy Medicine performs during 
peacetime be relevant and pertinent to justifying this excess capacity. With this 
realization, this research will begin to explore medical readiness from the perspective that 
the quantity and quality of work performed in the Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) is 
an important factor in assessing medical readiness.  This means that the amount and type 
                                                 
50 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs, Medical Readiness Strategic Plan (MRSP) 2001, 
DoD 5136.1-P, March 1995. 
51 Doyle, R. B. “Readiness and Military Health Care After the Cold War”. Medical Readiness: 
Policies and Issues Web Site. [http://www.teleologic.net/IDEA/MR/MR_Home.htm]. Accessed November 
2002.  
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of work performed in Navy Medicine’s MTFs should ideally enhance the skills and 
talents of the individuals who are called upon to provide medical care in the forwardly 
deployed area of operations. This chapter will describe and analyze the historical 
workload seen in all of Navy Medicine’s MTFs. 
 
B. READINESS – WHAT IS IT? 
In his book Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, Richard Betts 
discusses Mobilization, Structural, and Operational Readiness as a continuum of 
readiness. He views readiness as a mix of speed and effectiveness and uses descriptors 
such as time horizon, potential capability, and actual capability as the measures for which 
readiness can be assessed.  Table 1 below presents this framework for further discussion. 
Table 1. Summary of Stages of Readiness 
Stage Time Horizon Potential Capability Actual Capability 
Unreadiness > Decade Latent Negligible 
Mobilization Readiness Years Incipient Embryonic/skeletal 
Structural Readiness Months / Weeks Organized < 100% of potential 
Operational Readiness Days / hours Realized 100% of potential 
Source: Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences52 
Mobilization Readiness, as a policy decision is viewed by Betts as the decision to 
maintain a peacetime economy with the potential to shift that economy to a wartime 
economy as the threat for war increases. The capability of this type of readiness is 
minimal, as only a small nucleus of full time members are in place to help constitute a 
bigger force as the need arises. This process could take years to build up to a full scale 
war machine, but is viewed to be a reasonable approach when considering the monetary 
costs associated with maintaining a more ready force. Structural readiness concerns mass 
as  “it is about how soon a force of the size necessary to deal with the enemy can be 
available.”53 Structural readiness denotes the number of personnel that possess a minimal 
                                                 
52 Betts, Richard K., Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences. p. 40. Harrisonburg, 
Virginia: The Brookings Institution, 1995. 
53 Ibid. p. 41.  
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acceptable level of training and competency.  Structural readiness answers the question 
of how effective the total force can be, if given enough time to “pull up its socks.”54 
Operational readiness is concerned with efficiency “and is measured in terms of how 
soon an existing unit can reach peak capability for combat.”55  The question for 
operational readiness for an organization becomes a matter of performance and the level 
of effectiveness given that there is “no time to pull up its socks.”56 
These various stages result in a continuum of readiness and are not without their 
associated costs. Tradeoffs occur when evaluating the capacity of the organization to 
expand, consumption of resources used by the organization, and the capability of units 
when measured against time. Using the continuum above, it is safe to say that 
Operational Readiness is the most monetarily costly form of readiness, as it uses up large 
amount resources with constant training, manning, and expenditures. The result is that 
you have a force that is always ready to go and able to provide the capability and capacity 
that a government may need.  
Conversely, the costs of Mobilization Readiness are much lower, as the 
consumption of resources is minimized. The consequence of this choice of readiness is 
that the size and capability of the military forces is severely limited. The time horizon 
needed to field an adequately sized force may exceed what is required for victory. The 
capability of the force is not yet determined and thus vulnerabilities exist for the 
governments which choose this stage of readiness.  
Ultimately, along this continuum of the stages of readiness, choices and tradeoffs 
must occur. It is within the confines of tradeoffs that the concept of medical readiness 
will be discussed.  
1. Medical Readiness 
An earlier study by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) laid the groundwork for 
this discussion on medical readiness. They provided two views of medical readiness. One 
view was the Health Readiness perspective that “involves maintaining the health of all 
                                                 
54 Ibid, p. 41.  
55 Ibid. p. 40.  
56 Ibid. p. 41.  
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types of military personnel.”57 This perspective is focused on the development of a 
healthy force in preparation for war. Ensuring that the military forces receive the proper 
preventive healthcare prior to battle is vital to a successful force.  Health Readiness is 
synonymous with the “benefit mission” discussed in the first chapter.  
The second view outlined by CNA is described as Care Readiness.  This view 
“involves the readiness of the caregivers themselves as well as all medical support 
personnel and equipment involved in providing care during military operations.”58  It is 
focused on the ability and preparedness of medical forces to deliver medical care during 
wartime and constitutes the area of concentration for this research.  Within this Care 
Readiness model, CNA provided seven differing perspectives with which to evaluate 
readiness. These perspectives included historical, mission planner, strategic planner, 
trainer, service, mobilization planner, and operator.  This thesis and this chapter look at 
medical readiness primarily through a historical perspective in that historical workload 
measures are considered as a basis for preparedness.  
While there is a vast array of discussion points, measurements and assessment 
tools designed to assign a value to “readiness,” the ability to provide a single tool that 
gives an overall perspective of medical readiness is beyond the scope of this research. 
According to CNA, “it is difficult to measure medical readiness directly.”59 There are a 
number of proxies and surrogates that are used to infer or calculate readiness, such as the 
working condition of equipment, completion of training milestones, resources allocated, 
and staffing levels. But these are only indirect measures of readiness. Possessing indirect 
measures is problematic in terms of being able to thoroughly analyze readiness.  
For example, if we use Readiness as a dependent variable and use staffing levels 
as an independent variable, then one would expect to see an increase in Readiness with 
increasing levels in staffing. In other words, there is a positive relationship between the 
two variables. But because staffing is an indirect measure of Readiness, it may not 
accurately reflect the true Readiness measure associated with a reduction in staffing. 
Staffing may be reduced because of technological innovations that actually improve 
                                                 
57 Horne, David E., TRICARE and Readiness. Center for Naval Analysis. p. 10.  1996. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. p. 6.  
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Readiness. But because staffing has decreased, the effect of technology is not considered 
and therefore a lower level of Readiness is mistakenly recorded.  
It is with this understanding of the limitations of indirect measures that the author 
decided to use peacetime workload as an indirect measure for medical readiness. The 
purpose of this chapter is to look at the quantity and quality (type) of workload performed 
in Navy MTFs during peacetime and trend these workload metrics between 1990 and 
2002. Some emphasis will be placed on historical surgical workload, as this is likely to be 
seen in forward deployed wartime scenarios. 
 
C. NAVY MEDICINE CLINICAL WORKLOAD 
Workload has been defined as “The total amount of work to be performed by an 
individual, a department, or other group of workers in a period of time.”60  The official 
Navy definition for workload is defined as “an expression of the amount of work, 
identified by the number of work units or volume of a workload factor (WLF), that a 
work center has on hand at any given time or is responsible for performing during a 
specified period of time.”61 Navy Medicine uses a variety of workload factors and 
information technology and decision support systems to help record uniform performance 
indicators, collect expense information by work centers and assist the organization to 
plan for and resource its personnel, business and material requirements.  
Just as “workload” has a broad definition, clinical workload can be defined by a 
number of variables and methods. Traditionally, the number of patient visits is used as a 
production measure for MTF inpatient and outpatient clinics and is used as a workload 
factor in determination of manpower requirements. While the volume of patients seen 
may serve as a starting point for workload determination, this method is remiss in that it 
does not consider factors such as the acuity and complexity of patients seen, the skill 
level requirements of the providers needed to adequately treat and care for these patients, 
the design and material condition of the facility, time required to see, treat and care for 
                                                 
60CancerWEB Project Website.  “On-line Medical Dictionary.” 
[http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/omd/index.html]. Accessed December 2002.  
61Chief of Naval Operations. Manual of Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures. 
OPNAVINST 1000.16J. p. B-19.   January 1998.  
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patients, resources consumed, procedures performed, etc. For this reason, weighting 
scales have been developed to help account for some of the differing variables that are 
found with patients seen at MTF’s.  
In the case of an outpatient visit in a surgery clinic, when looking strictly at 
volume or the number of patient visits, a telephone consult (when a doctor calls a patient 
at home to speak with them to discuss lab results, patient conditions, treatment options, 
etc.) counts as one patient visit.  Similarly, when a patient presents to the surgery clinic 
for an evaluation for possible surgery, a complete medical interview and history are 
obtained along with a full physical examination of the patient.  This also is counted as 
one patient visit.  Obviously the time, space, and “work” is greater for the patient visit at 
the clinic than for the phone consult, but both are counted as one visit. By weighting the 
different visits, the actual workload performed would be counted higher for the clinic 
visit when compared to the phone consult by the provider.  
What follows is a brief review of the data systems and records that were used to 
obtain data for this research. 
1. Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System (MEPRS) 
Across the services of the Department of Defense (DoD), each branch has its own 
health care system that is to some degree unique to its constituents. This uniqueness is 
intended to insure that each service’s health care requirements are met. But universally, 
the same standards of care and generally accepted practices are common to each service. 
Under the authority of DoD Directive 6000.12, “Health Services Operations and 
Readiness,”62 ASD (HA) indicated the need to update and standardize the reporting of 
expense and manpower data for fixed military and dental treatment facilities across the 
military services.   
As a result of this mandate, DoD, and consequently Navy Medicine, upgraded the 
use of the Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System (MEPRS) “to provide a 
uniform system of healthcare cost management.”63  MEPRS provides a cost assignment 
                                                 
62Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. DoD Directive 6000.12: Health Services 
Operations and Readiness. April 1996.  
63 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. DoD Directive 6010.13-M:  Medical Expense 
and Performance Reporting System for Fixed Military Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities.   p. 8. 
November 2001. 
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methodology, uniform reporting of personnel utilization data by work centers and 
detailed performance measures and expense classification by work centers.64 The overall 
purpose of MEPRS is to provide the decision makers of Navy Medicine and ultimately 
DoD with a “uniform system for managing and reporting on the fixed military healthcare 
delivery system.”65  
MEPRS can also assist managers at all levels because it enables quantitative data 
to be compared with actual performance objectives. Local decision makers can evaluate 
significant deviations from these objectives and take corrective actions. By having one 
uniform reporting system, DoD can compare across services, using the same metrics, 
definitions, and concepts with the confidence that “apples are being compared against 
apples.” This standardization allows for best business practices, efficiencies, manpower 
management, performance, and success stories to be shared across services, thus 
potentially improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the MHS.  It is important to note 
that MEPRS does not record the workload performed outside of the MTFs and dental 
facilities, thus the peacetime work performed in the field and on the ships or in the 
civilian sector is not recorded by MEPRS.  
MEPRS assigns workload based on a chart of functional cost code accounts. The 
assignment of workload to the various accounts is critical for the determination of 
resource allocation.  For example, the functional categories found in MEPRS are 
“…Inpatient Care, Ambulatory Care, Dental Care, Ancillary Services, Support Services, 
Special Programs, and Readiness.”66 These categories are further itemized into summary 
accounts and subaccounts. “An example of this hierarchical arrangement follows: 
 A Inpatient Care (functional category) 
 AA  Medical Care  (summary account) 
 AAA   Internal Medicine  (subaccount) 
 AAB   Cardiology  (subaccount)”67  
                                                 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid. p. 9. 
66 Ibid. p. 14. 
67 Ibid.  
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As you can see from the above description, the first level MEPRS code identifies 
the workload as occurring in the inpatient arena of the facility reporting the workload. 
The second level code further identifies the inpatient workload into a summary account 
that is identified as Medical Care.68  It is through this assignment process that “surgical 
workload” can be determined and trended over time. MEPRS data is available from 
multiple sources. Figure 4 below gives a good representation of the various IT systems 
and the flow of data that MEPRS can take. 
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Figure 4.   Various Sources for Obtaining MEPRS Data 
Source:  Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System/Expense Assignment   





                                                 
68 For full description and listing of MEPRS codes, see Appendix A-1.  
69 Bacon, R.K. “Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System/Expense Assignment System 
Brief.” May 2002. [http://www.pasba.amedd.army.mil/dqfas/Resources/MEPRSOverview.ppt]. Accessed 
December 2002.  
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2. Expense Assignment System, Version 4 (EAS IV) 
The Expense Assignment System, Version 4 (EAS IV) is the MHS’s decision 
support system that “provides comprehensive, timely, and accurate cost information to…  
mangers at all levels.”70  This system is the source for all cost data and provides all MTFs 
with a decision support tool to manage workload, personnel, and financial information.71 
“The EAS IV provides standardized reporting of workload, expense and manpower data 
to integrate day-to-day healthcare and resource management activities.”72  This system 
tracks data on a monthly basis and utilizes the Resource Based Relative Value Scale 
weighted data for a more accurate costing of resources.73  This system is integrated with 
MEPRS in the assignment of costs and is considered more accurate because of the ability 
to weight patient visits based on diagnosis and current procedural terminology (CPT) 
coding. Workload determination is derived from the Workload Assignment Module 
(WAM), which is a subsystem of the Composite Health Care System (CHCS).  EAS IV is 
the only system within MHS that combines clinical workload, labor hours and expenses 
to provide the MHS with a cost/unit of service produced.  
3. World Wide Report 
The World Wide Report (WWR) is a file that is updated monthly and is sent from 
each DoD MTF’s CHCS. The WWR file is used for workload reporting and bid price 
adjustment.74 The WWR file counts outpatient visits and inpatient dispositions by 
MEPRS codes and uses relatively simple business rules (e.g., it counts telephone consults 
the same as actual appointment visits.)75  This report contains only aggregate data and so 
no patient information is recorded.76 Each medical/dental command is responsible for 
exporting their WWR on a monthly basis. These reports are sent to the Navy Medical 
Information Management Center (NMIMC) in Bethesda, Maryland and the Military Data 
                                                 
70 Military Health System Health Care Reengineering Web Site. 
[http://www.tricare.osd.mil/hcr/downloads/01009.doc]. Accessed December 2002.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid.  
74 World Wide Report (WWR) Frequently Asked Questions Web Site. 




Repository (MDR).77 Ultimately, this information is downloaded into a system known as 
MHS Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (MHS MART or M2) so that all DoD 
MTF facilities may have access to the WWR.  
4. Standard Inpatient Data Record (SIDR) 
The Standard Inpatient Data Record (SIDR) takes data from the CHCS and 
provides a summary of inpatient admissions and dispositions at the MTF.78 The SIDR 
contains inpatient International Classification of Diseases-Ninth Revision (ICD-9) 
diagnostic coding, Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) and CPT coding.  Indirect 
methods of measuring workload and clinical skills utilization can be derived from the 
volume and types of patients seen in an inpatient setting and are used as a part of this 
research. All SIDR data received for this research was sanitized (no patient level data 
such as names, SSNs, dates of birth, etc.) prior to transmission via email. This data was 
received  in the format of an Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The data that was received was 
in aggregate form by fiscal year and was broken out by MTF. 
5. Standard Ambulatory Data Record (SADR) 
The Standard Ambulatory Data Record (SADR) is a daily file that obtains 
information that is exported from the Ambulatory Data Module. The data entry for the 
Ambulatory Data Module occurs at the clinic level by the provider seeing the patient and 
documents information such as names, social security numbers, dates of birth, ICD-9 
Codes, CPT codes, and MEPRS according to the medical service or clinic that sees the 
patient. “This information is used for third party billing, population health analysis and 
feedback, and resource sharing agreements.”79  All SADR data received for this research 
was sanitized (no patient level data such as names, SSNs, dates of birth, etc.) prior to 
transmission via email. This data was received in the format of an Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. The data that was received was in aggregate form by fiscal year and was 
broken out by MTF. 
 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Standard Inpatient Data Record (SIDR) Frequently Ask Questions web site. 
[https://131.158.50.247/reconcile/FAQ/DQSIDRFAQ.htm]. Accessed December 2002.  
79 Standard Ambulatory Data Record (SADR) Frequently Asked Questions web site. 
[https://131.158.50.247/reconcile/FAQ/DQSADRFAQ.htm#q2]. Accessed January 2003. 
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D. WORKLOAD AS DEFINED IN THIS RESEARCH 
In his editorial entitled Competence is a Habit from the January 2002 issue of the 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Dr. David Leach characterizes the 
acquisition of [clinical] skills as a developmental process, observing that “competence 
develops over time and is nurtured by reflection on experiences.”80  In that same issue of 
JAMA, Dr. Epstein and Dr. Hundert further define competence as the “habitual and 
judicious use of communication, knowledge, technical skills, clinical reasoning … in 
daily practice for the benefit of the individual and the community being served.”81 In this 
vein, the brothers and philosophers Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus described the Dreyfus 
Model of Skill Acquisition in 1980. This theory proposes that there is a continuum of 
skill development that occurs in 5 stages, beginning with Novice, moving next to 
Advanced Beginner, then Competent, and Proficient, and lastly as Expert.82  The Navy 
Nurse Corps and many other nursing programs around the country base their competency 
levels on this model of skill acquisition.83   
When defining “workload” in this research, it was felt that the volume of patients 
and quality (or types) of patients seen in Navy Medicine would serve as a proxy for a 
measurement of medical readiness. The old adage that “experience is the best teacher” is 
the premise for the analysis presented below. “Hands-on experience is undoubtedly the 
best method of maintaining clinical competence and must be factored into any objective 
measurement [of medical readiness].”84   “Most would agree that physician competence 
                                                 
80 Leach, D.C. “Competence is a Habit.” Journal of the American Medical Association. p. 243. 
January 2002.  
81 Epstein, R.M., Hundert, E.M. “Defining and Assessing Professional Competence.” Journal of the 
American Medical Association.  p. 226. January 2002.  
82 Benner P.  “The Dreyfus Model of Skill Acquisitions applied to nursing” In: Evans, N. Lewis, E. 
deProssse J, editors. From Novice to Expert, Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Practice. pp. 13-38. 
Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1984. 
83 McNamara, K.J., Schulman, C., Jepsen, D., Cuffley, J.E. “Establishing a Collaborative Trauma 
Training Program with a Community Trauma Center for Military Nurses.” International Journal of Trauma 
Nursing. p. 50. April-Jun 2001.  
84 Knuth, Thomas E. “The Peacetime Trauma Experience of U.S. Army Surgeons: Another Call for 
Collaborative Training I Civilian Trauma Centers”.  Military Medicine. p. 139. March 1996.  
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in the techniques of injury surgery is a key factor in maintaining readiness for the care of 
wartime casualties.”85 
1. Outpatient Visits and Hospital Admissions 
With this understanding in mind, and with the previously stated concern of a shift 
in focus to ambulatory practices, the first step was to garner information on the total 
number of patients seen in Navy Medical MTFs over the last ten years.  Data was 
requested and received from the NMIMC. Summary data for all facilities using the Navy 
Health Care Planning Matrix for Fiscal Year 1992-2002 was obtained through a Freedom 
of Information Act (FIOA) request to NMIMC requesting information on access to 
Health Care Annual Report (HCARE). Specifically requested was data from Fiscal Year 
1992 through 2002 and information that was contained in the Summary Tabs Report of 
HCARE. All years were received except for some data for FYs 1995 and 1998 that was 
reported as missing from NMIMC.86 Additionally, the complete summary for 1992 was 
not available. The Summary Tabs Report shows selected data from various IT systems 
used in Navy Medicine in a table format that allows for consistent measurement and 
comparison over time. A sample of the data contained in the Summary Tabs Report can 
be found in Appendix B.  
The first measurement that was evaluated was the catchment population for each 
Navy Medical Facility (in the continental U.S. and overseas).  The catchment area is 
defined by OASD (HA) as the five digit zip code zones whose geographic center lies 
within 40 miles of the center of the zip code zone in which the MTF is located.87 The 
catchment population is based on data projections that are primarily evaluating the 
number of eligible beneficiaries enrolled in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting 
System (DEERS), the total service POM active duty end-strength projections, projected 
estimates of retirees by age groups obtained from OASD (HA)/HB&P, and growth rates 
                                                 
85 Smith, A. M., Hazen, S. J. “What Makes War Surgery Different?” Military Medicine. p. 33. January 
1991.  
86 Email from LT Dorina Maris, FIOA Coordinator, NMIMC, dated November 7th, 2002.  
87 Naval Medical Information Center’s On-Line Health Care Annual Report Web Site. “Glossary”. 
[http://nhso.med.navy.mil/resource/homeport.htm]. Accessed November 2002. 
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of paid retirees as reported by the office of the DOD Actuary, adjusted for regional 
migration patterns computed from historical DEERS data.88   
With the “downsizing” of the military during the early and mid-90’s, it is 
important to consider the total number of persons whom are eligible to receive care at 
Navy MTF’s. Using the catchment population as a “pool” for the numbers of patients 
eligible to be seen in a given year, an index based on this population can be generated.  
Table two below shows the change in overall Navy Medicine Catchment Population over 
the last 10 years.  Note that the catchment population did not change according to the 
reports between the years 1993 and 1994. 
 
Table 2. Total Catchment Population by Fiscal Year for Navy Medicine 
 











Source:  HCARE  Report 
 
Figure 4 below is a graphical representation of Table 2 and shows the dramatic 
decrease in the number of beneficiaries eligible for medical care in Navy MTFs. One 
could hypothesize that the smaller the “pool” of eligible patients, the fewer the number of 
patients who will be seen in Navy Medicine over a given period of time. 




Figure 5.   Summary of Total Eligible Beneficiaries for Navy Medicine. 
 
From a high year in 1994-95 of 1,985,621 eligible beneficiaries in the catchment 
population to the year 2001 (1,559,248 persons), there was approximately a 27 percent 
decrease (426,373) in the numbers of persons eligible to be seen in Navy MTFs. 
Presumably, this number serves as an indirect indicator of the number of persons who 
exited the military and decreased accessions as a result of the “peace dividend” and 
military drawdown.  From the outset, over the last ten years, the total number of persons 
eligible to be seen in Navy MTFs has reduced by a substantial amount. Fewer eligible 
patients does not directly indicate that there were fewer patients seen in Navy MTFs, so 
further data is required to assess the number of patients seen in Navy Medicine. It is also 
important to consider that with the implementation of TRICARE for Life,  the catchment 
population would be expected to go up for 2002 and beyond which is not indicated here. 
The Summary Tab Reports also provide the total number of outpatient visits 
(OPV) and admissions (ADM), among other metrics, by facility in Navy Medicine.  An 
OPV is defined as counted for “each outpatient who presents himself/herself at an MTF 
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treated or observed in his home or quarters by medical personnel.”89 These OPVs are 
coded using the MEPRS format to assign workload and costing information for that type 
of outpatient visit. The Summary Tab Report does not break these visits out by codes. 
The data source for outpatient visits comes from the WWR. An ADM is defined as the 
“total number of patients admitted for treatment or observation in the hospital” and 
includes newborns.90 The source for this information also comes from the WWR.91   
It is important to note that these measures are considered “raw” measures (or 
simple counts) and are not weighted. Historically these un-weighted workload measures 
have been used in the MHS as the “gold standard.”  But they do not directly reflect output 
or productivity accurately in that they do not consider the consumption of resources, 
costs, or complexity of cases. These numbers do allow for following trends over time 
which is how they will be used in the context of this research. Table three below shows 
the raw metrics for all of Navy Medicine. Note that there is missing data from 1995 and 
1998 OPVs and 1998 ADMs.  
 
Table 3. Total Outpatient Visits and Admissions for Navy Medicine by Fiscal Year 
      Fiscal Year     Outpatient Visits         Admissions 
1992 6,595,977 190,789 
1993 6,697,299 183,870 
1994 7,311,829 175,255 
1995 Missing 159,888 
1996 6,943,850 151,347 
1997 6,823,864 114,578 
1998 Missing Missing 
1999 5,501,744 89,021 
2000 5,114,154 95,395 
2001 5,111,078 93,162 
Average 6,262,474 139,256 
Source:  HCARE  Report 
 
                                                 
89 Naval Medical Information Center’s On-Line Health Care Annual Report Web Site. “Glossary”. 




The graph below clarifies the magnitude of change in the number of outpatient 

















Mean Outpatient Visits per Year
for 1992 -2001
 
Figure 6.   Total OPVs by Fiscal Year for Navy Medicine 
 
Looking at Figure 6 above, one notices that since 1994, there has been an overall 
decrease in the total number of OPVs by almost 1.5 million visits. This represents 
approximately a 23 percent decrease in the annual OPVs from 1992 to 2001. The 
decrease in OPVs may be in response to the decrease in the number of eligible 
beneficiaries over that same period of time. In order to more clearly evaluate the number 
of OPVs seen in Navy Medicine, it would be more appropriate to compare these numbers 
using the catchment population for that same year as base. The ratio of OPVs to the 
catchment population will serve as an index by which the OPVs can be more accurately 



































Figure 7.   Ratio of Total OPVs to Total Catchment Population by Fiscal Year 
 
When using this ratio, the number of OPVs by catchment population shows that 
the number of OPVs per catchment population (eligible beneficiary) averages about 3.6 
OPVs per year. One can also see the increase in the number of OPVs between 1993 and 
1996, followed by a sharp decrease in the number of OPVs through 2001. While these 
numbers alone are descriptive of the trend seen in Navy Medicine, they do not show 
causality. While this is beyond the scope of this thesis, I propose two theories here to 
explain these changes. As the drawdown in the military was instituted during the early to 
mid-1990’s, persons who were leaving the military were required to complete their out-
processing. Part of that process requires medical exams and evaluation to ensure that a 
healthy individual is leaving the service. This may partially account for the increase in 
OPVs.  
In addition, it was during the early to mid 1990’s that the implementation of 
TRICARE was in full swing and there was a push to proactively manage the health of the 
population that Navy Medicine served (in the same vein as a true Health Maintenance 
Organization). This effort placed an emphasis on preventive health care initiatives that 
encouraged beneficiaries to see their health care providers to become proactive 
participants in their health maintenance. Both of these events could have encouraged the 
increase in OPVs through 1996.  The steadily decreasing trend seen after 1996 may be 
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also explained by the implementation of TRICARE in that the TRICARE program’s 
different health plans allow eligible beneficiaries to be seen “outside” of the Navy’s 
MTFs in the civilian sector.  
Again this is conjecture, but may give a possible explanation as to why there has 
been a decrease in the number of OPVs per year per eligible beneficiary. In the final 
analysis, it appears that, on average, there are fewer patient visits (OPVs) in 2001, per 
eligible beneficiary in Navy MTFs when compared to 1992. 
Figure 8 below gives a graphical representation of the total admissions seen in 
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Figure 8.   Total ADM by Fiscal Year for Navy Medicine 
 
Similar to the OPVs, the total number of patient ADMs per year to Navy MTF’s 
has seen a decreasing trend over the last ten years. There were 97,627 fewer hospital 
ADMs in Navy Medicine when comparing 1992 to 2001. This represents over a 51 
percent decrease in the number of ADMs over this same time period when measured on 
an annual basis. This may be in response to the corresponding decrease seen in eligible 
beneficiaries (or catchment populations) seen in Table 2. To place these total numbers of 
ADMs on a more level playing field, a better method of annual comparison would be to 
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index the total yearly ADMs to the total catchment population.  Figure 9 below shows the 
ratio of ADMs per year to the catchment population. Said another way, Figure 9 shows 
the percentage of admissions to Navy MTFs per eligible beneficiary (person) by year. 
The mean ratio line indicates that on average, over the last 10 years, there have been 

































Figure 9.    Ratio of Total ADMs to Total Catchment Population by Fiscal Year 
 
Generally, not only has there has been a decrease in the raw number of hospital 
admissions in Navy Medicine as seen in Figure 8 above, but also there has been a 
decrease in the number of admissions per eligible beneficiary as seen in Figure 9. This is 
good from an economic and resource standpoint in that hospital admissions are expensive 
and require a lot of clinical, material and administrative resources.  But from a 
workload/readiness standpoint, the decrease in patient admissions may mean less 
experience for Navy Medicine’s clinical providers. In the context of this research, the 
decrease in workload per provider cannot be ascertained, as we have not yet evaluated the 
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force structure of Navy Medicine over this same time period. The next chapter will 
further analyze this issue. 
To summarize the above section, it was argued that to remain competent from a 
clinical perspective, it is important for practitioners to practice their trade. Using the 
Dreyfus Model as a guide, “moving from advanced beginner to competent means less 
detachment and greater immersion in particular contexts.”92  The information provided 
above illustrates that the “pool” of persons eligible for treatment in a Navy MTF within 
all of Navy Medicine’s Catchment Areas over the period from 1992 to 2001 has shrunk 
by almost 20 percent. A corresponding decrease in OPVs by approximately 23 percent is 
observed during this same time period. The overall decrease in ADMs during this same 
time frame was significantly different, with over 51 percent fewer admissions.  Figure 10 
































Figure 10.   Overall Comparison of the Change in Catchment Population, OPVs, and 
ADMs from 1992-2001 
  
This decrease in patient admissions suggests that the number of opportunities for 
clinical experience in the inpatient and outpatient arena has declined over the last decade, 
and consequently the chances to develop the skills that may be needed during wartime 
                                                 
92 Leach, D.C. “Competence is a Habit”. Journal of the American Medical Association. p. 243. 
January 2002. 
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and move along the continuum to being a more competent provider have also diminished. 
The problem here is that the “quality” or the type of workload (Internal Medicine 
Admissions vs. Surgical Admissions vs. Pediatric Admissions) has not been established.  
The next section will attempt to further “qualitize” or describe the type of inpatient or 
ADM workload seen from 1999-2002.  Because the same data could not be obtained 
prior to 1999, we will do a quick comparison of catchment population, OPVs and ADMs 
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Figure 11.   Overall Comparison of the Change in Catchment Population, OPVs, and 
ADMs from 1999-2001 
 
This shorter time period trend shows that the catchment population has increased 
by almost 2 percent, OPVs have decreased by 7 percent while hospital admissions have 
increased almost 5 percent.  It could be that this is shows a reversal in trends that were 
shown in Figure 10 above over the last decade.  This can serve as a starting point for 
further research. 
2.  Describing the Type of Workload Seen in the Inpatient Areas 
Data was requested from NMIMC that would identify the ADMs for Navy 
Medicine using MEPRS codes to identify where the workload was actually assigned for 
the years 1992-2001. Because of the technological difficulty (IT systems are different 
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now than what was used in years past) of obtaining data prior to 1999, I was only able to 
receive MEPRS data from 1999-2002. The data received breaks down the workload by 
three methods. The first two methods are raw workload measures and the third is a 
weighted workload measure. Raw workload measures usually represent outputs or simple 
calculations that are collected by the MTFs.  
The first measurement method is Total Dispositions – which is defined as “the 
removal of a patient from a hospital’s census by reason of discharge, transfer, death, or 
other termination of inpatient care.”93 The second measure is Days in Hospital, Total or 
Total Hospital Days which is the total number of days a patient is assigned to a specific 
MEPRS code (medical service or work center). Lastly the Relative Weighted Product 
(RWP) is the measure of workload “derived from biometric dispositions”94 and “is a 
measure of the relative resource consumption of a patient’s hospitalization as compared 
to that of other patients.”95   The source of this data comes from the Standard Inpatient 
Data Record (SIDR) as described in the previous section.  
With MEPRS coding, each workload measure is initially assigned a functional 
category, in this case “A” for Inpatient Care. A secondary summary account or second 
level MEPRS code is given for a summary account to further itemize the workload. A 
third level code can be assigned to decompose the workload to a specific clinical area or 
sub-account. As a starting  point, we will analyze the various workload measurements for 
the selected the inpatient summary accounts or second level MEPRS codes for Inpatient 
Medical Care (AA), Inpatient Surgical Care (AB), Inpatient Obstetrical and 
Gynecological Care (AC), Inpatient Pediatrics (AD), Inpatient Orthopedic Care (AE), 
and Inpatient Family Practice (AG).  The table below gives a summary of three workload 
indicators by second level MEPRS codes by Total Dispositions. 
 
 
                                                 
93 Coventry, J., et al. MHSS Workload Primer: Reference Guide to MHSS Workload Measurement 
Terminology. Systems Research and Applications (SRA) Corporation. 





Table 4. Summary of Inpatient Workload by Second Level MEPRS for Fiscal Years 
1999-2002 for Total Dispositions 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change, FY 99 - 02 
Medical Care (AA) 15,264 16,174 16,616 17,197 + 12.6 
Surgical Care (AB) 15,400 15,338 14,380 13,467 - 12.5 
OB/GYN (AC) 20,808 22,399 21,817 22,503 + 8.1 
Pediatrics (AD) 20,928 21,981 21,284 22,180 + 6.0 
Orthopedic Care (AE) 5,241 5,063 4,736 4,042 - 22.8 
Family Practice (AG) 10,077 10,653 11,210 11,463 + 13.8 
Other Dispositions 3,943 3,880 3,881 3,435 -12.8 

































Figure 12.   Total Number of Dispositions by Type of Medical Service 
An initial look at Figure 12 above clearly shows that the bulk of recorded 
dispositions occur in the OB/GYN and Pediatric work centers.  Also notice the close 
correlation between the two. This correlation occurs because these trend lines capture 
pregnant mothers for the OB/GYN work center and newborns for the Pediatric work 
center.  Generally, the patients seen in these areas are relatively healthy and once the 
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delivery is complete, and the newborn is stabilized, the workload is not intensive. This 
measure does not capture the intensity or weighted work associated with the care of new 
mothers and newborns, but merely the volume of work.  The majority of “Other 
Dispositions” listed above fall under psychiatric care and are not evaluated in this 
research.  
The other notable trend that is readily apparent is that all the work centers except 
for the Surgical Care and Orthopedic Care work centers appear to have either relatively 
flat or slightly increasing volume according to the raw measure of dispositions from FY 
1999 to 2002. This decrease in patient volume for the surgical services and orthopedic 
services may represent the continuing increasing trend towards surgical care being 
provided as outpatient surgeries, producing a decrease in the volume of inpatient 
admissions and dispositions related to the surgical conditions. 
In contrast to the previous measure of total dispositions, the measure of 
output/workload shown in Table 5 and Figure 13 for Total Hospital Days indicates that 
the Pediatrics and Medical Care services have patients who spent the most number of 
days in Navy hospitals for the years 1999-2002.  
 
Table 5. Summary of Inpatient Workload by Second Level MEPRS for Fiscal Years 
1999-2002 for Total Hospital Days by Type of Medical Service 
2nd Level MEPRS 
Code Description 1999 2000 2001 2002 
% Change,  
FY 99-02 
Medical Care (AA) 59,758 64,132 64,820 66,693 + 11.6 
Surgical Care (AB) 52,730 51,991 48,724 46,216 - 12.3 
OB/GYN (AC) 51,206 55,998 54,492 57,127 + 11.6 
Pediatrics (AD) 62,533 66,597 65,109 68,648 + 9.8 
Orthopedic Care (AE) 15,080 15,947 15,558 13,734 - 8.9 
Family Practice (AG) 23,680 25,162 29,087 26,260 + 10.9 
Other Hospital Days 29,283 27,279 24,210 19,930 -31.9 



























Figure 13.   Total Days in Hospital by Type of Medical Service 
 
Consistent with the previous measure of total dispositions, the only services that 
have a decreasing trend of total days in the hospital over the last four years are the 
surgical and orthopedic services. Again, this may be due to the trend toward outpatient 
surgery that would not be captured by this measurement.  In terms of patient care 
experience, further information would be needed to determine if the type of outpatient 
surgeries performed enhance the skills that would be necessary in treating the casualties 
of war. It can be inferred that because the number of surgical types of patients is going 
down, those who care for these patients (primarily the nurses and ancillary staff) in the 
inpatient areas will have less exposure and experience treating these types of patients. 
This may adversely affect the medical readiness of those individuals to treat surgical 
types of patients. 
The” Other Hospital Days” is primarily psychiatric hospital days. It can be seen 
that there has been a significant reduction in the number of days a psychiatric service has 
kept patients in the hospital.   
Lastly, as a weighted measure of workload for the inpatient area, the Relative 
Weighted Product (RWP) was used to identify trends.  Recall that the RWP is a measure 
of resource consumption of a patient’s hospitalization as compared to that of other 
patients and serves as a weighted measure that reflects patient complexity and the length 
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of stay. Table 6 and the figure below show the RWP for all of Navy Medicine from 1999-
2002. These values were rounded to the nearest whole number. 
 
Table 6. Summary of Inpatient Workload by Second Level MEPRS for Fiscal Years 
1999-2002 for Relative Weighted Product (RWP) by Type of Service 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change from FY 99-02 
Medical Care (AA) 17,754 18,996 18,669 19,766 + 11.3 
Surgical Care (AB) 22,156 21,148 19,725 18,225 - 17.7 
OB/GYN (AC) 12,418 13,331 12,885 13,226 + 6.5 
Pediatrics (AD) 10,962 11,610 10,347 10,809 - 1.4 
Orthopedic Care (AE) 7,079 6,779 6,371 5,705 - 19.4 
Family Practice (AG) 4,934 5,366 5,630 5,657 +14.7 
Other RWP  3,097 2,070 2,076 1,949 -37.1 






























This weighted measure of RWP provides an interesting contrast to the previous 
two un-weighted measures. When looking at the resources consumed and complexity of 
the patients, both the surgical and medical care workload consume more. As observed 
earlier, the OB/GYN and Pediatrics services may have more total dispositions, but when 
weighted against the type of patients, the most complex patients, on average, are seen by 
the surgical and medical services. Additionally, even this weighted measure shows a 
declining amount of inpatient workload (- 17.7%) over the four-year period of 1999-2002 
for the surgical services, which on this weighted scale, is more significant than the raw 
measures above. Also for Orthopedic Care, there has been a 19.4 percent decrease in the 
RWP over the four years described above. This may reflect technological advances and 
the medical policy decision to treat patients more on an outpatient basis. 
To summarize the above section that analyzed the trend of inpatient care in Navy 
Medicine from the years 1999 to 2002, it is clear, whether looking at simple, raw 
measures or weighted measures, that the only services that have seen a consistent 
decrease in inpatient workload are the Surgical and Orthopedic services. If mortality data 
from the Persian Gulf region are an indicator of incidence of injury, then 91.7 percent of 
deaths “occurred as a direct result of combat during the war”96 (39.5 percent) or from 
injuries not associated with battle (52.2 percent).  The types of traumatic combat 
casualties that are most likely to be encountered on the battlefield are those that would 
most require the skills of a general or orthopedic surgeon. “History has repeatedly 
demonstrated that 60 – 70 percent of surviving injuries from war are those of the 
extremities.”97 Additionally, the decrease in surgical inpatient admissions reduces the 
number of clinical experiences to which the nursing staff is exposed and may reduce 
opportunities to develop crucial clinical skills.  It would be a leap to say that this decrease 
in workload adversely impacts the medical readiness of Navy Medicine; however it is 
clear that there has been a decline in inpatient surgical workload and this may warrant 
                                                 
96 Writer, James, DeFraites, Robert, et al. Comparative Mortality Among U.S. Military Personnel in 
the Persian Gulf Region and Worldwide During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. p. 118. 
Journal of the American Medical Association. January 1996.  
97 Smith, A. M., Hazen, S. J. “What Makes War Surgery Different?” p. 35.  Military Medicine.  
January 1991. 
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further evaluation and analysis.  To see a summary of data used for this analysis, refer to 
Appendix C.  
To see what has happened in the outpatient arena in Navy Medicine from 1999-
2002, the following section will describe and analyze the workload experience of 
outpatients. 
 
3. Describing the Type of Workload Seen in the Outpatient Areas 
Data was requested from NMIMC that would identify the workload for outpatient 
clinics in Navy Medicine using MEPRS codes for the years 1992-2002. The current 
decision support system, MHS MART (M2) is only able to retrieve MEPRS data back to 
1999. Because of this constraint, I was only able to receive MEPRS data from 1999-
2002. The data received breaks down the workload by two methods. The first method is a 
raw workload measure, Visits, Raw, or Raw Visits, while the second measure is a 
weighted workload measure, Simple RVU.  
The first measurement method, Raw Visits, is defined as the “count of the number 
of visits encounter derived from the total treatment” during a patient visit.98 In simplistic 
terms, it is the number of times a patient visited a specific medical service or provider. 
This visit is recorded and the MEPRS workload data is assigned to that medical service. 
The second measure, Simple RVU, is the summation of all relative value units (RVUs) of 
all CPT codes in an encounter, with no adjustments of any kind.”99  An RVU “is used by 
Medicare and other third party payers to determine the comparative worth of physician 
services based on the amount of resources involved in furnishing each service.”100  Each 
procedure is described in the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) manual as outlined 
by the American Medical Association. This manual provides standardized, specific and 
descriptive details of each procedure and allow for consistent billing according to these 
                                                 
98 M2 Data Dictionary as of December 2002, Outpatient Tab. 
[http://eidsportal.ha.osd.mil:9999/hrnp$30000/EIDSPORTAL.HA.OSD.MIL:9999/Action/26011[portal]] – 
Accessed December 2002.  
99 Ibid.  
100 Daugird, Allan, “Call RVUs: One Way to Make Call More Equitable”, p. 32. Family Practice 
Management. June 2002.  
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CPT codes.101  The source of this data set comes from the Standard Ambulatory Data 
Record (SADR) as described in the previous section and represents all Navy MTFs for 
fiscal year 1999-2002. 
Similar to the inpatient side of workload measurement, there are MEPRS codes 
assigned to each “clinic” in the outpatient arena.  Each workload measure is initially 
assigned a functional category, in this case “B” for Outpatient Care. A secondary 
summary account or second level MEPRS code is given for a summary account to further 
itemize the workload. A third level and fourth level code is assigned to decompose the 
workload to a specific clinical area or sub-account. The data set from NMIMC was 
received in Microsoft Excel format, by fiscal year, by Navy Military Treatment Facility. 
This data was further organized into aggregate data by the second, third, and fourth level 
MEPRS codes by year for all of Navy Medicine. The resulting aggregation allowed for 
easy summation of total workload measures for the year by clinic. 
As a starting point, we will analyze the various workload measurements for the 
selected  outpatient summary accounts or second level MEPRS codes for outpatient. The 
table below shows the relationship between the MEPRS Code and the outpatient clinic. 
Table 7. Summary of Second Level MEPRS Codes by Treatment Service 
MEPRS Code Outpatient Clinic 
1. BA Medical Care 
2. BB Surgical Care 
3. BC OB / GYN 
4. BD Pediatrics 
5. BE Orthopedics 
6. BF Psychiatric and Mental Health 
7. BG Family Practice 
8. BH Primary Medical Care 
9. BI Emergency Medical Care 
10. BJ Flight Medicine Care 
11. BK Undersea Medical Care 
12. BL Rehabilitative Ambulatory Services 
Source: MEPRS Manual102 
                                                 
101 Ininns, Graham D., Applying Resource Based Relative Value Scales (RBRVS) to the CHAMPUS 
Program. p. 5. Masters Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California. December 1990.  
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Once the data was aggregated by year and second level clinic, a summary table 
was built to display this data by workload measures. The table below shows the summary 
table by Total Raw Visits.  Three MEPRS codes (BT, BX, and BZ) and associated data 
were left off of this table for evaluation as there was either little or no data for these 
clinics and there were no associated definitions for these clinics in the MEPRS Manual or 
the M2 Data Dictionary. 
 





Treatment Service Clinic 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change, 1999-2002 
BA Medical Care 645,953 744,270 858,287 932,298 44.3% 
BB Surgical Care 439,233 471,728 488,936 534,924 21.8% 
BC Obstetrical and Gynecological Care 468,506 451,306 507,397 559,001 19.3% 
BD Pediatrics Care 419,950 422,861 528,835 569,620 35.6% 
BE Orthopedics Care 315,429 355,854 333,636 375,505 19.0% 
BF Psychiatric and Mental Health Care 299,711 338,783 397,973 433,309 44.6% 
BG Family Practice Care 682,176 866,169 1,097,798 1,27,1845, 86.4% 
BH Primary Medical Care 2,662,081 2,568,472 2,766,248 2,923,320 9.8% 
BI Emergency Medical Care 402,376 425,843 478,793 499,797 24.2% 
BJ Flight Medicine Care 87,099 105,155 122,192 144,589 66.0% 
BK Undersea Medicine Care 18,589 30,153 42,268 43,544 134.2% 
BL Rehabilitative Ambulatory Services 421,924 475,132 520,907 544,585 29.1% 
 Grand Total 6,863,027 7,255,726 8,143,270 8,832,337 28.7% 
Source: SADR 
 
An initial glance at the table above reveals that every single outpatient clinic has 
experienced a double-digit increase in total visits from 1999-2002. Despite a relatively 
stable catchment population over the same time period, there has been a dramatic 
increase (28.7 percent) in the number of outpatient visits. This would possibly reflect the 
continuing trend toward the outpatient treatment and management of patients. So while 
the selected overall RWP for inpatients as described in the previous section for the same 
                                                 
102Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. DoD 6010.13-M:  Medical Expense and 
Performance Reporting System for Fixed Military Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities.   November 
2001. 
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time period has decreased by 4 percent, there has been a overall corresponding increase 
in outpatient visits by 28.7 percent.  
To look at a weighted version of this outpatient surgical workload, the table below 
shows the Sum of Simple RVU measure for this increase and how it differs from a raw 
measure.   MEPRS codes for which there was no definition or substantial data were 
eliminated from this summary table and not included in this analysis.  
 





Treatment Service Clinic 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change, 1999 - 2002 
BA Medical Care 724,379 857,642 969,421 989,827 36.6% 
BB Surgical Care 713,771 724,439 726,923 802,610 12.4% 
BC Obstetrical and Gynecological Care 739,273 751,212 924,360 877,371 18.7% 
BD Pediatrics Care 330,246 375,241 447,448 461,233 39.7% 
BE Orthopedics Care 433,542 479,357 449,759 501,544 15.7% 
BF Psychiatric and Mental Health Care 684,479 801,394 934,863 981,523 43.4% 
BG Family Practice Care 529,261 687,505 829,857 910,175 72.0% 
BH Primary Medical Care 2,401,035 2,491,319 2,696,294 2,638,552 9.9% 
BI Emergency Medical Care 412,437 444,508 501,642 534,175 29.5% 
BJ Flight Medicine Care 93,783 114,477 127,224 140,407 49.7% 
BK Undersea Medicine Care 21,454 30,627 35,518 21,772 1.5% 
BL Rehabilitative Ambulatory Services 464,020 564,883 691,494 709,276 52.9% 
 Grand Total 7,552,793 8,322,634 9,334,995 9,568,488 26.7% 
Source: SADR 
 
This table illustrates that, with the exception of Undersea Medicine, all outpatient 
service clinics have seen at least a ten percent increase in weighted workload. Particularly 
noticeable are the increases in the work centers BG, BL, BJ, BF, BD, BA, and BI.  These 
clinic areas have seen a 30 percent increase between 1999 and 2002.   
To drill down further, notice the 22 percent increase in surgical care as an un-
weighted measure and the 12 percent increase when using the weighted measure. From 
the information provided, it is not evident as to which specific surgical clinics are 
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providing the bulk of surgical care. In an effort to clearly identify the specific type of 
surgical care provided over this time period, an evaluation of the third level MEPRS code 
must occur. This will enable us to better understand the distribution of workload relative 
to overall surgical care. The table below looks at the how the surgical workload by Total 
Raw Visits in the various outpatient clinics was divided up from 1999-2002.  
 
Table 10. Sum of Total Raw Visits by 3rd Level MEPRS  Codes for                                 





Description of Surgical Clinic 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change  1999-2002 
BBA General Surgery Clinic 104,716 106,217 108,045 119,746 14.4% 
BBB Cardio/Thoracic Surgery Clinic 2,758 3,151 2,991 3,070 11.3% 
BBC Neurosurgery Clinic 11,681 11,280 17,111 20,726 77.4% 
BBD Ophthalmology Clinic 99,628 104,137 109,338 129,933 30.4% 
BBF Otolaryngology Clinic 109,055 120,652 119,463 115,146 5.6% 
BBG Plastic Surgery Clinic 10,992 17,840 20,245 18,110 64.8% 
BBH Proctology Clinic 2,283 2,166 2,791 2,277 - 0.3% 
BBI Urology Clinic 68,694 70,898 76,526 83,596 21.7% 
BBJ Pediatric Surgery Clinic 3,156 4,337 3,648 4,773 51.2% 
BBK Peripheral Vascular Surg Clinic 12,437 13,369 13,105 12,500 0.5% 
BBL Pain Management Clinic 13,753 17,679 15,673 18,874 37.2% 
BBM Vascular & Interventional Radiology Clinic 118  
BBZ Surgical Clinics Cost Pool 80 2 6,055 7468.8% 
  Grand Total 439,233 471,728 488,936 534,924 21.8% 
Source: SADR 
 
When looking at this data, it is important to look for some emerging trend. The 
third level MEPRS code of BBZ (Surgical Clinics Cost Pool) identifies a work center  
designated to capture workload metrics that cannot be assigned to any other work center 
(surgical subspecialty). The values attributed to this work center do not provide any value 
to the current analysis and will not be considered. It is also important to note that this data 
includes Ambulatory Procedure Visits (APV) and/or same day surgery visits. Given that, 
it appears that the top five increases in patient volume by surgical clinic occur in the 
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Neurosurgery clinic (77.4 percent), Plastic Surgery clinic (64.8 percent), Pediatric 
Surgery clinic (51.2 percent), Pain Management clinic (37.2 percent), and 
Ophthalmology clinic (30.4 percent).  
It is difficult to generalize from the data given, and this analysis does not consider 
the possibility of changes in coding methodology or data quality issues that may be 
present. However, it could be argued that the major increases noticed in the surgical area, 
as a total percentage, have occurred in specialty clinics whose surgeons and staff may be 
less likely to provide the type of combat surgical care patients may need during wartime. 
Conversely, it can also be argued that the physicians who work in these various clinics 
have similar initial training and some have specialized trauma training.  
But one of the questions that must be considered is how recent or current that 
trauma training is. Previous anecdotal evidence demonstrates that while there were many 
surgeons onboard the hospital ship U.S.N.S Comfort during the Gulf war, only 10 percent 
of the specialists on the Comfort had any recent trauma experience. According to 
Ochener, et al., many of the physicians were trained during their residency to treat serious 
casualties. Since that time though,  few had actually seen or managed seriously injured 
patients. This lack of experience with severely wounded casualties necessitated refresher 
training for these physicians and their staffs.103   
In keeping with the assessment of professional competence as described by 
Epstein and Hundert previously, there are several dimensions to this assessment which 
must be considered. These dimensions of professional competence include cognitive, 
technical, integrative, context, relationship and habits of mind.104  It is in the  dimension 
of technical skills, such as physical examination skills and surgical/procedural skills that 
decreased workload and adequate case mix may impact “readiness.”  From the data 
presented above, it appears that the specialty clinics (neurosurgery, plastic and pediatric 
surgery, and ophthalmology) are seeing the largest proportion of increases in workload. 
Epstein and Hundert argue that “experience does not necessarily lead to learning and 
                                                 
103 Ochener, M.G., Harviel, J.D., Stafford, P.W., et al. Development and organization for casualty 
management on a 1,000-bed hospital ship in the Persian Gulf. Journal of Trauma. April 1992.  
104 Epstein, R.M., Hundert, E.M. “Defining and Assessing Professional Competence.” p. 227. Journal 
of the American Medical Association. January 2002. 
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competence”,105 but Knuth counters that “current clinical competence is implicitly 
related to an ongoing exposure and [an active] trauma practice.”106   
Furthermore, the dimensions of context (clinical setting and use of time) and 
relationship (communication skills, conflict resolution, and teamwork) are key aspects to 
developing professional competence.107 The question that remains unanswered is 
whether these specialty cases provide the Navy medical team with the ongoing skills and 
exposure to the type of patients that develop and/or maintain wartime readiness 
competence. If not, then this data may indicate a widening gap between the skills used in 
peacetime Navy Medicine and their relevance to the skills that may be required during 
wartime.   
It is not uncommon to use physicians as proxies in medical studies to evaluate 
case and patient load.  Much of the medical care and workload provided center on the 
number of doctors and the types of patients they see.  It is important to note that if the 
increase in outpatient population is now substituting for what used to be done on an 
inpatient basis, the entire staff  (nurses, corpsmen and others) is missing experiences that 
may prove valuable to the care of those injured in wartime/combat scenarios. 
By sheer volume, it becomes apparent that, on average between 1999-2002, the 
Otolaryngology, Ophthalmology, General Surgery, and Urology clinics saw more 
patients (85 percent of total visits, on average, over the four years) than the other clinics. 
It is also evident that between 1999 and 2002, there has been almost a 22 percent increase 
in outpatient volume for the surgical services. Compare this to the 17.7 percent decrease 
in weighted (RWP) surgical workload as seen in the previous section and it is possible to 
see the migration away from the inpatient area and into outpatient area work centers. As 
this volume includes initial appointments for surgical consults, follow up appointments, 
same day surgery visits, etc. it is difficult to get an idea of the complexity or type of visits 
these represent. To better evaluate this, a weighted measure, Simple RVUs by surgical 
clinic was used. 
                                                 
105 Ibid.  
106 Knuth, Thomas E. “The Peacetime Trauma Experience of U.S. Army Surgeons: Another Call for 
Collaborative Training in Civilian Trauma Centers”. p. 139.  Military Medicine.  March 1996. 
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The next table below shows the sum of Simple RVUs by 3rd Level MEPRS codes. 
This table shows the sum of the relative value of each procedure (CPT) performed during 
a visit for each of the surgical services.  These values were rounded to the nearest whole 
number. 
 
Table 11. Total Simple RVU by 3rd Level MEPRS Codes for Surgical Care from       





Description of Surgical 
Clinic 1999 2000 2001 2002 
% Change, 
1999-2002 
BBA General Surgery Clinic 166,593 159,890 165,642 175,451 5.32% 
BBB Cardio/Thoracic Surgery Clinic 3,353 3,816 3,393 3,615 7.83% 
BBC Neurosurgery Clinic 19,036 17,785 23,466 32,352 69.95% 
BBD Ophthalmology Clinic 171,874 168,456 164,115 191,444 11.39% 
BBF Otolaryngology Clinic 180,404 187,395 184,265 184,102 2.05% 
BBG Plastic Surgery Clinic 23,577 31,549 29,049 29,781 26.31% 
BBH Proctology Clinic 6,054 5,114 6,0545 5,874 -2.98% 
BBI Urology Clinic 99,929 100,761 103,038 115,408 15.49% 
BBJ Pediatric Surgery Clinic 3,9456 5,053 4,271 6,268 58.85% 
BBK Peripheral Vascular Surg Clinic 16,139 17,255 19,744 19,725 22.22% 
BBL Pain Management Clinic 22,193 27,357 23,884 33,870 52.61% 
BBM Vascular & Interventional Radiology Clinic    1,088  
BBZ Surgical Clinics Cost Pool 673 8  3,633 439.72% 
  Grand Total 713,771 724,439 726,923 802,610 12.45% 
Source: SADR 
 
Similar data for the Orthopedic Care Clinic (BEA) shows a slight decrease in 
weighted outpatient workload of -.54 percent. 
Again, for this analysis, we will toss out the Surgical Clinics Cost Pool. This data 
indicates that the top five increases in Simple RVU total, by surgical clinic are 
                                                 
107 Epstein, R.M., Hundert, E.M. “Defining and Assessing Professional Competence.” p. 227. Journal 
of the American Medical Association. January 2002. 
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Neurosurgery clinic (69.95 percent), Pediatric Surgery clinic (58.85 percent), Pain 
Management clinic (52.61 percent), Plastic Surgery clinic (26.31 percent), and Peripheral 
Vascular clinic (22.22 percent). When compared to simple visits, the top five as a 
percentage does not include ophthalmology. It is also interesting to note that while the 
sum of total visits went up by 14.4 percent for General Surgery, the sum of the simple 
RVU for General Surgery only increased by 5.32 percent.  It is assumed that the higher 
the RVU, the more complex the visit and the more resources in personnel and material 
are consumed by that service. The “leading” clinics for RVUs listed here are again 
specialty clinics.  Similar to the total visits, the same clinics, Otolaryngology, 
Ophthalmology, General Surgery, and Urology Clinics, by total simple RVUs, constitute 
the majority of outpatient care. 
4. Describing the Type of Work Seen in Same Day Surgery (SDS) 
In 1996, ASD (HA) established the Ambulatory Procedure Visit (APV) directive 
that “eliminates the requirements for admission and inpatient care for certain health care 
services.”108  An APV is defined as a same day procedure that “requires an unusual 
degree of intensity”109 and occurs in a specially equipped and staffed unit that is 
designated for the purpose of caring for APVs.110  There is some confusion between the 
DoD and the different military services as to the exact coding procedures for APVs,  but 
in Navy Medicine, an APV is synonymous with Same Day Surgeries and is generally 
coded in a fashion so as to capture that workload.111  For the purpose of the study and for 
clarity, the terminology “Same Day Surgery” will be used to mean APVs.  
To further look at the actual number of Same Day Surgery (SDS) cases, the 
MEPRS data set was analyzed by looking at the fourth level of the code. Any fourth level 
MEPRS code that ends with the numeral “5” is reported as a SDS case.112 The SADR 
                                                 
108 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. DoD Instruction 6025.8: Ambulatory Procedure 
Visit (APV). September 1996. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Phone conversation with Ms. Jennifer Ike, NH Lemoore MEPRS Coordinator. February 2003.  
112 Phone and email conversation with Ms. Shannon McConnell-Lamptey at NMIMC, January 2003; 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. DoD Instruction 6025.8: Ambulatory Procedure Visit 
(APV). September 1996.  
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data was manipulated to identify only those codes that end with a 5. This newly created 
data set produced the results indicated in the table below. 
 
Table 12. Sum of Raw Visits by 4th Level MEPRS Codes for Surgical Care and Same 




Same Day Surgery Clinic 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change, 1999-2002 
BBA5  General Surgery Clinic 9,856 9,309 9,628 12,425 26.1% 
BBC5  Neurosurgery Clinic 576 507 195 270 -53.1% 
BBD5  Ophthalmology Clinic 3,568 2,710 3,318 4,224 18.4% 
BBF5  Otolaryngology Clinic 8,529 7,915 7,383 8,858 3.9% 
BBG5  Plastic Surgery Clinic 1,047 915 807 1,099 5.0% 
BBH5  Proctology Clinic 217 440 1186 1125 418.4% 
BBI5  Urology Clinic 2,813 2,926 2,738 3,305 17.5% 
BBJ5  Pediatric Surgery Clinic 176 188 198 521 196.0% 
BBK5 
Peripheral Vascular Surg 
Clinic   236 296  
BBL5 Pain Management Clinic   36 180  
 Grand Total 26,782 24,910 25,725 32,303 20.61% 
Source: SADR 
 
This table shows that the bulk of SDSs under the Surgical Care Sub-account BB, 
come from four primary surgical services, General Surgery, Otolaryngology, 
Ophthalmology, and Urology. In fact, on average, these four clinics, Navy wide account 
for 90 percent of the total same day surgery visits within the second level MEPRS code 
BB for Surgical Care.   
It is interesting to see where the largest percentage increases have occurred in the 
SDS arena for Surgical Care. The Proctology clinic (418 percent) and Pediatric Surgery 
clinic (196 percent) have seen the largest increase in workload when compared to the 
other clinics. It is also interesting to note the change in SDS visits for General Surgery. 
This indicates that there has been a 26 percent increase in SDS visits between 1999 and 
2002.  This means that more than 2,500 SDSs were performed in 2002 as compared to 
1999. This is a substantial increase and clearly shows the change in treatment strategies 
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afforded by new surgical and pharmacological technologies and the business decision to 
treat patients as an outpatient rather than an inpatient.   As this is a raw measure, the 
Simple RVU measures were applied to these same Surgical Clinics for SDS. The table 
below highlights these results.  
 
Table 13. Sum of Simple RVU by 4th Level MEPRS Codes for Surgical Care               




Description of Surgical Clinic 1999 2000 2001 2002 Percent Change,1999-2002 
BBA5  General Surgery Clinic 55,402 50,954 51,301 64,427 16.29% 
BBC5  Neurosurgery Clinic 5,601 6,430 1,689 2,933 -47.64% 
BBD5  Ophthalmology Clinic 33,511 26,042 24,310 26,599 -20.62% 
BBF5  Otolaryngology Clinic 51,929 49,068 45,439 45,272 -12.82% 
BBG5  Plastic Surgery Clinic 11,584 10,653 7,699 9,848 -14.98% 
BBH5  Proctology Clinic 745 1,574 4,615 4,830 548.63% 
BBI5  Urology Clinic 18,211 17,414 14,973 19,337 6.18% 
BBJ5  Pediatric Surgery Clinic 761 900 928 2,021 165.74% 
BBK5 Peripheral Vascular Surg Clinic 2,060 3,000  
BBL5 Pain Management Clinic 61 420  




A comparison analysis between Tables 12 and 13 demonstrates the merit of using 
a weighted workload scale. Total visits in SDS for the Surgery Clinic increased by 26 
percent between 1999 and 2002. Using the weighted measure of RVU, the workload only 
increased by 16.3 percent for that same time period.  Most striking is the difference 
between the Ophthalmology clinics total visits and RVU totals. While this clinic saw an 
increase of 18.4 percent in Raw Visits between the observed years, it saw a 20.6 percent 
decrease in RVU total for the same years.  Additionally, the Otolaryngology clinic and 
Plastic Surgery clinic saw similar contrasts.  Excluding the Pediatric Surgical clinic, the 
General Surgery clinic saw the largest increase in workload and the majority of SDS 
cases for these observed years.  These increases may be positive in terms of providing 
surgeons and staffs with relevant experiences.  
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In the final analysis of weighted workload for Surgical Care of SDS cases (2nd 
level MEPRS code BB), the overall increase is only .16 percent. Raw workload data 
indicates an overall percentage increase of 20.6 percent. While weighted surgical 
inpatient surgical care (AB) is down significantly (-17.7 percent), overall weighted 
outpatient surgical care (BB) is up 12.4 percent.   That increase in weighted outpatient 
care cannot be attributed to weighted SDS care.  
In comparison, the overall percentage increase for Medical Care  of SDS cases 
(2nd level MEPRS code BA) is up by 160 percent over the same time period. This 
contrast between Surgical Care and Medical Care may indicate the emphasis placed on 
primary care. This contrast may also reflect the change from  treatment of illness and 
injury to a focus on prevention. It may also illuminate the fact that the transition to 
outpatient SDS cases has not “made up for” the decreases seen in inpatient surgical care. 
This hints at an overall decrease in surgical exposure for Navy Medicine.  
The second level MEPRS code summaries of SDS for other work centers are 
given in Appendix I.  
5. Relationship Between Inpatient Dispositions and SDS Cases 
The final set of data that will be scrutinized here will take more of an aggregate 
view of the outpatient arena, looking strictly at the SDS cases and the relationship 
between these and inpatient dispositions.  All SDS codes (those MEPRS ending with “5”) 
were isolated and put together in one data set using Excel. These SDS codes were then 
aggregated according to their second level code as was done earlier, but now these codes 
contain only SDS. This separation will allow for a consistent comparison of Inpatient 
Dispositions, seen in the previous section, to SDS by second level MEPRS codes.  This 
process was applied to both the Total Visits and RVU measures. As the inpatient data was 
only measured by dispositions, hospital days, and RWP, and the outpatient data used was 
measured by Total Visits and RVUs, it was decided that the closest “like measure” would 
be to compare the Total Dispositions for the inpatient data and the Total Visits for the 
SDS in anticipation that the offsetting decrease in inpatient dispositions between 1999 
and 2002 would see similar increases in SDS outpatient data.  
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The chart below shows the relationship between Inpatient Dispositions and SDS 
seen between 1999 and 2002 by comparing the differences between the two measures, the 
ratio of Outpatient SDS to Inpatient Dispositions and the percentage change between the 
two.  
 
Table 14. Relationship Between Inpatient Dispositions and Outpatient SDS for 1999 -
2002 
 MEDICAL CARE 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change, 1999 - 2002
Inpatient Dispositions Medical Care (AA) 15,264 16,174 16,616 17,197 0.127 
SDS  Medical Care (BA) 5038 6131 6467 8317 0.651 
 Difference 10,226 10,043 10,149 8,880 -0.132 
 Ratio SDS/In 0.330 0.379 0.389 0.484 0.465 
 SURGICAL CARE   
Inpatient Dispositions Surgical Care (AB) 15,400 15,338 14,380 13,467 -0.126 
SDS  Surgical Care (BB)  26,862 24,912 25,725 32,304 0.203 
 Difference -11,462 -9,574 -11,345 -18,837 0.643 
 Ratio SDS/In 1.744 1.624 1.789 2.399 0.375 
 OB/GYN   
Inpatient Dispositions OB/GYN (AC) 20,808 22,399 21,817 22,503 0.081 
SDS  OB/GYN (BC) 5,587 6,154 5,800 5,423 -0.029 
 Difference 15,221 16,245 16,017 17,080 0.122 
 Ratio SDS/In 0.269 0.275 0.266 0.241 -0.102 
 PEDIATRIC CARE   
Inpatient Dispositions Pediatrics (AD) 20,928 21,981 21,284 22,180 0.060 
SDS  Pediatrics  (BD) 239 191 157 227 -0.050 
 Difference 20,689 21,790 21,127 21,953 0.061 
 Ratio SDS/In 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.010 -0.104 
 FAMILY PRACTICE   
Inpatient Dispositions Family Practice (AG) 10,077 10,653 11,210 11,463 0.138 
SDS  Family Practice  (BG) 214 96 23 141 -0.341 
 Difference 9,863 10,557 11,187 11,322 0.148 
 Ratio SDS/In 0.021 0.009 0.002 0.012 -0.421 
 ORTHOPEDICS   
Inpatient Dispositions Orthopedic Care (AE) 5,241 5,063 4,736 4,042 -0.229 
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 MEDICAL CARE 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change, 1999 - 2002
SDS  Orthopedic Care (BE) 11,130 11,618 11,106 11,688 0.050 
 Difference -5,889 -6,555 -6,370 -7,646 0.298 
 Ratio SDS/In 2.124 2.295 2.345 2.892 0.362 
Source: SIDR and SADR Data Sets  
 
Figure 15 below shows more clearly what the information in the table above 











































Figure 15.   Ratio of Outpatient SDS to Inpatient Dispositions from 1999-2002 
 
This figure shows the number of Outpatient SDS per Inpatient Disposition and is 
indicative of the relative proportion of patients that are seen in SDS versus 
hospitalization. The orthopedics department (BE) treated a majority of its surgical cases 
on an outpatient (SDS) basis, on average, with almost 2.5 SDS visits for every one 
disposition. Similarly, the overall surgical care work center (BB) has two SDS visits for 
every one hospitalization.  These work center workload metrics are significantly higher, 
on average than the other medical work centers. The Pediatric work center plot is difficult 
to see on the above graph because it is behind the Family Practice trend line. 
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This data demonstrates that when compared to other medical work centers, 
Surgical care and Orthopedic care have fewer hospital dispositions in relationship to the 
number of SDS seen over the same time period.  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has taken a quick glance at the topic of military readiness and 
medical readiness. Medical readiness can be viewed through many differing lenses, 
depending on the position of leadership and job held. Medical readiness or the ability “to 
provide combat health support” was recently described by the ASD (HA) as the “heart 
and soul of our Military Health System.” 113  Combat health support is one of the primary 
reasons for military medicine’s existence. Navy Medicine views the “readiness mission” 
as an integral part of their organizational makeup. Measurements or metrics of medical 
readiness are difficult to capture and many times only serve as indirect indicators of 
readiness.   Historically, Navy Medicine views medical readiness by looking at questions 
such as “Do we have the right people, with the right training, right equipment, going to 
the right place” and ensuring that they are in alignment to meet the requirements.  
This chapter takes a different perspective from the historical view taken by Navy 
Medicine. It has been long known that the Navy has “excess capacity” in terms of 
personnel and infrastructure when we are not at war. This excess capacity is utilized on a 
daily basis in the CONUS MTFs for treating beneficiaries, maintaining clinical skills, 
education and training.  Medical personnel are utilized in this capacity until called upon 
to fulfill readiness or wartime requirements or missions other than war. With the 
increasing costs of health care, it becomes more and more important that the excess 
capacity be used efficiently and is relevant to supporting the readiness mission.  
This chapter takes a macro perspective, evaluating the amount and type of 
medical care being provided in all Navy Medicine MTFs and attempts to assess how this 
care is relevant to supporting the wartime mission. The premise here was that the amount 
and type of inpatient care seen in our MTFs are important and should represent the type 
                                                 
113 Winkenwerder, William. ASD Letter on Readiness dated 26 NOV 02. 
[https://bumed.med.navy.mil/ASD%20Letter%20on%20Readiness.doc]. Accessed November 2002. 
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of care that would need to be provided during wartime.  Another premise is that it is 
critical for providers to maintain those skills and remain competent through adequate 
patient volume and caseload. It has been shown “that hands-on clinical exposure at 
military hospitals is essentially non-existent and inadequate for maintaining current 
clinical competence in trauma surgery.”114 It is possible that this is not only true for 
surgeons, but for the entire Navy health care team.  
The relevance of the workload that is being performed by Navy health care 
providers in the MTF’s and its relationship to development and maintenance of wartime 
workload are debatable.  This research has shown that the number of inpatient admissions 
has decreased in Navy Medicine by over 50 percent between 1992 and 2001, with a 
corresponding decrease in outpatient visits by almost 23 percent.  
Data for the period between 1999 and 2002 suggests that across Navy Medicine 
MTFs, weighted workload measures for inpatient care have decreased by 3.9 percent.  
Additionally, this chapter has shown during this same time period, there has been an 
overall decrease in surgical and orthopedic inpatient care when using both weighted (- 
17.7 percent surgical and –19.4 percent orthopedics) and un-weighted measures (ranging 
from – 12.3 percent to –22.8 percent).  These findings are promising from a fiscal 
standpoint. But do they aid the readiness of the organization? That question remains 
unanswered. 
While inpatient workload has decreased slightly between 1999 and 2002, the 
overall Navy Medicine weighted outpatient workload has increased by 26.7 percent for 
the same years. Of interest to this research is that weighted surgical outpatient care has 
increased by 12.4 percent. But there has been essentially no increase (.16 percent) in 
weighted outpatient same day surgery workload. Using these inpatient and outpatient 
workload statistics, we can infer that there has been an overall decrease in the amount of 
surgical care provided by Navy Medicine.  If using un-weighted measures (Raw visits), 
the overall surgical outpatient care (including SDS volume) between 1999 and 2002 
increased by almost 22 percent. SDS raw visits alone increased by 20 percent during this 
same time frame.  
                                                 
114 Knuth, Thomas E. “The Peacetime Trauma Experience of U.S. Army Surgeons: Another Call for 
Collaborative Training 1 Civilian Trauma Centers”. p. 141.  Military Medicine.  March 1996. 
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From this information, it appears that that while total raw visits for SDS went up 
by 20 percent, the weighted workload associated with this increase hardly changed (.16 
percent).  It may be difficult to reconcile these differences, but one possible answer to 
this contrast is that the relative complexity and resource consumption per patient have 
declined over the same period.   
The concern here is that this apparent decrease in inpatient surgical workload for 
Navy Medicine may point to excess capacity that is not preparing individuals for their 
readiness mission.  Fewer inpatient surgical cases may hinder the development and 
enhancement of skills needed to care for wartime casualties for the entire organization. 
Obviously this is debatable and it may be that the decrease in inpatient surgical workload 
has no bearing on the organization’s ability to care for seriously injured patients. If this is 
the case, then the information provided in this chapter highlights the decreasing surgical 
inpatient workload and the changes in the organizational model to one that is focused on 
outpatient care. However, if this is not the case, then this decreasing trend of inpatient 
surgical workload should be monitored and followed closely to ensure that there is not a 
degradation of knowledge, skills and abilities required to meet the readiness mission. 
According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 presents 
a strategic context in which military commanders “must have an overwhelming array of 
capabilities available to conduct offensive and defensive operations.”115 In addition to 
other military operations and contingencies this “will require a rapid, flexible response to 
achieve national objectives in the required timeframe.”116  Using the framework of 
operational readiness as discussed in section B of this chapter, there may be less and less 
time for Navy Medicine to “pull up its socks” before the medical support organization is 
needed to reach peak capability to support those in combat. The imperative of having a 
peacetime model in which the workload directly supports or resembles the type of 
workload likely to be seen in wartime becomes increasingly central to medical readiness.  
                                                 
115 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5: Strategy Division. 
Joint Vision 2020. p. 12. June 2000. 
116 Ibid.  
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III. NAVY MEDICAL MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL TRENDS 
A. OVERVIEW  
Over the last decade various governmental, military and institutional studies have 
examined the MHS and its manpower and personnel structure. These studies were 
prompted by budgetary and legislative pressures to reduce the total size of the military 
establishment as part of the peace dividend expected at the close of the cold war. The 
MHS was particularly scrutinized because the overall DoD active duty end strengths were 
expected to decline by twice the rate of medical forces from fiscal year 1987 to FY 
1999.117   
A critical element for any successful organization is its ability to clearly articulate 
and define its missions and then properly size itself to meet the needs of those missions. 
This is an extremely challenging aspect of organizational planning but is fundamental to 
the achievement of the military’s mission.  This organizational planning occurs in the 
military under the rubric of Manpower and Personnel planning and is the central focus for 
this chapter. 
 Important to any analysis of the manpower arena of the military is the 
development of a broad understanding of the “drivers” for the requirements 
determination process. It is the requirements determination process that provides a 
foundation for the quantity and quality (type) of force structure that is in existence.  This 
chapter will cursorily examine the requirements determination process for Navy 
Medicine, describe the methodology of this process and then perform a trend analysis of 
Medical Corps and Nurse Corps personnel end strength over the last decade. 
 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR NAVY MEDICINE MANPOWER 
The end of the cold war signified many changes for military strategists and the 
way they viewed the new world and the role of the U.S. military in that world. One key 
conclusion was that the size of the forces would need be smaller than was needed during 
                                                 
117 General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees. Wartime Medical Care: 
Personnel Requirements Still Not Resolved. p. 2.  June 1996. 
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the cold war. But the question was “how much smaller”?  Ultimately, the overall military 
force was reduced in size by about 37 percent from 1987 - 2000.  Similarly, the Navy was 
reduced in size by approximately 36 percent during this same time period.118  Table 15 
below shows how the DoD average strength numbers have changed over the last decade. 
 
Table 15. Average Military Strength in Thousands by Service from 1987-2000 
 
FISCAL 





1987 2,168 777 583 199 609 
1988 2,I38 769 581 197 591 
1989 2,121 766 584 196 575 
1990 2,079 750 583 196 550 
1991 2,033 734 575 198 526 
1992 1,898 663 551 190 494 
1993 1,743 590 520 181 452 
1994 1,654 560 485 175 434 
1995 1,562 528 449 174 411 
1996 1,490 497 426 173 394 
1997 1,439 492 396 174 377 
1998 1,412 483 385 172 372 
1999 1,377 473 370 172 362 
2000 1,373 475 370 172 356 
% Change from 
1987 - 2000 - 36.67 - 38.89 - 36.54 -13.57 - 41.54 
Source: Selected Manpower Statistics119 
 
 
With the drawdown underway, in 1991 Congress asked DoD to reassess its 
medical personnel requirements. “Specifically, section 733 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 required, among other things, that 
DoD determine the size and composition of the military medical system needed to 
                                                 
118 Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Selected 
Manpower Statistics. [http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/m01/fy00/m01fy00.pdf]. Accessed January 2003. 
119  Ibid. 
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support U.S. forces during a war or other conflict and identify ways of improving the 
cost-effectiveness of medical care delivered during peacetime.”120  The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, conducted this study, known as 
the “733 study”. The results caused quite a stir in the military medical establishment.  
This study, released in 1994, estimated that the MHS would only need 
approximately 50 percent of the current number of physicians by fiscal year 1999 to treat 
casualties based on the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of fighting two nearly 
simultaneously Major Theater Wars (MTWs).121  The military services disagreed with 
the physician estimate found in the 733 study, stating that the methodology used did not 
account for the training requirements, overseas hospital requirements and a rotation base 
to sustain these functions. The services made different assumptions about the personnel 
needed for medical readiness than the 733 study and estimated medical personnel 
requirements to be much higher. The military medical establishment projected only a 16 
percent decrease in total active duty medical personnel and only a 4 percent decrease in 
active duty physicians.122   
As a result of this difference between the two estimates, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense directed that an update to the 733 study be conducted to mesh the differences 
and improve the model used by DoD to project manpower requirements. This later study, 
published in 1999,  became known as the “733 Update” study.123  This study agreed with 
the military services that there needed to be a larger physician force structure than the 
original study specified. The 733 Update concluded that “72 percent of active duty 
physician strength was required to meet military missions and peacetime and training 
needs.”124 The 733 Update also indicated that results of this estimate were highly 
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121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid. p. 4.  
123 Ibid. p. 3. 
124 Cecchine, G., Johnson, D., Bondanella J., et al.  Army Medical Strategy: Issues for the Future. p. 
11.  Rand Corporation. 2001. 
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sensitive because of the assumptions that were used. These sizing estimates could vary 
greatly depending on the set of assumptions used for the analysis.125 
1.  Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement Model 
In response to the original 733 study, the Navy developed a model called the 
Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement (THCSRR) model “to correct what it 
considered inaccuracies in the 733 study.”126 This model is still used today in assisting 
Navy Medicine manpower planners and programmers in establishing the medical 
readiness manpower requirement.  
As outlined in Chapter I, the Navy Medical Department has two primary 
missions, the readiness mission and the benefit mission. The readiness mission can be 
further subdivided into what is called the wartime mission and the day-to-day operational 
support mission. Figure 16 below illustrates the decomposition of the readiness mission.  
 
Figure 16.   Readiness Mission Components  
 
One of the central themes of the second Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
“was to shift the basis of defense planning from a ‘threat-based’ model that has 
dominated thinking in the past to a ‘capabilities-based’ model for the future.”127 This 
new model “serves as a bridge from today’s force, developed around the threat-based, 
two-MTW [Major Theater War] construct, to a future, transformed force.”128 
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126 General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees. Wartime Medical Care: 
Personnel Requirements Still Not Resolved. p. 3.  June 1996. 
127 Office of the Secretary of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. p. iv. September 2001.  
128 Ibid. p. 18. 
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Currently the wartime mission of Navy Medicine entails the ability to care for 
medical casualties as a result of a scenario based on two MTWs and includes “mobilizing 
two hospital ships, supporting the fleet and the Marine Corps’ operations ashore and 
afloat, numerous fleet hospitals, and maintaining OCONUS MTFs and dental treatment 
facilities (DTFs).”129 The THCSRR model does not include the peacetime benefit 
mission as a variable and thus does not specifically address peacetime manpower 
requirements. This is done through a separate process called the Shore Manpower 
Determination Process (SMDP), explained  in the next section.  
The Day-to-Day Operational support mission for Navy Medicine is comprised of 
the daily medical care that is provided to active duty Navy personnel assigned to naval 
vessels, the FMF, and OCONUS MTFs/DTFs. In keeping with larger Navy manpower 
policies, there is a sea-shore rotation and overseas rotation that must occur to “relieve” 
those Navy medical personnel assigned to those duties. The day-to-day operational 
support mission includes the number of requirements necessary to adequately support this 
rotation back to the CONUS.130 
When we consider the manpower requirements for Navy Medicine, it is important 
to consider how many uniformed people are needed. The medical establishment in the 
Navy is somewhat unique when compared to the Unrestricted Line communities 
(Aviators, Surface Warfare Officer, Submariners) in that there are civilian counterparts 
who can perform exactly the same job as those in uniform. There are civilian doctors, 
nurses, dentists, hospital administrators, etc. who perform exactly the same duties as 
uniformed Navy Medicine personnel. 
The second question that must be asked when considering Navy Medicine 
manpower requirements concerns the elements of the jobs that Navy Medicine performs 
that make them military specific.  These elements include the possibility of providing 
medical care in a combat zone, on deployed naval vessels, military aircraft, in overseas 
hospitals, and in remote locations in the continental U.S. If there is nothing military-
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specific about the requirement, then studies have shown that contracting these healthcare 
functions to outside healthcare agencies is a cost effective way to do business.  
a. Wartime Mission Requirements Determination 
The wartime mission of Navy Medicine entails the ability to care for 
medical casualties as a result of a scenario based on two MTWs.  From a macro 
perspective, this scenario is derived from the planning of the National Command 
Authority and the National Security Strategy.  The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review also provides the construct for the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS 
articulates the risks and vulnerabilities of the U.S. and identifies the various forces and 
military options needed by the U.S. government to combat and defend against these risks.  
The NMS provides inputs into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that ultimately 
provides the direction and assignments for war planning. The Combatant Commanders 
then advance the JSCP into Operational Plans (OPLANS).131   
There are various tools and models that the planners and programmers use 
to determine workload, but the basic assumptions are similar. Using OPLANS and 
illustrative planning scenarios, suppositions are made regarding the population at risk in 
these scenarios, the number and type of casualties (both wounded in action and disease, 
non-battle injuries), lengths of stay in theater (evacuation policies) and the level of care to 
be received at various echelons of care. These variables, among others, are eventually 
used to determine the number of wartime bed requirements (theater workload or TW), as 
well as the number of surgical and medical doctors and operating room requirements 
needed to care for these casualties.132  It is from these wartime bed requirements that 
Navy Medicine answers the call to meet the hospital bed requirements in the form of 
Medical Platforms, i.e., Hospital Ships (T-AHs), Fleet Hospitals (FHs), and OCONUS 
MTFs.  
The office in the Navy Medical Department responsible for staffing the 
Navy’s portion of the TW is N931. N931 depends upon subject matter experts (SMEs) to 
assist in determining the appropriate quantity and quality of medical staff to support these 
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platforms. Through SMEs, platform advisors and the use of the Required Operating 
Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) documents for these 
platforms, and various other considerations, the staffing package for those TW platforms 
is determined. The staffing for the OCONUS augmentation is based on the staffing for a 
FH. 133 
b. Day-To-Day Operational Requirement Determination 
Specific medical manpower requirements for the fleet are derived through 
a different process predicated on Condition III readiness of a particular ship’s ROC/POE. 
This requirement varies depending on the class of ship. Condition III, called “wartime 
steaming,” is the condition that drives the daily manpower requirements for the fleet. 
This condition determines the medical manpower needed by the fleet to meet both the 
wartime requirement and the day-to-day operational missions. An interesting part of this 
requirement determination process is that most of the enlisted manpower requirement for 
the fleet is based on workload measures, while the officer requirement is based on 
“command authority, special skills/knowledge, and watch-stations.”134 
N931 uses other processes to provide medical staff augmentation for the 
casualty treatment and receiving ships (CRTS) and the Marine Corps. The CRTS 
augmentation package is based upon the recommendations of SMEs similar to the TW 
requirements. The Marine Corps medical manpower requirements are not based on 
workload but rather on the mission and tasks of the organization.  
Once the wartime and day-to-day operational medical manpower 
requirements have been determined, the first component of the THCSRR model is 
derived. The union of these two pieces, wartime and day-to-day operational pieces, forms 
what is called the Medical Operational Support Requirement (MOSR). These are 
essentially two different databases that are joined to form a third database that defines 
“the minimum number of fully trained active duty personnel required to accomplish both 
missions.”135 Figure 17 shows the union of these two requirements. CNA recently 
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estimated that the total wartime requirement represents nearly 19,000 medical billets (not 
including OCONUS MTFs, isolated CONUS, BUMED, and others).136 
 
 
Figure 17.   Medical Operational Support Requirement (MOSR) 
Source: MPN 101: Medical Manpower and THCSRR Processes Briefing137 
 
Once the MOSR has been completed, the second component of THCSRR, 
known as sustainment requirements, can be calculated. The “sustainment requirements 
allow for a continuous flow of qualified personnel into MOSR specified jobs as people 
attrite either from the Navy or from their current skill level and move to a higher skill 
level.  The sustainment requirement, therefore, is the calculated number of billets 
required for officers and enlisted in training and must be added to the MOSR.”138 By 
adding both MOSR and the sustainment piece together, as seen in Figure 18 below, we 
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Figure 18.   Total HealthCare Readiness Requirements Model 
Source: MPN 101: Medical Manpower and THCSRR Processes Briefing140 
 
The total manpower requirement for Navy Medicine consists of military, 
civilian, contractors, and even volunteers. The THCSRR only speaks to the military 
subset needed for readiness. The next section briefly describes the development of Navy 
Medicine’s peacetime manpower requirements. 
2. Peacetime Manpower Requirements 
For wartime and day-to-day missions, the number of uniformed medical 
personnel required by the Navy to meet those missions is defined. It is because of these 
two missions and the “excess capacity” during peacetime that the health benefit mission 
is accomplished.141  The active duty men and women in the MTFs in CONUS provide a 
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portion of this healthcare. This section will provide an overview of the peacetime 
manpower requirements determination process in Navy Medicine. 
The manpower requirements determination process for Navy Medicine is similar 
to the process used by other shore commands throughout the Navy. This process, 
formerly called the Efficiency Review Process, is now known as the Shore Manpower 
Requirements Determination (SMRD) Program. This congressionally mandated program 
is a “dynamic process that provides a systematic means of determining and documenting 
minimum manpower necessary to accomplish an approved activity tasking” in the form 
of a Mission, Function, and Task (MFT) Statement.142 This process “reviews and 
assesses workload in terms of the activity's missions, functions and tasks; objectively 
reviews and determines the equipment, processes, and skills necessary for the activity to 
efficiently and effectively discharge those missions, functions and tasks; determines the 
number and defines the mix of military, civilian, and contractor manpower required; and 
implements a resulting plan to improve the activity's ability to accomplish its mission.”143 
Ultimately, a shore organization’s requirements are delineated in the Statement of 
Manpower Requirements (SMR). The SMR discloses the “activities approved 
quantitative and qualitative peacetime manpower requirements.”144  The end result of the 
SMRD process is that there is a credible baseline which will be reflected on the Activity 
Manning Document (AMD) and will serve as a template for future studies for MFTs, 
workload indicators, and manpower requirements.145 
The manpower requirements determination process is currently performed by the 
Bureau of Medicine’s Requirements Determination (REDE) team, officially, M1R 
(formerly MED 15). The REDE team receives its guidance, policy and direction from the 
M1 shop, which is located at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in Washington, D.C. 
The Health Care Support Office is the administrative location for the REDE Team and 
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provides the administrative oversight and support for all of Claimancy 18 (All Navy 




Figure 19.   REDE Team Administrative and Operational Reporting Roles146 
 
The purpose of the REDE team is to provide MTFs and DTFs and other 
Claimancy 18 activities with technical guidance and assistance in the manpower 
requirements determination process. REDE also provides validation of activity manpower 
requirements and assists in the development and maintenance of staffing standards for all 
health care services and support for Navy Medicine.147 
There are various tools and techniques used to determine the amount of work 
performed in an activity/command. Work-studies include a Method Study, which is a 
systematic recording or critical examination of existing and proposed ways of performing 
the work required. This method of study is always looking at developing a more effective 
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and economical way to accomplish the work. Method Studies include such techniques as 
organizational analysis, flow process charts and space layout analysis among others. 
Another work-study tool is Work Measurement, which is “the application of techniques 
which establish the time for a qualified worker to perform a specific job at a defined level 
of performance.”148 Various Work Measurement techniques used by persons involved 
with determining workload amounts include work sampling, operational audits, and 
staffing standards.  
It is necessary to keep in context that we are talking about health care providers 
where adequate staffing ratios or manpower requirements are critical to maintaining 
public trust, patient safety and health. There are also internal (Surgeon General) and 
external organizations, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital 
Organizations (JCAHO), National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), and other 
organizations involved in ensuring that Navy MTFs meet acceptable staffing standards.  
Historically, Navy medicine has used the Joint Health Care Manpower Standard 
(JHMS) publication, JHMS DoD 6025.12 STD, as a guideline for the calculation of 
medical manpower requirements. 149  Because these standards are out of date, the M1 
shop at BUMED is looking to bring on-line a commercially available tool called the 
“Requirements Tool Box” to assist in determining total manpower requirements based on 
workload and staffing standards.150 
Once these peacetime manpower requirements have been determined, they must 
be funded. In October of 1991, the Deputy Secretary of Defense orchestrated the 
beginning of a unified medical program for all medical activities within the DoD. This 
action formed the basis for resources to the military health establishment to fall under the 
direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). 
                                                 
148 Manpower Conference Briefing. BUMED Manpower Requirements Determination Team. 
[http://www.changearchitect.com/manpower/WorkshopPresentations/SMRDIICOMBINED.ppt]. Accessed 
December 2002. 
149 Sarmiento, Jeanne. Pediatric Outpatient Clinic Manpower Requirement Variables at Navy 
Medical Treatment Facilities. p.23. Masters Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California. June 
2000. 
150 Franco, Richard. Email to author dated January 27, 2003.  
75 
Eventually, all services consolidated their medical budgets and programming functions 
into a unified Defense Health Program (DHP).151  
It is through the DHP that Navy Medicine is able to buy or authorize the funding 
of billets to meet the manpower requirements. Of the total Navy medical billets 
purchased, almost 75 percent are directed requirements from Claimancy 18 and are 
funded with DHP dollars. The other 25 percent of medical billets authorized are managed 
and paid for by various other Marine, fleet, and staff claimants. The figure below shows 
the Navy Medical Department by claimant. 
 
Figure 20.   Navy Medical Department Billets by Claimant152 
 
As Figure 20 suggests, the peacetime manpower requirements determination 
process establishes a base for THCSRR allocation.   A key aspect of THCSRR 
implementation is the recent ability of Navy Medicine to link wartime requirements to 
                                                 
151 Copenhaver, Kimberly.  Navy Health Care Readiness Requirement Model and Programming 
Costs. p. 16.  Masters Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California. December 1994. 




peacetime billets. This is done through the Component Unit Identification Code (UIC) 
concept.   
3.  Component Unit Identification Concept 
All Navy commands are identified by the Navy Comptroller through a five digit 
numeric code called the UIC. The command or activity with a UIC is considered a parent 
command. A Component UIC identifies an activity subordinate to a parent command. 
“Readiness” or mobilization platforms such as Fleet Hospitals or Hospital Ships have 
Component UICs associated with a parent UIC. Peacetime billet authorizations are used 
to meet the mobilization requirement, i.e., they are matched to mobilization platform 
requirements. This Component UIC is linked to an MTF (or parent command) to meet the 
platform requirements. Navy Medical Personnel are now ordered to their Component 
UIC, e.g., Naval Hospital Bremerton, Fleet Hospital Bremerton Detachment.  
This distribution process for Navy Medical Department personnel is centralized 
through the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) and allows personnel to know their 
mobilization billet at the point of receiving orders. This is beneficial for several reasons. 
The first is that the parent command no longer controls the assignments of the individual 
to the mobilization platforms. Historically, this has been problematic because individuals 
at a command have been assigned to multiple platforms during one full-length tour. This 
causes inefficiencies with training resources and decreases the readiness status of the 
platform to which they were assigned.  
For example, an individual would report to Naval Hospital “X”. In addition to 
assignment to the hospital, this same person would be assigned to a mobilization 
platform, say, Fleet Hospital “Y”. With this mobilization platform assignment comes 
specific types of training unique to the FH.  Then for various reasons, that individual 
would be reassigned by the parent command to another mobilization platform to meet a 
vacancy, e.g., a Hospital Ship. All the training that the individual has received on the FH 
may be valuable to the individual in terms of exposure, but the organization has lost 
valuable time and training resources. In addition, the Hospital Ship is at a disadvantage 
because the newly assigned individual has not had any ship training and must backtrack 
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to ensure that individual meets required training standards.  This lack of training 
adversely impacts the readiness status of the ship.  
With the Component UIC concept, the parent command is out of the loop in this 
decision making process. The assignment now occurs at BUPERS. An individual is 
ordered to the mobilization platform to meet a specific readiness requirement, but reports 
to the hospital for their day-to-day duty. In this way, the individual, the local command 
and the larger organization knows which readiness requirements are being met. In 
addition, this stabilizes training requirements and platform readiness criteria. By 
assigning persons to the readiness platform, it also places a focus on the readiness aspect 
of the medical jobs. In essence, the person would be assigned to the mobilization 
platform, but report to the Commanding Officer of the parent command and be assigned a 
job at the command based upon the peacetime requirements determined through the 
SMRD process. Ideally, this also provides a better skill match between what the person is 
doing at the parent command (peacetime requirements) and their mobilization assignment 
(readiness requirements). For example, a nurse who is assigned to the mobilization 
platform of a Hospital Ship as a critical care nurse will be assigned to the intensive care 
ward at the parent MTF.  
Because there are differences in the readiness/mobilization requirements and the 
peacetime billets, there are a number of mismatches that occur between these two. This 
next section will begin to look at readiness requirements, billets and bodies to further 
examine this issue. 
A recent Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) study determined that in general, Navy 
Medicine’s billets and bodies can meet the wartime requirements (as defined by CNA, 
wartime requirements do not consider OCONUS MTFs, Commanding Officers, training 
billets, etc).153 But as noted above, there are some mobilization requirement and 
peacetime billet mismatches. This mismatch was evaluated through a series of 
conferences of subject matter experts and the Bureau of Medicine Corps Chiefs. A list of 
THCSRR Allocation polices and rules at the skill/subspecialty level was approved to 
                                                 
153 Rattleman, C., Levy, R., Carey N., Tsui, F. Wartime Medical Requirements: Profiles and 
Requirement Determination Processes. p. 51. Center for Naval Analysis. October 2001. 
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cover these mismatches. In the Nurse Corps, some of these substitution rules are platform 
specific, whereas for the Medical Corps, the substitution rules are not platform specific. 
 For example, if the Fleet Hospital requirement calls for a critical care nurse with 
a primary subspecialty (SUBSP1) of 1960,  it is possible to substitute with a Medical 
Surgical Nurse (SUBSP1 1910); however, it is not possible to substitute more than 40 
percent of the 1960 requirements with 1910 bodies. Likewise, if the requirement for 
OCONUS MTF is a nurse with SUBSP1 1945 (ER/Trauma), the  1960 (critical care 
nurse) may substitute for 100 percent of the 1945 requirements. A Medical Corps 
example is if the requirement calls for 16P0 (Emergency Medicine doctor), then a 16R0 
(Internist) may substitute for 20 percent of the 16P0 requirements, but a 16Q0 (Family 
Medicine doctor) may substitute for 33 percent of the Emergency Medicine doctor.  A 
listing of these substitution rules for Medical Corps and Nurse Corps as of FY 1999 can 
be found in Appendix D.  
 
C.  TREND ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL CORPS AND NURSE CORPS END 
STRENGTH  
The following data is presented as a historical trending of Medical Corps and 
Nurse Corps end strength from 1990 – 2002 by primary subspecialties. The author 
requested data from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) that contains a list of 
the total number of all Navy Medicine personnel by designator and primary subspecialty 
from 1990 – 2002.  BUMED was able to provide data that included all medical 
department officers and incorporates operational UICs (ships, Marines, squadrons, etc.) 
that were in inventory or in Navy Medicine at the end of the fiscal year. This is 
considered “faces” data because it represented the actual number of persons in Navy 
Medicine rather than the “spaces” data which represents the peacetime requirements as 
determined by the SMRD program. This data was received in 13 separate spreadsheet 
files (one file for each fiscal year) without any personal identifying information (no 
names or social security numbers). Each file contains over 10,000 lines of data including 
the UIC, billet sequence code, pay grade, designator, primary and secondary 
subspecialties, and additional qualification designators (AQDs). An example of this data 
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for FY 1993 is seen in Figure 21 below.  The column headings with an “X” represent a 
description of the column that precedes it.  
 
FY UIC XUIC BSC DESIG GRADE SUBSP1 XSUBSP1 SUBSP2 XSUBSP2 AQD1 XAQD1
1993 00168 
NMEDCOM 
NACAPREG 12080 2905 K 1960V 
CRIT CAR 
AN 1900E 
NURSG    
BS    
1993 00018 
BUMED 
WASH D.C. 64020 2200 G 1775P 
PUB HLTH 




CT 26905 2100 G 1500K 
SG GEN   
BC        
1993 66099 
NMC PT 
HUENEME 24680 2100 H 1626J 
PM OCC   
FT 1605J 










FADM AN    
Figure 21.   Example of Data File Received from BUMED 
 
The data source for this information is the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
Information Management System (BUMIS), linked to the Total Force Manpower 
Management System (TFMMS). TFMMS is the single authoritative database for total 
force manpower requirements and active duty manpower authorizations and end strength 
for the Navy. BUMIS extracts medical requirements and personnel data from TFMMS 
and uses this information to complete its own database.   
1. Methodology Used for Trend Analysis 
These 13 files were combined into one master file, containing all records from 
1990-2002 using the statistical analysis program SAS 8.01 for Windows. This newly 
created data set contained 150,765 observations and 20 variables Each observation 
represents one person in Navy Medicine, by fiscal year, identifying their assigned duty 
station (UIC), billet sequence code, designator (Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Nurse 
Corps, Medical Service Corps), rank or pay grade, including their primary and secondary 
subspecialties along with any AQDs that the individual may possess.  This information 
was used to begin the process of sorting and analyzing this Navy Medicine end strength 
data.  
 From a macro view of Navy Medicine, the officer corps end strength has 
decreased from a high in 1992 of 12,216 personnel to 11,242 in 2002. This represents a 
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decrease of 7.79 percent. Between 1990 and 2000 the cut in  strength for Navy Medicine 
Officer Corps was 5.4 percent when end strength for the entire Navy organization was cut 
by 36.5 percent.  This difference in end strength for Navy Medicine and the overall 
organization represents the degree to which Navy Medicine was able to justify its size 
using the THCSRR model.  
Because the focus of this study is dealing with clinical workload and staffing, the 
author determined to limit the focus to only the Medical Corps (those observations with a 
designator of 2100 or 2105) and Nurse Corps (those observations with a designator of 
2900 or 2905). The Medical Service Corps (MSC) is a diverse corps that has three 
primary classifications of jobs: (1) health care administrators, (2) health care scientists 
(environmental health officers, epidemiologist, and biochemists among others) and (3) 
clinicians (physician assistants, physical therapists, psychologists, etc).  While there are a 
number of Medical Service Corps officers who are clinical providers, they were 
purposefully excluded from this analysis, as their THCSRR requirements are 
significantly smaller when compared to the Medical Corps and Nurse Corps 
requirements.  
The first procedure performed was to determine the end strength of Medical 
Corps and Nurse Corps officers for each year from 1990-2002. This would allow for 
trending measures to show any major changes in overall numbers for this time period. 
While doing this procedure, it was discovered that there had been a change to the Medical 
Corps Subspecialty codes between 1993 and 1994. It was necessary to re-map the old 
subspecialty codes to the new ones in order to make a consistent comparison across 
years. Using BUMED INSTRUCTION 1214.1, all Medical Corps subspecialty codes 
prior to 1993 were mapped to the new subspecialty codes found in the Manual of Navy 
Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications, NAVPERS 15839I.  
For example, in 1993, a fully trained Obstetrician/Gynecologist (OB/GYN) would 
possess a primary subspecialty (SUBSP1) of 1510J, where J represents “fully trained”. In 
1994, the same doctor had a SUBSP1 of 15E0. In 1993, a OB/GYN with a board 
certification specialty in Gynecologic Oncology would have a SUBSP1 of 1562K, where 
the K represents “board certification”. This same OB/GYN in 1994 would have a 
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SUBSP1 coded as 15E1 with an AQD of 6EG.  Notice with the year 1994 and later 
coding scheme that the “0” at the end represents general training, where the “1” at the 
end represents specialty training. This generally holds true for all the subspecialty codes.   
Because of the complex nature of these SUBSP1 codes and the numerous 
variations that these codes can take, the author decided to look at the end strength 
numbers of the Medical Corps by title name.  Using the example found above, any 
OB/GYN doctor with general training, board certification, and/or any SUBSP1 (such as 
OB/GYN obstetrics critical care medicine, gynecologic oncology, maternal fetal 
medicine, reproductive endocrinology, etc.) was designated as an “OB/GYN” with a 
“15E” code.  These were aggregated together to give one listing for all OB/GYN doctors, 
no matter what level of training or specialty. Doing this reduced the possible 
permutations and combinations of SUBSP1 and AQDs from over 200 to 25 general 
categories or a General Category Code. A complete listing of the mapping scheme and 
aggregation used for this research is found in Appendix E.  
For the Nurse Corps, the process of organizing the data was more straightforward. 
Using BUMED INSTRUCTION 1214.1 CHANGE TRANSMITTAL 1 as a reference, all 
Nurse Corps observations were classified under the numeric codes listed in this 
document. The suffixes for these codes for the various SUBSP1 were not evaluated in 
this analysis. For example, a medical/surgical nurse has a SUBSP1 of 1910. Suffixes for 
this SUBSP1 include “1910K” for Certified in Medical/Surgical nursing, “1910P” for a 
nurse who possesses a Master’s level of education, or an “1910S” for a nurse who has 
significant experience in Medical/Surgical nursing. Eliminating these suffixes left only 
35 general categories for the Navy Nurse Corps. These general categories can found in 
Appendix F. 
a. End Strength for Medical Corps from 1990 – 2002.  
End Strength (E/S) is defined in the OPNAVINST 1000.16J as “the 
number of officer…requirements which can be authorized (funded) based on approved 
budgets.”154 Essentially it is the number of uniformed personnel set by Congress allowed 
to be on active duty September 31st of each year.  Officer Community Managers are 
                                                 
154 Chief of Naval Operations. Manual of Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures. p. B-5. 
OPNAVINST 1000.16J. January 1998. 
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responsible for managing the professional development and career growth of officers in 
their communities.  They develop strength plans, accession plans, and promotion plans on 
a regular basis to ensure that their community is at the proper E/S by the end of the FY.  
In total, inventory of personnel must be within 1.5 percent above or ½ percent below  
congressionally mandated E/S levels.  
When analyzing E/S numbers, it is significant to note that these numbers 
may not be representative of the entire year. Unlike other Navy communities, Navy 
Medicine’s lowest strength numbers occur between March and April. Most gains or 
accessions into Navy Medicine occur between May and August. This influx of new 
personnel coincides with the new graduates who are coming out of schools and 
universities. The point here is that the E/S numbers represent a snapshot in time and the 
actual strength numbers are  likely to be lower throughout the rest of the year.  
The Table 16 below shows Navy Medicine’s E/S numbers from 1990 to 
2002 for the entire Officer Corps, Medical Corps, and Nurse Corps. Four different time 
periods are listed at the bottom of the table for comparison analysis. These four different 
time periods are the same ones used in other sections of this research.  
 
Table 16. End Strength Numbers for Navy Medicine Officer Corps, Medical Corps, 
and Nurse Corps for FY 1990 - 2002 





1990 11,834 4,166 3,058 
1991 12,096 4,332 3,132 
1992 12,216 4,325 3,301 
1993 12,204 4,336 3,331 
1994 11,870 4,258 3,219 
1995 11,718 4,170 3,313 
1996 11,473 4,101 3,266 
1997 11,274 4,018 3,283 
1998 11,186 4,028 3,189 
1999 11,205 4,073 3,143 
2000 11,199 4,051 3,120 
2001 11,248 4,091 3,147 
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2002 11,242 4,097 3,156 
% Change in E/S from 1990 - 2002 - 5.00 -1.66 +3.20 
% Change in E/S from 1990 - 2000 -5.36 -2.76 -2.03 
% Change in E/S from 1992 - 2000 -8.34 -6.34 -5.48 
% Change in E/S from 1999 - 2002 +.30 +.59 +.41 
Source: BUMIS 
 
The table above reveals only small decreases in E/S as compared to the 
larger changes made in overall DoD E/S and Navy E/S (as seen in Table 15) for similar 
time periods.  The reason for this small change in size is because of the readiness 
requirements determined by THCSRR. THCSRR is able to justify the minimum number 
of medical personnel needed in uniform to support the readiness requirements.   
The next step was to look at the Medical Corps by general categories to 
see if there were any emerging trends in the end strength by the general categories as 
mapped out in Table 17 below and found in Appendix E.  
 
Table 17. Mapping and Aggregation of Old SSP1 Codes to New Codes and General 
Category Code for Medical Corps 
TITLE DESCRIPTION 
NEW






Flight Surgeon Aviation Medicine 15A0   1602 15A0 
Preventive Medicine 
Officer Aerospace Aerospace Medicine 15A1   1624 15A1 
Anesthesiologist Anesthesia, General 15B0   1540 
 Anesthesia, Subspecialty 15B1   1541 
15B 
General Surgeon Surgery, General 15C0   1500 
 Surgery, Subspecialty 15C1    
 Thoracic & CDV Surgeon  
Surgery Subspecialty 
Cardio thoracic Surgery 6CD 1507 
 C/Rectal Surgeon  
Surgery Colon & Rectal 
Surgery 6CE 1501 
 Pediatric Surgeon  Surgery Pediatric Surgery 6CH 1506 
 Peripheral Vascular Surgeon  
Surgery Peripheral 











 Plastic Surgeon  Surgery Plastic Surgery 6CJ 1520 
 Surgical Oncology  Surgery Oncology 6CL 1560 




General 15D0   1515 
 
Neurological Surgery, 
Subspecialty 15D1    
 
Complex Spinal 
Neurosurgery    1570 
 Skull based Neuro Surgery  
Neurological Surgery 
Complex Spinal Neuro- 




General 15E0   1510 
 
Obstetrics/Gynecology 
Subspecialty 15E1    
 Gynecologic Oncology    1562 
 Maternal Fetal Medicine  
OB/GYN Gynecologic 
Oncology 6EG 1551 
 Reproductive Endocrinology  
OB/GYN Maternal Fetal 
Medicine 6EH 1512 
15E 
General Medical Officer General Medicine 15F0   1600 15F 
Ophthalmologist Ophthalmology, General 15G0   1524 
 
Ophthalmology, 
Subspecialty 15G1    
 
Comprehensive 
Ophthalmologist    1580 
 




Comprehensive 6GD 1526 
 Glaucoma  
Ophthalmology 
Subspecialty Cornea & 





Subspecialty Glaucoma 6GF 1578 
 Oculoplastics  
Ophthalmology 
Subspecialty Neuro-
Opthalmology/Surgery 6GG 1529 
 Ophthalmologic Pathology  
Ophthalmology 















Surgery 6GI 1527 
 
Orthopedic Surgeon Orthopedic Surgery, General 15H0   1516 
 
Orthopedic Surgery, 
Subspecialty 15H1    
 Trauma Surgery    1545 
 Hand Surgery  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Faculty 
Development 62D 1517 
 Foot and Ankle Surgery  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Hand Surgery 62F 1550 
 Musculoskeletal Oncology  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Foot & Ankle 
Surgery 6HD 1559 
 Pediatrics Orthopedics  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Orthopedic 
Oncology 6HF 1519 
 Spine Surgery  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Pediatric 
Orthopedic Surgery 6HG 1518 
 Sports Medicine / Surgical  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Spine 
Surgery 6HH 1535 
 Total Joint  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Sports 
Surgery 6HI 1513 
15H 






Development 26D  
 
Facial Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgery    1521 
 Head and Neck Surgery  
Otolaryngology 
Subspecialty Facial 
Plastics & Reconstructive 6ID 1590 
15I 
Urologist Urology, General 15J0   1508 
 Urology, Subspecialty 15J1    
 Urology Fellowship    1563 
 Pediatric Urology  
Urologic Subspecialty 
Pediatric Urology 6JG 1509 
15J 
Preventive Medicine 
Officer Preventive Health 
Preventive Medicine, 














General 15K2   1626 
 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 
Physical Medical and 
Rehabilitation, General 15L0    
 
Physical Medical and 
Rehabilitation, Subspecialty 15L1    
 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehab.    1634 
15L 
Pathologist Pathology General 15M0   1680 
 Pathology Subspecialty 15M1    
 Ophthalmic Pathology    1690 
 Anatomic Pathology  
Pathology Subspecialty 
Anatomic Pathologist 6MB 1682 
 Clinical Pathology 
Pathology Subspecialty 
Clinical Pathologist 6MC 1681 
 Cytopathology  
Pathology Subspecialty 
Cytopathologist 6MF 1691 
 Dermatopathology  
Pathology Subspecialty 
Dermatopathologist 6MG 1684 
 Forensic Pathology  
Pathology Subspecialty 
Forensic Pathologist 6MH 1685 
 Hematopathology  
Pathology Subspecialty 
Hemato-Pathologist 6MI 1686 
 Immunopathology  
Pathology Subspecialty 
Immuno-Pathologist 6MJ 1688 
 Neuropathology  
Pathology Subspecialty 
Neuro-Pathologist 6MK 1683 
15M 
Dermatologist Dermatology, General 16N0   1618 




General 16P0   1616 
 
Emergency Medicine, 
Subspecialty 16P1   1635 
16P 
Family Practitioner Family Medicine General 16Q0   1610 
 
Family Medicine 
Subspecialty 16Q1    
 




Medicine Specialist 62A 1609 
 Family Practice Obstetrics  
Family Medicine 
Subspecialty Faculty 











Internist Internal Medicine, General 16R0   1612 
 
Internal Medicine, 
Subspecialty 16R1    
 Adolelescent Medicine    1644 
 Allergy/Immunology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Adolescent 
Medicine Specialist 62A 1652 
 Critical Care Medicine  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Allergy/Immunologist 62B 1699 
 Imnunology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Critical Care 62C 1653 
 Cardiology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Allergy 
Immunologist Dli 6RF 1643 
 Cardiac Electrophysiology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Cardiology 
General 6RG 1659 
 Interventional Cardiology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Cardiac 
Electrophysiologist 6RH 1658 
 Endocrinology/Metabolism  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Interventional 
Cardiologist 6RI 1654 
 Gastroenterology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Endocrinologist 6RK 1647 
 Hematology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Gastroenterologist 6RL 1648 
 Medical Oncology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Hematologist 6RN 1649 
 Infectious Disease  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Oncologist 6RO 1641 
 Nephrology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Infectious 
Disease Specialist 6RP 1655 
 Pulmonary Disease  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Nephrology 6RQ 1642 
 Rheumatology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Pulmonologist 6RR 1656 
 Tropical Medicine  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 











Neurologist Neurology, General 16T0   1620 
 Neurology, Subspecialty 16T1 
Neurology Subspecialty 
Faculty Development 62D  





Child Neurologist 6TD 1668 
 Neurophysiology  
Neurology Subspecialty 
Medicine Neuro-
Ophthalmologist 6TF 1669 
16T 
Undersea Medical Officer Undersea Medicine, General 16U0   1605 
 
Undersea Medicine, 
Subspecialty 16U1    
 Undersea Occupational Med.    1606 
 Hyperbaric Medicine  
Undersea Medicine 
Subspecialty Undersea 
Occupation Medicine 6UE 1632 
16U 
Pediatrician Pediatrics, General 16V0   1614 
 Pediatrics, Subspecialty 16V1    
 Developmental Pediatrics    1611 
 Pediatric Intensivist    1617 
 Pediatric, Gastroenterology  
Pediatrics Subspecialty 
Pediatric 
Intensivist/Critical Care 6VI 1661 
 Pediatric Cardiology  
Pediatrics Subspecialty 
Pediatric 
Gastroenterologist 6VL 1660 
 Neonatology  
Pediatrics Subspecialty 
Pediatric Hematologist 
Oncologist 6VN 1615 
16V 
Nuclear Medicine 
Specialist Nuclear Medicine 16W0   1678 
 Nuclear Radiologist    1673 
16W 
Psychiatrist Psychiatry, General 16X0   1622 
 Psychiatry, Subspecialty 16X1    
 Child Psychiatry    1623 
 Forensic Psychiatry  
Psychiatry Subspecialty 
Child/Adolescent 
Psychiatry Subspecialty 6XH 1698 
16X 
Radiologist (Diagnostic) Diagnostic Radiology 16Y0   1670 











 Imaging Radiology    1675 
 Neurologic Radiology  
Radiology Subspecialty 
Imaging 6YD 1672 
 Pediatric Radiology  
Radiology Subspecialty 
Neuro-Radiology 
Subspecialty 6YF 1671 
Radiologist (Therapeutic) Radiation Oncology 16Y2    
 Theraputic Radiology    1676 
 Interventional Radiology  
Radiology Subspecialty 
Interventional/Vascular 
Rad 6YE 1677 
 
Executive Medicine Executive Medicine 1806   1806 1806 
Sources: BUMEDISNT 1214.1 and Medical Corps Specialty Leader Orientation Manual 
For Active Duty and Reserve Specialty Leaders155 
 
Only a select few general categories for Medical Corps will be examined for this 
research. The entire table of E/S by general category for Medical Corps can be found in 
Appendix G. Table 18 below highlights the end strength of doctors in all of Navy 
Medicine by general category from 1990-2002. 
 








Surg NeuroSurg OB/GYN Optho Ortho Oto Uro ER FP Intern PED 
1990 258 27 177 86 177 98 68 88 336 448 195 
1991 263 27 174 83 201 98 70 101 350 449 191 
1992 269 26 164 83 201 99 74 103 339 447 182 
1993 265 26 163 79 214 102 72 115 338 437 184 
1994 254 25 163 81 199 93 65 127 340 425 173 
1995 251 27 159 89 167 95 61 121 369 416 229 
1996 239 28 164 89 159 91 65 131 377 417 233 
1997 232 21 176 86 157 94 59 138 392 407 225 
                                                 
155 Medical Corps Specialty Leader Orientation Manual For Active Duty and Reserve Specialty 
Leaders. [http://www-nehc.med.navy.mil/SPECIAL/PrevMed/Specialty_Leader_Manual.pdf]. Accessed 









Surg NeuroSurg OB/GYN Optho Ortho Oto Uro ER FP Intern PED 
1998 222 19 180 85 153 87 56 152 426 408 217 
1999 224 17 188 81 158 82 52 153 467 399 221 
2000 213 19 173 78 160 78 53 170 496 378 239 
2001 223 23 169 79 174 75 49 182 518 373 234 
2002 239 26 172 81 181 80 51 176 529 374 245 
Total  3152 311 2222 1080 2301 1172 795 1757 5277 5378 2768 
% Change 
1990 - 2002 -7.36% -3.70% -2.82% -5.81% 2.26% -18.37% -25.00% 100.00% 57.44% -16.52% 25.64%
% Change 
1992 - 2001  -17.10% -11.54% 3.05% -4.82% -13.43% -24.24% -33.78% 76.70% 52.80% -16.55% 28.57%
% Change 
1999 - 2002 6.70% 52.94% -8.51% 0.00% 14.56% -2.44% -1.92% 15.03% 13.28% -6.27% 10.86%
Source: BUMIS 
 
An evaluation of this data from an overall perspective (FY1990 – FY2002) and a 
comparison to the overall Medical Corps trends (found in Table 16 above), reveal 
increases in the number of Medical Corps personnel in the areas of orthopedics, 
emergency room doctors, family practice physicians, and pediatricians. From a workload 
viewpoint this would appear to be consistent with the increasing focus on primary care 
and outpatient visits. Between 1990 and 2001, there has been a steady increase in the 
number of emergency room physicians. As of 2002 there were 100 percent more ER 
doctors in Navy Medicine when compared to 1990.  The most significant overall 
decreases found in this data involve urologists, otolaryngologists, and internal medicine 
doctors, whose E/S numbers have declined by 25 percent, 18.4 percent, and 16.5 percent 
respectively.  
 From a more recent perspective (1999 – 2002), the largest percentage increases 
occur in neurology (53 percent), emergency room (15 percent), and orthopedics (15 
percent). The only decreases in Medical Corps personnel come from obstetrics and 
gynecologists (8.5 percent), internal medicine doctors (6 percent), otolaryngologists (2 
percent), and urologists (2 percent). With the exception of neurosurgeons, the positive 
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increases in manning appear reasonable when compared to the overall changes seen 
within Medical Corps over the same time period.  
In summary, it appears that E/S numbers for the various Medical Corps have been 
relatively stable from year to year and appear to make no major swings.  This consistency 
illustrates the incremental nature of community management. General Surgeons, over the 
entire period examined, have had a slow downward trend in total numbers, but recent 
years show that there is an attempt to raise these levels of E/S. The real question here is 
whether or not these are the right numbers. History has shown that “to date, the defense 
establishment has yet to reach consensus on what medical resources are required for the 
combination of operational missions, wartime readiness, and peacetime health care.”156 
As of August 2002, community manager inputs suggest that the Medical Corps is 
“currently 200+ over authorized levels.”157 These numbers are highly sensitive to the 
character of the assumptions. There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty in medical 
manpower requirements and these assumptions color the stated demand for personnel.  
Additionally, there are some specialties that are out of balance according to 
THCSRR. These aberrancies include excess numbers in some of the primary care 
specialties such as Emergency Medicine, Internal Medicine, Pediatrics, and General 
Medical Officers. There are shortfalls in some of the surgical and other specialties, 
including General Surgeons, Anesthesiologists, Radiologists and Gastroenterology.158   
b. End Strength for Nurse Corps from 1990 – 2002 
Next, the Nurse Corps was analyzed in a similar fashion. The combined 
data set was arranged so that a new data set was formed. Any Navy Medicine Officer that 
had a designator of 2900 or 2905 (Nurse Corps) was included in the Navy Medicine 
active duty E/S data set.  These observations were broken out by primary subspecialty. 
Not all subspecialties were evaluated; however a complete listing of this information is 
found in Appendix H.  It is important to note that  SUBSP1 of 1900 is Professional 
                                                 
156 Cecchine, G., Johnson, D., Bondanella J., et al.  Army Medical Strategy: Issues for the Future.   p. 
12. Rand Corporation.  2001. 
157 Barrow, Angie. “Medical Department Officer Community Management Brief.” 
[https://bumed.med.navy.mil/med03/SG_Conf_2002/Plenary_Session/Community%20Management.ppt]. 
Accessed November 2002.  
158 Ibid. 
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Nursing. The largest number of nurses in the Nurse Corps, on an annual basis, have this 
listed as their primary subspecialty. 1900 is the SUBSP1 that is given to all new nurses 
when they enter the Navy. After a few years of nursing experience, most nurses choose to 
specialize. Once they meet the requisite experience and certifications, they are eligible to 
apply for a change to their SUBSP1.  Nurses are allowed to have three subspecialties, a 
primary, secondary, and tertiary. Only the primary SUBSP is evaluated here.  
 
Table 19. End Strength Number by Primary SUBSP for Nurse Corps 1990-2002 
 
Prof.Nsg Med/Surg Perinatal Peds Ambulatory ER/Trauma OR CriticalCare
SUBSP1 1900 1910 1920 1922 1940 1945 1950 1960 
1990 1134 154 112 36 166 161 245 340 
1991 1092 182 118 40 200 162 256 335 
1992 1135 232 116 53 239 147 240 375 
1993 1091 225 154 57 261 145 236 382 
1994 985 247 175 45 262 156 248 355 
1995 1192 220 158 38 255 143 255 336 
1996 1209 188 149 33 261 142 255 302 
1997 1312 163 132 33 235 137 257 292 
1998 1305 198 138 43 72 154 249 333 
1999 1231 190 138 41 68 145 243 376 
2000 1147 185 140 44 68 165 240 422 
2001 1167 197 146 43 67 164 235 411 
2002 1152 205 150 40 69 180 268 386 
% Change 1990 - 2002 1.59% 33.12% 33.93% 11.11% -58.43% 11.80% 9.39% 13.53% 
% Change 1992 - 2001 2.82% -15.09% 25.86% -18.87% -71.97% 11.56% -2.08% 9.60% 
% Change 1999 - 2002 -6.42% 7.89% 8.70% -2.44% 1.47% 24.14% 10.29% 2.66% 
Source: BUMIS 
 
Evaluating the entire time frame from 1990 to 2002 reveals some 
interesting trends. All categories presented for this analysis, with the exception of 
Ambulatory Care nursing, have experienced moderate to significant increases in E/S 
numbers. The largest increase in E/S by SUBSP1 occurred in Perinatal nursing (33.93 
percent) and Medical/Surgical nursing (33.12 percent). Nurses who work in these clinical 
areas are primarily utilized as inpatient care providers.  Moderate increases in E/S are 
also observed in Critical Care nursing, ER/Trauma, and Pediatrics, with 13.5 percent, 12 
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percent and 11 percent increases, respectively. The number of Professional nurses has 
been relatively stable over the 13 year time frame.   
Of particular interest was the significant decrease in end strength for 
Ambulatory Care nurses between 1990 and 2002. This decrease of over 58 percent is the 
largest decrease of any subspecialty. At a time in which the focus of medical care has 
shifted from the inpatient domain to the outpatient domain, the number of nurses who 
carry Ambulatory Care as a primary SSP has decreased. From a macro perspective, this 
seems counterintuitive.  The number of doctors who work in the ambulatory care setting 
has increased while the number of nurses who have 1940 as a SUBSP1 has decreased.  It 
would be logical to assume that the more doctors available to perform increasing 
workload, the more nursing staff  would be needed to provide support. Information in this 
analysis tends to contradict this assumption. 
Additionally, the number of nurses whose practice is generally in the 
inpatient areas (Critical Care, Med/Surg, and Professional nurses) has experienced 
moderate growth. This increase is interesting given the fact that it occurs the face of a 
medical model that has shifted its focus away from the inpatient area. The data seems to 
present some contradictory themes. An August 2002 Nurse Corps Community brief 
alluded to this pattern. The brief points out that the number one retention tool for nurses 
is the opportunity for advanced education (more specialization), but the “challenge is 
continual utilization of this training.”159  
There has been an increase of 83 percent in end strength in Nurse 
Practitioners (Pediatric, Family, OB/GYN, and Midwifes) from 1990 to 2002. See 
Appendix H for more detail. Nurse Practitioners (NPs) are independent primary care 
providers who see patients in the same clinics as many of the primary care doctors. It 
could be that those nurses in Ambulatory Care are choosing to specialize further and 
obtain NP degrees. This increase in NPs may account for some of the decrease seen in 
Ambulatory Care nursing. Additionally, the increases seen in the NPs hint at the focus 
being placed on primary care settings. While overall numbers for the Nurse Corps have 
                                                 
159 Barrow, Angie. “Medical Department Officer Community Management Brief.” 
[https://bumed.med.navy.mil/med03/SG_Conf_2002/Plenary_Session/Community%20Management.ppt]. 
Accessed November 2002. 
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changed little, the distribution of nurses has shifted to a larger number having primary 
SSPs that are essentially “inpatient” focused.  There has been an increase of 8 percent 
from 1990 to 2002 in nurses with a primary SSP of 1900, 1910, 1920, 1960, and 1964 
(Neonatal ICU nurses). There has been an overall decrease in the number of “outpatient” 
nurses (those who possess primary SSPs of 1920, 1922, 1940 and 1945) of over 20 
percent.   If you add the NPs to this outpatient category, then the change is only – 1 
percent.   
Lastly, Peri-operative (Operating Room/Post Anesthesia Care) nursing has 
seen an overall increase of 9 percent. The individuals who serve in this area are critical to 
supporting the readiness mission, particularly those who serve and participate in forward 
deployed units. Their skills are important to maintaining a competent surgical team.  
It is important to understand that from this global perspective, using these 
numbers alone can be misleading. There may be policy decisions, business strategies, 
clinical rules, coding changes or data quality issues that explain the trends observed here. 
It is beyond the scope of this research to determine if this is the case. This macro 
approach is intended to analyze the numbers as they appear and to draw conclusions. The 
next chapter will look more closely at the various workload measures seen in Chapter II 
in conjunction with this E/S information.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to give a synopsis of Navy Medicine’s Manpower and 
Personnel world. The military drawdown of the early to mid 1990’s did not affect the 
officer corps of the Navy Medical Department to the same degree as it did the rest of the 
Navy.  The reason for this is that Navy Medical planners and programmers were able to 
clearly articulate the manpower requirements needed to support the wartime scenarios of 
two major regional conflicts through the Total Health Care Support Readiness 
Requirement model. This programming was founded on Defense Planning Guidance and 
is one of the key drivers for the THCSRR. In addition, they were able to demonstrate that 
it is not just wartime requirements that are needed to support the Navy. There is the day-
to-day operational medical support required to meet the needs of the fleet and Marines 
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which includes the overseas MTFs and the number of persons necessary to sustain 
appropriate sea/shore rotations, overseas rotations, etc. THCSRR sets the floor or 
minimum number of uniformed personnel, by skill mix, in Navy Medicine to meet the 
readiness requirements of the organization. 
In addition to readiness requirements determination, the Navy has a peacetime 
benefit mission that it is required by law to support. This mission occurs in our CONUS 
MTFs and is  considered part of our direct care system. There is a separate and distinct 
peacetime requirements determination process that is used to determine the manpower 
requirements for shore based installations. This process, the Shore Manpower 
Determination Requirements Program, is the name given to the practice used to 
determine peacetime medical requirements. Traditionally, this is based on the historical 
workload generated at each medical facility. Although various tools and methods are 
used to assist with this determination, most recently, Navy Medicine is attempting to 
determine these manpower requirements based on a combination of workload and 
staffing standards.  
The Component UIC was briefly described and highlighted as a bridge to link 
peacetime billets to wartime requirements. This linkage has assisted Navy Medicine 
manpower planners and detailers to better meet  readiness requirements. It has also 
placed an emphasis on readiness requirements and allowed for a more central distribution 
point. This has also created training efficiencies and permitted more focused mobilization 
training which is beneficial for the entire organization.  
Lastly, Medical Corps and Nurse Corps end strengths were briefly analyzed using 
a general category description for the Medical Corps and primary subspecialty for the 
Nurse Corps. In the aggregate, between 1990 and 2002 neither Corps has had a 
significant change in overall size (- 1.7 percent for Medical Corps and 3.2 percent for the 
Nurse Corps).  
For the Medical Corps categories evaluated, it appears that there have been a few 
primary care specialties that have had significant increases in total size over the 13 year 
period evaluated (Emergency Medicine 100 percent increase, Family Practice 57 percent 
increase, and Pediatrics 25 percent increase). These increases may be in response to the 
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changing emphasis toward outpatient treatment and preventive health initiatives. During 
this same time period, there appears to be a slight decrease in the total number of the 
surgical doctors.  
For the Nurse Corps, it appears that the largest increases in E/S, as a percentage, 
have occurred in the subspecialties of Peri-natal nursing and Medical / Surgical nursing. 
Both of these specialties focus their practice on patients who are in the inpatient areas of 
nursing care. The most significant decrease in total percentage seen for the Nurse Corps 
occurs in the primary subspecialty of Ambulatory Care nursing (-58 percent). The 
increase in E/S for nurses who have a primary sub-specialty in inpatient nursing and the 
decrease in nurses who have a primary subspecialty in outpatient nursing runs counter to 
the nature of workload trends seen over the last few years and seems to conflict with the 
prevalent medical model, i.e., a shift from inpatient to outpatient care.  
Like reading a quote without understanding the context, the trends have been 
presented here to a large degree in isolation. There has  been no effort to look at a larger 
perspective with which to frame some of these trends. The next chapter will attempt, at a 
minimum, to compare these end strength numbers against the workload data presented in 
Chapter II. It is hoped that this type of comparison will elucidate the net changes, by 
specialty, for Navy Medicine and get one step closer to determining whether Navy 
Medicine’s peacetime workload supports  wartime requirements.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF WORKLOAD AND END STRENGTH DATA  
A. OVERVIEW  
Manpower requirements are a function of and intrinsically linked to workload, 
and cannot be determined in isolation from it.  Yet in the last two chapters, we have 
treated these two variables separately.  In Chapter II, workload was first looked at in 
relationship to the “pool” of available patients (catchment population). Workload was 
then trended by evaluating the historical amount and type of work performed at MTFs 
throughout Navy Medicine. In Chapter II, the focus was on who was doing the work, i.e., 
the medical workforce that delivered care to these patients.  
In Chapter III, a cursory trend analysis was performed on the actual numbers of 
doctors and nurses who were available to perform the clinical work in Navy MTFs over 
the last few years.  This analysis answered the question of who was doing the work, but 
the question that was left unanswered was “What work was being done?” 
In this chapter these two elements, workload and staffing, will be combined on a 
timeline in order to form a more complete picture and trend of the clinical work 
performed per doctor or nurse.  Ideally, there should be a direct relationship between 
workload and the amount of resources needed to complete the work. This chapter takes 
an overarching view of Navy Medicine, evaluating the work and personnel over time to 
see if there has been a change in the clinical work relative to the number of persons 
available to do the work. The context is important, as there will again be a focus on the 
surgical aspects of the workload. Outpatient metrics will be used as a comparison or 
reference indicator to inpatient metrics.   
 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The data used for this analysis has been explained in previous chapters. It is 
important to remember the fact that this comprehensive set of data includes workload that 
occurs at OCONUS MTFs. The OCONUS MTFs, in the view of the Total Health Care 
Support Readiness Requirement (THCSRR) model, are components of the readiness 
mission. Therefore, to analyze this data from all Navy MTFs, which includes the 
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OCONUS MTFs, is to include workload that falls under the day-to-day operational 
support mission. This is important because in this analysis the purpose is to demonstrate 
the workload performed as part of the peacetime mission and attempt to show its 
relevance to enhancing the skills of Navy nurses and doctors through exposure to an 
“appropriate” volume and case mix.  By including the OCONUS workload, we are 
including work that is already a part of Navy Medicine’s readiness mission. Additionally, 
the workload used for this analysis does not capture the work that occurs outside of 
MTFs. The “loss” of this workload is reasonable, as we are interested in the workload 
that MTFs provide.  
Furthermore, the data set for personnel used in this analysis includes all of Navy 
Medicine’s doctors and nurses in the organization. This means that the numbers used not 
only represent the doctors and nurses that work in MTFs, but also include those assigned 
to operational units such as ships, squadrons, and the Marines. It also includes those who 
were assigned as Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, Officers in Charge as well 
as other command and staff positions (jobs where typically there is no direct patient 
care).  No attempt was made to look at only those personnel assigned just to MTFs. 
Historical data from Chapter III indicated that between 68 and 75 percent of all medical 
billets (including enlisted personnel) were MTF billets. The assumption here is that a 
doctor or a nurse in the end strength data set is assigned to an MTF.  Because we know 
this is not the case, this will mean that the measurements used for these calculations will 
be “generous” in their results.   
Additionally, another assumption made is that all nurses and doctors in the data 
set are involved in direct patient care. Again, we know this is not true. The implicit 
assumption is if a doctor or nurse has a primary subspecialty of, say, general surgery or 
critical care, then they are practicing as a general surgeon or a critical care nurse. We 
attempt to correct for some of this in the fact that the use of primary subspecialty codes 
will give a better indication of those who are more likely involved in direct patient care. 
However, it is possible to carry a clinical primary subspecialty code and not be involved 
in patient care.  
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An example will assist in illustrating these assumptions. Suppose that the 
workload for FY 2000 shows that there were 100 units of work performed during that 
year, and that end strength for that year showed that there were 10 nurses.  This means 
that there were, on average, 10 units of work per nurse for FY 2000. This is what this 
analysis will measure. But because we know that there were fewer nurses assigned to 
MTFs (they were on ships, headquarters staff positions, etc.), it is likely that 
approximately 25 percent of those nurses were not assigned to MTFs, where the work 
was being captured. Therefore, the actual amount of work per nurse was more like 13.3 
units per nurse (100 units work / 7.5 nurses). And because not all those nurses actually 
work in direct patient care, there were really only 5 nurses who performed the measured 
work. More accurately, this means that there were, on average, 20 units of work per nurse 
(who performed the work).  Therefore our stated measurement of 10 units of work per 
nurse demonstrates that that this workload per nurse is generous (less work per nurse than 
is actually the case) and not entirely accurate. However, if this same measurement is used 
for all time periods and we assume that the percent of nurses who work outside of MTFs 
and are not directly involved in direct patient care remains constant, then we can still 
garner valuable trending information.  
Lastly, it is important to remember that the clinical work recorded in Navy MTFs 
is not all provided by uniformed personnel. It is known that the demand for health care in 
military medicine (i.e., Navy Medicine) exceeds the capacity of uniformed personnel to 
deliver. Studies have shown that the “rates at which military beneficiaries used inpatient 
and outpatient services were on the order of 30 to 50 percent higher than those of 
civilians in fee-for-service plans.”160 While there may be legitimate reasons for this “over 
use,” in the final analysis, the demand for peacetime care on the whole exceeds the ability 
of uniformed personnel to provide it. This means medical care is provided by other 
sources.  
There is some workload that is captured at the MTFs that is provided through 
either direct government contracts (Naval Hospital “X” contracts with provider “Y” to 
perform “Z” service), managed care contracts or resource sharing agreements. Workload 
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that is performed in Navy MTFs is sometimes supported by uniformed personnel 
(Hospital Corpsmen may help civilian Dr. “Y” to get patients prepped for an exam, 
ensure the proper paper work is completed, etc.), and recorded as workload in the MTF. 
This data set contains that information. It is impossible to determine how much of this 
workload is “contracted out” with the data that is used for this analysis. This segregation 
of “uniformed work” and “contracted work” is not typically done in Navy MTFs  because 
the cost and resources used, for example, by a contracted civilian Family Practice doctor 
are the same as the cost and resources used by a Navy doctor. So from a fiscal standpoint, 
there is no difference.  
But what about clinical experience and exposure?   If the contractor is seeing the 
bulk of patients, this “takes away” from the case volume and patient mix seen by 
uniformed personnel. The bottom line is that there is some portion of workload occurring 
at Navy MTFs that is not is performed by Navy uniformed medical personnel. The extent 
or degree of this phenomenon is not identified in this analysis.  
 
C.   ORGANIZATIONAL TREND ANALYSIS 
The initial evaluation of this data first considers the pool of eligible patients or 
beneficiaries in light of the total number of doctors and nurses. This comparison provides 
the number of eligible beneficiaries in Navy Medicine MTFs catchment population as 
stated in the HCARE Report and the end strength by year for Navy Medicine doctors and 
nurses as identified through BUMIS.   
The next comparison that is trended over time is the ratio of admissions (ADM) 
and outpatient visits (OPV) to the number of doctors recorded on end strength for the 
same years.  



























1992 4325 1,942,420 449.11 190,789 44.11 6,595,977 1,525.08
1993 4336 1,985,621 457.94 183,870 42.41 6,697,299 1,544.58
1994 4258 1,985,621 466.33 175,255 41.16 7,311,829 1,717.20
1995 4170 1,865,951 447.47 159,888 38.34 Missing Missing
1996 4101 1,608,875 392.31 151,347 36.90 6,943,850 1,693.21
1997 4018 1,704,790 424.29 114,578 28.52 6,823,864 1,698.32
1998 4028 Missing Missing Missing Missing Missing Missing
1999 4073 1,529,727 375.58 89,021 21.86 5,501,744 1,350.78
2000 4051 1,529,974 377.68 95,395 23.55 5,114,154 1,262.44
2001 4091 1,559,248 381.14 93,162 22.77 5,111,078 1,249.35
2002 4097  Missing  Missing  Missing  Missing  Missing Missing 
% Change 
1992 -2001 - 5.41% -19.73% -15.13% -51.17% -48.38% -22.51% -18.08%
Source:  HCARE Report and BUMIS 
 
This table demonstrates that on the whole, from 1992 through 2001, the number 
of hospital admissions per doctor has decreased by almost 50 percent. Using the set of 
assumptions given in the previous section, this means that each doctor in Navy Medicine, 
on average, is admitting approximately 22 fewer patients per year in 2001 than in 1992.  
This does not sound extreme. However, consider that this represents almost 100,000 
fewer hospital admissions per year in 2001 when compared to 1992. While the doctor 
“misses out” by only 22 hospital admissions per year,  the inpatient hospital nursing staff 
and corpsmen also “miss out” of caring for those nearly 100,000 inpatients.  
 Interpreting this decrease in inpatient workload per doctor is difficult. It may 
mean that inpatient workloads are now at more “reasonable” levels when compared to 
years past. It may mean that the “bubble” of workload has shifted to the outpatient side of 
the house by the changes made to the medical model used by Navy Medicine. It may 
indicate a decreasing trend that signifies a  “loss of corporate knowledge” (in terms of 
caring for inpatients) by the organization and potentially point to a trend that may be 
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adverse to medical readiness. Or it may represent a combination of these hypotheses. It is 
difficult to interpret using numbers alone. 
This table also shows that in 2001, each doctor in Navy Medicine is seeing, on 
average, 276 fewer outpatient patients than were seen in 1992. Is this significant?  
Suppose a  doctor sees on average 20 patients per day. This means that each doctor saw 
about 14 fewer days’ (276 patients / 20 patients per day) worth of patients. On the 
surface, this does not seem too significant; however, looking at the entire organization, 
this data translates to almost 1.5 million fewer OPVs per year.  This seems a little more 
significant and suggests that this downward trend is worth investigating. Again, the 
reasons for this decrease may vary, but the bottom line is that while outpatient workload 
overall has decreased since 1992 by almost 23 percent, end strength of doctors has 
decreased by only about 5.5 percent.  
This same data is presented on the next page using the Nurse Corps’s end strength 
as the basis for the ratios determined.  This data shows changes similar to those seen 
above for physicians, which is not surprising since we are using the same information for 
the numerator in our calculations. This data indicates that, on average, between 1992 and 
2001, each nurse in the Nurse Corps is caring for almost half of the number of patients 












Table 21. Ratio of Catchment Population, ADMs and OPVs to End Strength Nurses 
Fiscal Year End Strength of Nurses 
Catchment 
Population 





Ratio of  




 OPV / Nurse
1992 3301 1,942,420 588.43 190,789 57.80 6,595,977 1,998.18
1993 3331 1,985,621 596.10 183,870 55.20 6,697,299 2,010.60
1994 3219 1,985,621 616.84 175,255 54.44 7,311,829 2,271.46
1995 3313 1,865,951 563.22 159,888 48.26 Missing   
1996 3266 1,608,875 492.61 151,347 46.34 6,943,850 2,126.10
1997 3283 1,704,790 519.28 114,578 34.90 6,823,864 2,078.55
1998 3189 Missing Missing Missing Missing Missing   
1999 3143 1,529,727 486.71 89,021 28.32 5,501,744 1,750.48
2000 3122 1,529,974 490.06 95,395 30.56 5,114,154 1,638.10
2001 3147 1,559,248 495.47 93,162 29.60 5,111,078 1,624.11
2002 3156  Missing Missing Missing Missing Missing  Missing 
% Change  
1992 -2001 -4.67% -19.73% -15.80% -51.17% -48.78% -22.51% -18.72%
Source:  HCARE Report and BUMIS 
 
Is this a deleterious to medical readiness?  Again, a number of factors need to be 
considered. Given the set of assumptions as outlined in section B above, it could be that 
that standard of care in 1991 was not what it was in 2001. It is possible that the staffing 
standards were such that there were different nurse to patient ratios in previous years. 
Recent studies have shown the benefit to improved patient outcomes when more hours of 
inpatient hospital care are provided by registered nurses. This means the more time 
nurses spend with patients, the shorter the average length of stay, the lower the 
complication rate,  and the lower the risk of death during hospitalization.161  While Table 
21 indicates that there are fewer inpatients per nurse, this may mean that better care is 
provided and patient outcomes are improving.  
Another possible variation in examining this apparent workload trend may be that 
in years past, more nurses were involved in direct patient care. It is possible that in more 
recent years there were fewer nurses involved in patient care and so the decrease in 
inpatient admissions has not changed the amount of patient exposure for nurses who are 
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104 
actually at the point of patient care. But this would also indicate there are fewer nurses 
who are involved in direct patient.  
The number of outpatients per nurse during this same time period has decreased 
by almost 19 percent. Given the limitations of this study, fewer outpatient visits per nurse 
means less overall patient care per nurse. Adding to the complexity of this analysis is the 
question of whether outpatient visits “add value” to the ability of the nurse to meet 
readiness requirements of a mobilization platform. While it is not within the scope of this 
research to investigate this question, this information does show, that on average, there 
are fewer outpatient visits per  nurse in 2001 than there were in 1992, with only a 4.5 
percent decrease in Nurse Corps end strength over this same period.   
 
D. INPATIENT TREND ANALYSIS BY PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY  
The next step in this analysis was to drill down further to see if it was possible to 
infer or derive more information about the surgical workload that has occurred in Navy 
Medicine. This analysis uses the second level MEPRS code or summary account of AB. 
AB indicates the work center that is credited with work is Inpatient Surgical Care. This 
summary account includes inpatient care and consultative evaluation in the surgical 
specialties and subspecialties of general surgery (ABA), cardiovascular and thoracic 
surgery (ABB), neurosurgery (ABD), ophthalmology (ABE), oral surgery (ABF), 
otolaryngology (ABG), pediatric surgery (ABH), plastic surgery (ABI), proctology 
(ABJ), urology (ABK), organ transplant (ABL), burn unit (ABM) and peripheral vascular 
surgery (ABN).162  The workload measured in this evaluation was compared to the 
number of surgeons available in Navy Medicine to perform the work. The assumption 
here is that a general surgeon is responsible for work assigned to the general surgery 
work center (ABA), the neurosurgeon performs work associated with the neurosurgery 
work center (ABD), the Emergency Medicine doctor performs the work associated with 
Emergency Room work center (BI), etc.  This appears to be a reasonable assumption.  
                                                 
162 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. DoD 6010.13-M:  Medical Expense and 
Performance Reporting System for Fixed Military Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities.   November 
2001. 
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The decision was made to use the Relative Weighted Product (RWP) as the 
measure of workload in this analysis. This weighted measure is useful because it 
identifies resource consumption and reflects patient complexity and the patient’s length 
of stay. The total RWP workload (from the summary  account AB) was used for each 
year from 1999 to 2002.  Because oral surgery is performed by a dentist with a specialty 
of oral surgery, the workload from the ABF work center (oral surgery) was subtracted 
from the total amount of workload (AB) to derive a RWP final value for each year.  
Appendix C can be used as a reference for the workload values obtained in this analysis. 
The next step was to use the mapping of general category codes for Medical 
Corps subspecialties as outlined in Appendix E. The end strength (E/S) for each year for  
the general category codes of 15C (general surgeons), 15D (neurosurgeons), 15G 
(ophthalmologists), 15I (otolaryngologists), and 15J (urologists) were added together to 
determine the total number of surgeons available to perform the workload as identified 
above. 
Table 22. Ratio of Inpatient Weighted Surgical Workload per Aggregate Surgeons 
 
Total RWP Workload for  
Summary Account  
“Inpatient Surgical Care” (AB) 
minus oral surgery workload. 
See Appendix C. 
E/S of General Category 
Codes for Surgeons 
15C+15D+15G+15I+15J.
See Appendix E.  
 RWP Workload Measure Total Number of Surgeons
Ratio of  
RWP/Surgeon
1999 21353.53 614 34.78 
2000 20294.32 601 33.77 
2001 18917.25 623 30.36 
2002 17261.00 658 26.23 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 - 24.58% 
Source: SIDR and BUMIS 
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Figure 22.   Ratio of Weighted Workload per Aggregate Group of Surgeons by Fiscal 
Year 
This information illustrates a downward trend in the amount of inpatient surgical 
workload per surgeon between 1999 and 2002. There is almost a 25 percent decrease in 
the amount of work per surgeon.  Given the set of assumptions in section B, this 
information may merit further analysis beyond the bounds of this research. In many 
ways, the reduction in inpatient surgical care provided by the physicians may have a 
ripple effect throughout the organization. If patients are not being admitted to the 
hospitals, then those who provide the nursing care and ancillary services are “missing 
out” on the exposure to and experience of caring for these patients as well. As the 
numbers of patients decrease, the organization and infrastructure that is set up to care for 
these individuals “miss out” on the opportunity to care for and “handle” these patients. 
Corporate knowledge in terms of patient care could be lost to inexperience. In the words 
of Dr. Howard Champion, former professor of Military and Emergency Medicine and a 
senior advisor in trauma at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, 
“combat trauma care danger signals” include a fading institutional memory and limited 
experience with injury.163 This decline in inpatient exposure may present a danger signal 
to the organization.   
                                                 
163 Champion, Howard R. “Epidemiology of Combat Death: Historical Perspective Briefing.” 
[http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/acfi/C6/C6/drchampion_files/frame.htm]. Accessed December 2002.  
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To take this particular analysis one step further, this research looks at the third 
level MEPRS codes for the general category code of “general surgeon” (15C found in 
Appendix E) across the same time period. This snapshot of data takes the workload of the 
work centers General Surgery (ABA), Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery (ABB), 
Pediatric Surgery (ABH), Plastic Surgery (ABI), Proctology (ABJ) and Peripheral 
Vascular Surgery (ABN) and totals the RWP workload for each year. This view further 
isolates the workload to that of the group of individuals who fall under the category of 
general surgeon (15C).  The table below draws upon the information found in 
Appendixes C and E.  
 




for Work centers 
ABA, ABB, ABH, 
ABI, ABJ, and 
ABN (See 
Appendix C) 
E/S of General 
Category 
Codes for Surgeon 
15C 
(See Appendix E) 
Ratio of 
Workload to 
E/S of  
Surgeon 
1999 15,851.31 224 70.76 
2000 15,767.57 213 74.03 
2001 14,756.38 223 66.17 
2002 13,869.57 239 58.03 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 - 17.99% 
Source: SIDR and BUMIS 
 
This more focused analysis of the workload in work centers most likely to be 
performed by general surgeons, cardio thoracic surgeons,  pediatric surgeons, peripheral 
vascular surgeons, plastic surgeons and colon/rectal surgeons shows a decrease of 




























Ratio of Work to Surgeon (15C)
 
Figure 23.   Ratio of RWP Inpatient Workload per Surgeon (15C) 
 
This more narrow approach to workload trending shows that the decline in work 
per general surgeon is not of the same magnitude as seen by the larger aggregate groups 
above in Figure 22.  Nonetheless, it is a downward trend that bears monitoring. 
Examining the inpatient workload at the third level MEPRS code for a specific 
work center (Appendix C) and comparing it to the E/S of like specialists from 1999 to 
2002 (Appendix F) shows that the ratio of workload per surgeon for neurosurgery (ABD) 
decreased by 53 percent, ophthalmology (ABE) decreased by 17 percent, otolaryngology 
(ABG) decreased by 26 percent, and urology (ABK) decreased by 28 percent.  
The same methodology as was used for general surgery was performed for 
orthopedic surgeons (15H). The orthopedic work center, AE, does not fall under the same 
summary account as the other surgeons and thus has been evaluated separately here.  One 
of the sub accounts for AE includes podiatric medicine (AEB). This work center was 
included in this analysis, though in reality this is workload not typically performed by  
podiatrists. The workload as a percentage for podiatric medicine accounted for no more 
than 1.8 percent in the final analysis and so podiatric medicine workload counts were left 
in the calculations.  The table and figure below are presented as the  workload for 
orthopedic surgeons for fiscal years 1999 to 2002.  
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1999 7,079.22 158 44.81 
2000 6,779.18 160 42.37 
2001 6,371.75 174 36.62 
2002 5,705.38 181 31.52 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 - 29.66% 
Source: SIDR and BUMIS 
 
The ratio of work per orthopedic surgeon for inpatient orthopedic care 
demonstrates a steady downward trend. Using 1999 as the base year, there has been a 30 
percent decline in the amount of inpatient orthopedic workload when compared to 2002. 
This is a significant finding. Information from Chapter II would indicate that it is 
questionable  whether this decline in inpatient surgery is being “made up for” on the 
outpatient side of the house. The graphical representation of orthopedic workload ratios 
(along with other specialties) can be found in Figure 24 on the next page.  
For comparison purposes, Figure 24 below was included to give an idea of the 
workload per provider by specialty area. This figure represents the RWP for each fiscal 
year by primary subspecialty code (using the general category code found in Appendix 
E). From the graph it appears that on average, the OB/GYN  providers have more 
workload in comparison to the other specialty areas.  The only specialty  that appears to 
be experiencing a consistent increase in the inpatient workload per provider would be the 
Internal Medicine specialty. Inpatient workload has increased by almost 19 percent for 
the subspecialty. This increase per provider is a function of both a decline in the number 
of Internal Medicine (16R) doctors and a simultaneous increase in workload.  
In the end, this data seems to indicate that while other work centers are 
experiencing either a relatively flat or slightly increasing workload per provider, the 
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weighted inpatient workload of the surgical areas of Navy Medicine (AB and AE) 
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(AA) to IM Doctor
Ratio of RWP Workload
(AC) to OB/GYN
Ratio of RWP Workload
(AD) to Peditrician
Ratio of RWP Workload
(AE) to Orthopedic
Surgeon
Ratio of RWP Workload
(AG) to FP Doctor
 
Figure 24.   Ratio of RWP Inpatient Workload to Internal Medicine (16R), OB/GYN 
(15E), Pediatrician (16V), Orthopedic Surgeon (15E) and Family Practice Doctor 
(16Q) 
 
E. OUTPATIENT TREND ANALYSIS BY PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY 
The next step was to use the outpatient workload performed as Same Day 
Surgeries.  Using our convention from before, SDS represents an ambulatory procedure 
visit and is designated as a fourth level MEPRS code that ends in a “5”. Using the same 
information found in Chapter II and E/S data in Chapter III, a more direct comparison or 
ratio of specific workload to specialist can be made. This type of analysis should be better 
able to isolate the workload changes by specialty and show where or if workload shifts 
have occurred by specialty. Again, we have chosen the weighted workload of the 
Relative Value Unit (RVU) for our analysis. This measure is used to determine the 
comparative worth of a physician’s services based upon the amount of resources used 
during that visit. The generally accepted principle is that the higher the RVU, the more 
involved and complex the patient visit is. While a direct comparison cannot be made 
between the inpatient RWP workload metric and the outpatient RVU workload metric, 
they are useful in determining the magnitude of work performed. 
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The first clinic evaluated was the General Surgery Clinic (BBA5) to determine 





Surgery Clinic - 
SDS  (BBA5) 
E/S  of General 
Surgeons (15C) 







1999 55,401.83 224 247.33 
2000 50,954.19 213 239.22 
2001 51,301.03 223 230.05 
2002 64,426.95 239 269.57 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 8.99% 
Table 25. Ratio of RVU Outpatient SDS Workload (BBA5) to General Surgeon (15C)  
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
We can see that there has been  an increase in overall outpatient surgical workload 
by 9 percent. This figure may be somewhat misleading because we are looking at only 
the BBA5 clinic for workload while using the E/S for general category 15C.  Category 
15C includes not only general surgeons, but cardio/thoracic, colon/rectal, pediatric, 
plastic, and peripheral vascular surgeons. This being the case, a more accurate way to 
depict this workload may be to sum the SDS workload for the work centers General 
Surgery Clinic (BBA5), Plastic Surgery Clinic (BBG5), Proctology Clinic (BBH5), 
Pediatric Surgery Clinic (BBJ5), and the Peripheral Vascular Surgery Clinic (BBK5). 
There was no workload counted for the Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery Clinic 
(BBB5), hence those work centers were eliminated from this next analysis.  The results of 





Sum of RVU 
Workload for 
SDS: BBA5 + 
BBG5 + BBH5 + 
BBJ5 + BBK5 
E/S of General 
Surgeons (15C) 







1999 68490.68 224 305.76 
2000 64080.86 213 300.85 
2001 66602.08 223 298.66 
2002 84125.61 239 351.99 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 15.12 % 
Table 26. Ratio of RVU Outpatient SDS Workload for the Surgery Clinics of BBA5 + 
BBG5 + BBH5 + BBJ5 + BBK5 to  the Category of General Surgeon (15C) 
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
Table 26 presents some evidence that the weighted workload seen in the selected 
SDS clinics, on average, has increased by 15 percent from 1999 to 2002. If you compare 
this to the weighted workload change on the inpatient side of patient care (a decrease of 
17.99 percent) using  similar methodology, then we observe almost a complete switch of 
areas in which surgical patients are cared for in Navy Medicine. But because we are only 
comparing 1999 to 2002, it is interesting to note that in the middle years (2000 and 2001), 
there was a slight downward trend in this measurement of work per general surgeon. The 
bulk of the workload can be attributed to the increase in workload in the Proctology clinic 
(547 percent increase in workload) and Pediatric Surgery clinics (166 percent increase in 
workload). Because of the initial downward change in workload per surgeon and then the 
sharp increase between 2001 and 2002, it is difficult to ascertain a specific trend. These 
developments will need to be followed over time to see if a clear trend is emerging.  
The next few tables present the same type of information by clinic specialty and 




















1999 5600.89 17 329.46 
2000 6430.03 19 338.42 
2001 1689.17 23 73.44 
2002 2932.88 26 112.80 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 -65.76% 
Table 27. Ratio of RVU Outpatient SDS Workload (BBC5) to Neurosurgeon (15D) 
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
 
When comparing the change in outpatient SDS workload per surgeon (-66 
percent) to the inpatient workload per surgeon for the similar work center of  
neurosurgery (ABD), there was a decrease in inpatient workload of 53 percent (Appendix 


















1999 33510.58 81 413.71 
2000 26042.24 78 333.87 
2001 24310.15 79 307.72 
2002 26599.43 81 328.39 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 - 20.62% 
Table 28. Ratio of RVU Outpatient SDS Workload (BBD5) to Ophthalmologist (15G) 
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
 
Using the ratio of work to surgeon again, here we see almost a 21 percent 
decrease in relative surgical workload per ophthalmologist, while at the same time we 
also observed a 17 percent decline in inpatient ophthalmologic workload (ABE) found in 
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1999 51928.67 82 633.28 
2000 49068.39 78 629.08 
2001 45438.74 75 605.85 
2002 45272.06 80 565.90 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 -10.64% 
Table 29. Ratio of RVU Outpatient SDS Workload (BBF5) to Otolaryngologists (15I) 
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
 
While the relative outpatient workload of otolaryngologists has declined by 
approximately 11 percent, there was a decrease of 26 percent in the inpatient area (ABG - 






Clinic - SDS  
(BBI5) 








1999 18210.67 52 350.21 
2000 17414.01 53 328.57 
2001 14972.95 49 305.57 
2002 19336.8 51 379.15 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 8.27% 
Table 30. Ratio of RVU Outpatient SDS Workload (BBI5) to Urologists (15J) 
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
 
Other than general surgery, this is the first specialty clinic where we observed a 
slight increase in relative outpatient workload. The ratio of workload per urologists 
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increased by 8 percent on the outpatient side while a decrease of 28 percent relative 
workload was observed in inpatient care (Appendix C).  
To assist in visualizing the data presented in the previous four tables, Figure 25 is 
helpful. 
 

































Source:  SADR and BUMIS 
 
Figure 25 more clearly shows the trends of workload per surgical specialty. It 
would appear that  Otolaryngolgists have a higher relative SDS workload than the other 
specialties.  This graph also shows the significant decrease in SDS workload per 
neurosurgeon. This relative decrease is due to the combination of the increase in the 
number of physicians who have 15D (neurosurgeon) as a primary subspecialty and the 
overall decrease in neurosurgical SDS workload.  
In order to assist in seeing the changes in relative workload per provider and 
comparing the inpatient changes to outpatient SDS changes, the table below shows a side 
by side comparison. This comparison summarizes the changes noted in the previous 
discussions covering the years 1999 to 2002.  
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% Change from 








Overall % Change 
in Weighted  SDS  
Workload per 
Specialist 
General Surgery -17.99 % 15.52 % 
Neurosurgery - 52.62 % -65.76 % 
Ophthalmology -17.07 % -20.62 % 
Otolaryngology -26.37 % - 10.64 % 
Urology -27.85 % 8.27 % 
Orthopedics -29.66 % -13.65 % 
Table 31. Comparison of Overall Percentage Change in Inpatient Surgical Workload 
to SDS Workload per Specialist 
 
Given the set of assumptions in section B, with the exception of the General 
Surgery category and Urology, Table 31 indicates that the amount of surgical workload 
per specialist has decreased in both the outpatient SDS and inpatient  areas. While 
looking at the numbers alone gives a picture of what is happening in terms of workload 
per provider, it does little to explain the reasons for this occurrence. This is one of the 
significant limitations of this research.  
Next, this research looked at the relationship between emergency room (ER) 
workload and the number of physicians who carry 16P (Emergency Medicine) as a 
primary subspecialty. It is generally felt that the ER doctors would provide a key role in 
the treatment and management of combat casualties. These individuals on a daily basis 
are faced with relatively high patient loads and are required to make accurate and timely 
decisions regarding patient care. Their potential exposure to injuries that may most 
closely resemble those that occur in combat, at least in the initial stages, is probably 
higher than any other type of doctor. Recall from the last chapter that there has also been 
a large increase (100 percent from 1990 to 2002) in the number or ER doctors, 
presumably to meet the peacetime requirements.  
The difference here between the workload measurements of the ER work center 
(BI) and the work centers evaluated above is that the ER is considered an outpatient 
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clinic and so no inpatient comparison can be made. The information  below shows the 
ratio of work performed in the ER work center, Navy wide, for 1999 to 2000.  
 




E/S of ER 
Physicians 
Ratio of RVU to 
ER Physicians 
1999 412,437.2 153 2695.668 
2000 444,507.9 170 2614.752 
2001 501,641.5 182 2756.272 
2002 534,175 176 3035.085 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 12.59 % 



















Ratio of RVU Workload to ER
Physician (16P)
 
Figure 26.   Ratio of Workload to the Number of Emergency Medicine Doctors 
 
Despite a small decrease in workload relative to the number of ER doctors in 
FY2000, there has been a relative increase in the amount of work per ER physician by 
almost 13 percent from 1999 to 2002. This increase in workload occurs despite a 15 
percent increase in the number of ER physicians during this same period. This also would 
tend to imply that the Emergency Departments have been increasingly busy over the last 
several years.  
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In summary, the only specialty that has seen an increase in inpatient workload 
evaluated in this research was the Internal Medicine (16R) physician and this increased 
by 19 percent.  This data shows that inpatient surgical workload per provider has declined 
by 18 percent between 1999 and 2002 and that inpatient orthopedic workload per 
provider has decreased by almost 30 percent. Outpatient workload volume was shown to 
have increased by 13 percent per Emergency Medicine physician (16P) between 1999 
and 2002. 
The above data suggests that per physician (all specialties) in Navy Medicine, 
hospital admissions have declined by almost 50 percent between 1992 and 2001. 
Between 1999 and 2002, weighted inpatient surgical workload per the general category 
of surgeon (primary subspecialties 15C, 15D, 15G, 15I, and 15J) as seen in Table 22,  has 
declined by almost 25 percent. Looking more specifically at the general surgeon category 
(15C), this data indicates that weighted inpatient workload has declined by 18 percent. 
Orthopedic inpatient workload per orthopedic surgeon had declined by 30 percent 
between 1999 and 2002.   
Does this represent a troubling trend? That cannot be answered here, but it is a 
trend that should be monitored. It may be that this observed decrease in inpatient surgical 
workload has “normalized” the workload per surgeon (i.e., the inpatient surgical 
workload seen in previous years was excessive and now has reached a more acceptable 
level). If this were the case, then the downward trend would not be as interesting. Also, 
while not evaluated here, the author believes that the administrative workload (burden) 
per surgeon has increased during this same time period. This should be evaluated and 
balanced against the decline in apparent inpatient workload. While the data does not 
suggest this, it may be that the outpatient workload “gained” over this period is more 
significant than the inpatient workload “lost” and requires further analysis.  
 
F.   WORKLOAD TREND ANALYSIS FOR NURSES  
The methodology used in the physician analysis above provides a direct link 
between the specialty of the doctor and the work center where the work was documented. 
This direct link is not apparent or even existent when evaluating the nurse’s workload or 
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attempting to correlate the number of nurses with a specific work center. For instance, a 
critical care nurse will care for patients who are admitted under different services 
(medial, surgical, obstetrics, pediatrics, orthopedics, etc.). There are also a number of 
hospitals in the Navy that have “multi-service units” which care for all types of patients, 
no matter what service admits them. This means that the nursing staff cares for a range of 
patients that includes mothers in labor and their newborns to retirees on their deathbed.  It 
is not uncommon to have a medical/surgical nurse (1910) caring for a newborn in a 
nursery one day and the next day caring for a patient admitted with chest pain and 
coronary artery disease.  The Nurse Corps does have a peri-natal subspecialty (1920) and 
a critical care subspecialty (1960), but it is only at the larger MTFs where they may work 
in the specific clinical area that matches their primary subspecialty. This “diversity of 
assignments” complicates the linkage between correlating primary subspecialty and the 
work center where the work is captured as was done for the physicians.  
Another complicating factor for this type of analysis with nursing is that the 
inpatient workload is not recorded using the MEPRS system as was done for other 
workload data presented in this analysis.  This inpatient workload is recorded by each 
facility using the Workload Management System for Nursing (WMSN). WMSN is a local 
database that provides a patient acuity classification structure that is designed to 
determine daily staffing based upon an assessment of patient care needs. According to the 
DoD WMSN Unit Manual, “WMSN captures nursing workload based on patient acuity 
and provides information for effective and efficient allocation and utilization of nursing 
personnel. DoD WMSN acuity is the workload factor used annually to determine nursing 
manpower requirements for the peacetime inpatient mission.”164  
The data that is collected in WMSN at each MTF does not go into the Expense 
Assignment System (EAS IV) to make any workload decisions. It is essentially a tool that 
is meant for use at the MTF and patient unit level. This allows for the individual MTF to 
assess workload and staffing changes at a local level (shifting resources from one 
inpatient unit to another), but does not provide a global picture of what is occurring 
regarding inpatient workload for Navy Medicine. Approximately 12 out of 20 or so 
                                                 
164 Department of Defense Workload Management System for Nursing, Version 4.1. Unit Manual.    
p. ii. [https://imcenter.med.navy.mil/wmsn/Manuals/unit41.doc]. Accessed January 2003. 
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facilities do submit  monthly workload reports, but these reports are not utilized by Navy 
Medicine for manpower decisions.165  These reports haven’t been consistently reported 
since 1999.166 
In addition to this lack of a global perspective on inpatient nursing workload, 
there have been many reported problems with the reliability of the data obtained from 
WMSN. These problems can be primarily traced to variability and differing 
interpretations of the persons entering the data.  The Navy is currently evaluating new 
systems to correct and enhance the current workload system shortfalls. 
Because of these limitations with the WMSN, and because this workload is not 
reported in MEPRS, this research will adapt its methodology to allow for some overall 
comparisons among nursing specialties, but on  a more limited basis.  These comparisons 
are explained below. 
  Since the focus of this research has been surgical care, we will start with the 
Peri-Operative nursing specialty (1950). Individuals who are in this specialty practice in a 
variety of settings that include “military treatment facilities, fleet hospitals, hospital ships, 
and the Fleet Marine Force (FMF).”167  “They are responsible for the nursing care prior 
to surgery including the preoperative, intraoperative, and postoperative stages of the 
patient's surgical experience.” 168  Whether a surgical case in performed as a  SDS or as a 
case that will be admitted to the hospital, the perioperative nurse is involved in the care of 
these patients.  
A portion of the workload that is captured under the summary account AB 
(Inpatient Surgical Care) includes consultative evaluation for referral patients. This work 
is labor that is performed by the physician. The perioperative nurse is not involved in this 
capture of workload. The MEPRS codes that begin with “D” fall under the functional 
                                                 
165 Phone conversation with Sharafat Yousufzai at the TRICARE Management Agency, February 
2003.  
166 Email from CDR Christine Boltz, Head, Analysis & Evaluation, Health Care Operations and Plans 
Naval Medical Center San Diego, March 2002.  
167 Perioperative Nursing Home Page. 
[https://bumed.med.navy.mil/med00nc/SpecialtyLeaderPage/perioperative_nursing/default.htm]. Accessed 
February 2003.  
168 Ibid.  
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account of ancillary services. The second level or summary account DF is for Surgical 
Services and DG is for Same Day Services. These sub-accounts use minutes of service as 
their metric for determining expenses and workload.  Data was requested from NMIMC 
for all “D” level MEPRS codes, similar to the data presented in earlier chapters. Unlike 
the data received for the “A” and “B” MEPRS codes, the data received was inconsistent 
and appeared to have significant quality problems. For example, for one year, one MTF 
(a smaller Navy MTF) was recording 85 percent of all listed Same Day Surgery services. 
This anomaly, along with other inconsistencies, prompted the discarding of this data and 
eliminated its use for this and subsequent analysis. It was decided to use the workload 
data collected for SDS as the comparison data for perioperative nurses because it 
appeared more reliable.   
Because of the direct link that could be attributed to a physician specialty and the 
workload associated with a specialty clinic, a weighted measure was used. This direct 
link is not established for the nursing workload and therefore an un-weighted and more 
indirect workload metric was used for this analysis. For similar reasons, the direct link to 
inpatient surgical workload could not be attributed to perioperative nurses. This prompted 
the use of total SDS visits (B**5) to be utilized as the comparison metric for 
perioperative nurses.  This comparison shown in Table 33 below exhibits the ratio of 
SDS visits to the E/S of perioperative nurses (1950) for each year. 
 
Table 33. Ratio of Total SDS Visits to E/S of Perioperative Nurses 
 
Total SDS Visits Workload for
B**5 
See Table 11. 
E/S of Perioperative Nurses
(1950) 
See Appendix H. 
Ratio of 
SDS Visits to 
Nurse 
1999 26,782 243 110.21 
2000 24,910 240 103.79 
2001 25,725 235 109.47 
2002 32,303 268 120.53 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 9.36% 
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
From information presented in Chapter III, Table 19, we see that the perioperative 
nurse subspecialty has increased by over 9 percent from 1990 to 2002. From 1999 to 
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2002, the overall increase in end strength for perioperative nurses has increased over 10 
percent. Using Table 12 from Chapter II, we observe that the un-weighted workload of 
Raw Visits for outpatient SDS surgical care has increased by almost 21 percent.  So 
despite the increase in E/S of  perioperative nurses, the ratio of workload per nurse has 
increased by 9 percent between 1999 and 2002.  
A similar analysis was performed using total emergency room visits as the 
workload measure and the total E/S of emergency nurses (1945 subspecialty) for the 
same years.  This matrix is present below. 
 
Table 34. Ratio of ER Visits to ER Nurse 
 
Total Emergency  Room 
Visits for Navy Medicine
 




ER Visits to  ER 
Nurse 
1999 402,376 145 2,775.01 
2000 425,843 165 2,580.87 
2001 478,793 164 2,919.47 
2002 499,797 180 2,776.65 
Overall Percent Change 1999 - 2002 0.06% 
Source: SADR and BUMIS 
 
This matrix shows that while there was a 24 percent increase in the number of ER 
visits in Navy Medicine between 1999 and 2002, the number of nurses with a primary 
subspecialty of 1945 also increased by 24 percent (Table 18). These changes net an 
overall change of zero percent.  
 
G.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has brought together the elements of workload and E/S staffing 
based on primary subspecialties in an effort to present a picture of the workload per 
provider over the last few years.  This was done by looking at weighted workload, in both 
the inpatient and outpatient areas.  Additionally, the workload for surgical SDS (B**5 
MEPRS codes) was examined to evaluate if  the “lost” inpatient workload is being seen 
under the outpatient surgical workload category. This “swap” of workload (from inpatient 
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to outpatient surgery) is evident for general surgeons, but not for the other surgical 
specialties (Table 31).    
The decreasing workload per provider found in this analysis is noteworthy, but it 
is important that subject matter experts as well as other health care analysts evaluate this 
information, critique it, and report on the “impact” on medical readiness (if any).  For 
example, is it reasonable to assume that evaluating SDS neurosurgical workload is even 
reasonable given the nature of its specialty? Such questions and analysis of subject matter 
experts would provide useful and insightful information to this trend analysis.  
Additionally, from this methodology, it was impossible to determine how many 
providers were actually at the point of direct patient care.  For example, we observed that 
the apparent inpatient workload per uniformed internal medicine physician has been 
increasing over the near term. What we don’t know is how much of that workload is 
“outsourced” to civilian providers inside the MTFs. It may be possible that while the 
number of uniformed providers has decreased in recent years, the number of contracted 
providers has increased in the MTFs to help offset the increase in internal medicine 
workload. The set of assumptions in section B is necessary to more fully understand the 
data that is presented here.  
 Regardless of the interpretations of the subject matter experts, it may be 
important for Navy Medicine to articulate how the changes in inpatient and outpatient 
surgical workload affects medical readiness of the organization and how current practices 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY  
Provision of state of the art health care requires a multifaceted, elaborate and 
sophisticated organization.  Large health care organizations face additional challenges of 
managing resources and operating efficiently. The Military Health System (MHS) is one 
of the world’s largest health care systems. Its size alone points to the complexity that 
faces this organization. Adding to this complexity is the sometimes competing nature of 
the dual missions of military medicine. The MHS has two primary missions. One mission 
is to provide timely, quality health services to its beneficiary population through the 
direct care system of Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs), commonly referred to as the 
health benefit mission. The other mission involves the tremendous responsibility of 
providing combat health services to the men and women of the armed services in forward 
areas of operation and is known as the readiness mission.  The need for uniformed 
personnel of MHS stems primarily from the readiness mission to care for military 
personnel in the operational military environment and during wartime.  
The complex roles of the MHS are many times intertwined in a series of tradeoffs 
between  the resources of time, talent, and money. Ideally, these two missions would 
operate hand in hand, working lockstep with one another, one directly supporting the 
other. In a perfect world, the case mix and volume of patients during peacetime would be 
related to the MHS’s wartime missions. But often the support provided by one mission 
for the other is tangential in nature, and at other times conflicting. The MHS “has always 
been challenged by the problem of reconciling the different requirements for the 
surgically intensive combat support environment and the different mix of providers 
necessary to support the routine, peacetime mission.”169 This thesis has looked at one 
aspect of the health benefit mission and how that role may “support” the readiness 
mission.  Specifically, this research has provided an analysis of Navy Medicine’s 
inpatient and outpatient surgical workload, the military staffing to perform that workload 
and its relationship to the readiness mission.   
                                                 
169 Email from CAPT Jack Smith, MC, USN  - Director of Clinical Program Policy Integration, 
OASD (HA). November 2002.  
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The Navy has a responsibility to its patients to provide quality health care. It also 
has a fiscal responsibility to Congress and ultimately the tax payer, to provide medical 
services as economically as possible. In its attempt to control costs and be good stewards 
of the tax payer’s dollars, the MHS uses many of the “tools” and organizational structures 
of the civilian sector. One such structure is managed care.  
Over the last decade or so, the MHS has adopted many strategies of the civilian 
managed care organizations as part of its own efforts to improve cost savings, service, 
quality, access to care, and business practices. One of the cornerstones of managed care is 
its increased emphasis on providing successful community based and worksite 
prevention-oriented, coordinated healthcare. Patients reap benefits from consistent 
healthcare and improved overall health. This focus on developing healthy communities 
makes good business and clinical sense from the managed care/population health 
perspective.  
But while this focus may have benefits in terms of cost avoidance and improved 
overall health for military members, there is concern about its impact on the ability of the 
MHS to provide optimal care in the surgically intensive environment a wartime scenario 
is likely to produce. It is this theme of  viewing medical readiness through the lens of 
peacetime health care delivery that is the hub of this research.   
Under the best of circumstances, peacetime medical care serves as the training 
ground for the readiness mission.  To some extent peacetime care accomplishes this 
objective, which is the way the system was designed. But is it possible that there is an 
increasing risk corridor in which the peacetime medical model comes less and less to 
resemble or support the development of skill sets that may be needed during wartime?  If 
this is the case, can an organization continue to effectively meet the expectations of both 
missions in a resource constrained environment? Although this is an old question for 
Navy Medicine,  the managed care model is relatively new and there is little published 
literature to assess the impact of this model on the readiness mission. With the increasing 
costs of health care, it becomes more and more important that the infrastructure and 
personnel in Navy Medicine be used efficiently and  relevant to the readiness mission. 
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The primary research question for this study was: Has there been a change in 
wartime-relevant medical workload and medical staffing over the last decade, impacting 
medical readiness?  It was felt that the skills needed to care for wartime casualties should 
have  a surgically intensive focus to care for those wounded in action.  Recent studies 
have suggested that wounded in action, chemical and biological casualties are likely to 
increase in future conflicts. With the  mounting likelihood of armed battles in large urban 
areas, the increased propensity for civilian casualties will add to the necessity for specific 
surgical and first responder skill sets. It has been suggested that the demands placed on 
Navy Medicine will “require enhanced skills of those providing care, a focus on patient 
stabilization and preparation for evacuation; perhaps requiring a larger and different mix 
of expertise onsite.”170  Recent evidence from the Persian Gulf War and the initial stages 
of Operation Enduring Freedom have demonstrated improved field preventive medicine 
efforts and surveillance and have decreased the incidence of disease non-battle 
injuries.171  This is very beneficial to the combat forces, but it also signifies the need 
specially trained medical personnel. 
Workload was determined to be a function of volume and type of patients seen in 
Navy Medicine.  This thesis began with a broad overview of inpatient and outpatient 
visits,  followed by a focus on inpatient and surgical workload. Outpatient workload was 
presented to provide a more complete picture of overall workload for the organization.  
Subsequently, the relative work per specialist was examined, primarily from a surgical 
standpoint. Ultimately, if wartime relevant medical workload is viewed through a 
peacetime lens and is defined as surgical in nature, it is clear that there have been some 
substantial changes in recent years. The most notable change has been the shift in focus 
of the surgical caseload from inpatient care to outpatient surgery.  This change has 
substantially reduced the number of surgical admissions to Navy’s MTFs over the last 
decade.  
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The question that remains unanswered is whether or not these changes impact the 
organization’s medical readiness.  If the assertion is that wartime relevant workload 
resembles inpatient surgical workload, then the answer is a definitive yes. However, it is 
not clear that this assertion can be made. Is there a difference between the set of skills 
needed for the procedures used in ambulatory surgery and those required for surgeries 
involving hospitalization?  And if those differences exist, do they impact the readiness of 
the organization?  This is for subject matter experts to explore. Some experts have argued 
that there is extensive overlap between technical skills that are needed to treat [combat] 
trauma patients and those skills that are practiced during the routine elective procedures 
that constitute most surgical practices. Others have made the claim that skill acquisition 
and professional competency are context dependent and involve relevant hands on 
experience and exposure. Noted surgeon, Dr. Arthur Smith had this to say about the 
differences between same day surgery and inpatient surgery and its relevance to the 
readiness mission:  
Basically, what would appear to be needed is a fundamental sense of 
flexibility in adapting to the fundamental availabilities of numbers of 
patients at hand, the numbers of casualties anticipated, evacuation 
capabilities and distances involved in evacuation. In addition, the lack of 
nursing support in the field, the unpredictable conditions of battle, and the 
evacuation distances involved are also factored into the equation. In sum, I 
am not sure that the issue of outpatient or inpatient surgery experience has 
much relevance to the gaps in surgical management seen in the early 
phases of any war.172 
This would seem to imply that there are many other factors to consider other than 
just the requisite skill sets needed to care for combat casualties. While this may seem 
obvious, recent history has suggested that this skill set is not being adequately developed. 
“Unfortunately, the Army CENTCOM Surgeon during Desert Shield/Storm described the 
fact that most military physicians did not understand the differences between combat 
surgery and peacetime surgery, resulting in their trying to do too much at initial 
treatment, thereby tying up operating rooms excessively and consuming limited supplies. 
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They had no idea as to the classic lessons of field surgery.”173 This example may point to 
the impact of the increasingly dichotomous nature of our dual mission medical force. 
There is also concern that the decrease in inpatient surgical workload  may likely impact 
the readiness of the staff that cares for these individuals, most notably, the nursing and  
hospital corps staff.  This is an area that would be ripe for further research and 
exploration.  
 Some would point out that the workload in outpatient surgical specialty clinics 
enhances medical readiness by arguing that any time a patient is seen in the military 
medical system,  it can be considered training, hence value added. Others would argue 
that what is more important is the type of patients seen. Still others would argue that what 
matters is a combination of volume and specific type of workload. This is an issue for the 
subject matter experts to seriously consider.  These same questions should be extended to 
the primary care arena as well. While these questions are not answered here, they do pose 
serious issues which should be explored further within the Navy Medicine organization. 
A summary of the findings of this research is presented below.   
For all of Navy Medicine MTFs from 1992 through 2001, the number of inpatient 
admissions has decreased  by over 51 percent (Table 3). During this same time period, 
the total number of outpatient visits has declined by almost 23 percent (Table 3). Neither 
of these numbers appears very surprising for this time period. Recalling that a significant 
number of MTFs were either closed or reduced in size during this time frame, it is easy to 
see why the numbers have declined to such a drastic degree. Additionally, the 
transformation of Navy Medicine’s medical model from one of treatment and 
intervention to a managed care model focused on health promotion, prevention and 
population health is designed to produce a healthier population, requiring fewer 
hospitalizations and fewer outpatient visits.  With the health plan options offered under 
TRICARE, beneficiaries may have easier access to civilian providers “out in town” and 
choose this as their health care option. This choice of health care may add to the overall 
decrease in the number of inpatient hospitalizations and outpatient visits seen throughout 
Navy Medicine.   
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Using raw counts of production for measurement of inpatient workload between 
1999 and 2002 (Tables 4 and 5), the overall inpatient workload has increased across 
Navy Medicine by 1.4 to 2.9 percent, depending on the measure used. The highest 
percentage increases were found in Family Practice (AG), Medical Care (AA), and 
OB/GYN (AC). However, the Relative Weighted Product (RWP) for inpatient care, a 
measure that reflects source of admission, case complexity, length of hospital stay, 
disposition status in conjunction with the patient’s diagnosis and other thresholds as 
compared to other patients, decreased by almost 4 percent (Table 6).  The slight increase 
in measures for raw inpatient workload and small decrease in weighted inpatient 
workload would tend to suggest that there are more patients being admitted for inpatient 
care across Navy Medicine, but the stays are shorter and/or resource consumption has 
decreased. It is a commonly accepted notion that the patients who are seen in the MTFs 
today are “sicker than they used to be” and their hospital stays are shorter than in years 
past.  
It may be that the weighted workload measures used in this analysis are not 
optimal for the analysis conducted, but over the period examined, there does not appear 
to be a substantial difference between raw inpatient workload measures and weighted  
inpatient workload measures.  The small difference between raw and weighted measures 
may also indicate a less complex patient population.  These distinctions are impossible to 
resolve with the data used in this research. Other than the decreases seen in psychiatric 
admissions, the most significant decreases in weighted inpatient workload for all of Navy 
Medicine occurred in Orthopedic Care (AE) and Surgical Care (AB), with changes of – 
19.4 percent and –17.7 percent respectively. From 1999 to 2002, there has been a 
consistent decrease in inpatient surgical and orthopedic workload.  
This thesis also examined the outpatient workload data for all of Navy Medicine. 
While outpatient visits from 1992 to 2001 decreased by over 20 percent (Table 3), more 
recent evidence suggests that from 1999 to 2002 total outpatient visits have increased by 
almost 30 percent (Table 8). Using the weighted workload information (using Relative 
Value Units) for this  same data shows a similar increase in workload by almost 27 
percent.  
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Examining the surgical side of outpatient workload and overall outpatient visits,  
we find that surgical outpatient care has increased by 22 percent (Table 8) between 1999 
and 2002.  But when one looks at the weighted values for this same information, we 
discover that the weighted outpatient surgical care has increased by only 12 percent 
(Table 9).  This would suggest that the complexity and resource consumption of the 
outpatient surgical visits have not increased in direct proportion to the total number of 
surgical outpatient visits.  
When evaluating the raw outpatient surgical workload more closely (Table 10) 
from 1999 to 2002, the it was found that the top three increases in volume, as a 
percentage, were the Neurosurgery Clinic (BBC), Plastic Surgery Clinic (BBG), and 
Pediatric Surgery Clinic (BBJ), with increases of 77 percent, 65 percent and 51 percent 
respectively. But if this outpatient care is broken out to the SDS workload of those same 
specialties (Table 13), we find a decrease in  neurosurgery workload (BBC5) of almost 
48 percent and a decrease in plastic surgery workload (BBG5) of 15 percent. Pediatric 
surgery outpatient workload, on the other hand, has increased by 166 percent over the 
same time period. Nearly half of all outpatient surgical visits are seen by either the 
General Surgery Clinic (BBA) or the Otolaryngology Clinic (BBF). From 1999 to 2002, 
these two clinics saw raw visit increases of 14 percent and 6 percent respectively.  
Using weighted outpatient workload values (RVUs) for surgical care (Table 11),  
it is seen that the magnitude of  change is not as great as the raw measures. The largest 
percentage increases of workload were found in the Neurosurgery Clinic (70 percent), 
Pediatric Surgery Clinic (59 percent) and the Pain Management Clinic (BBL)  (53 
percent).   General Surgery (BBA) saw a weighted increase of only 5 percent over this 
same period.  The Orthopedic Clinic (BEA) saw a slight decrease in workload over the 
same time period of -.54 percent.  
The last portion of workload data used in this research was surgical Same Day 
Surgeries (SDS) or Ambulatory Procedure Visits. From 1999 to 2002,  using the fourth 
level MEPRS code for Surgical Care (B**5), an increase in raw workload of 20.61 
percent (Table 12) was found. Yet when looking at the weighted workload for the same 
clinics, only .16 percent increase was observed (Table 13).  The largest increases were 
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found in the Proctology (BBH5), Pediatric Surgery (BBJ5), and General Surgery Clinics 
(BBA5). The Orthopedic Clinic (BEA5) during this same time period saw a decrease of 
minus 1.1 percent in weighted workload.  
Little change in total end strength (ranging from -6.3 percent to +3.2 percent 
depending on the years used and corps) (Table 16) was found when analyzing the total 
number of uniformed doctors and nurses in Navy Medicine from 1990 to the present. 
While there have been shifts in certain specialties during this same time period, the 
overall change has been minimal compared to the decreases in end strength seen in the 
entire Navy organization (approximately -36 percent) (Table 15). The reason for this 
comparatively small change for Navy Medicine end strength is that the Total Health Care 
Support Readiness Requirement model is able to “justify” or delineate the specific 
medical requirements needed to support hypothesized amounts and types of casualties 
likely to be seen in wartime scenarios.  It has been said that “Navy Medicine does not set 
the Requirement, Navy Medicine supports the Requirement.”174 This statement illustrates 
the dependence of Navy Medicine’s force structure on the Defense Planning Guidance 
and the war scenarios developed by the Combatant Commanders.  
While there has been little change in total end strength for doctors and nurses, 
there have been substantial changes in the number of doctors and nurses with particular 
specialties. Not all subspecialties were evaluated for this research (of particular note was 
the absence of analysis for anesthesia providers). For the Medical Corps, the notable 
changes between the years 1990 and 2002 are the increases in the number of uniformed 
Emergency Medicine Doctors (100 percent), Family Practice Doctors (57 percent), and 
Pediatricians (26 percent) (Table 17). It is likely that these changes reflect an emphasis 
on primary care and the adoption of a  medical model that emphasizes outpatient care.   
The most notable decreases in uniformed physician specialties found during this 
time frame include Urologists (-25 percent), Otolaryngologists (-18 percent), Internists (-
17 percent), and General Surgeons (-7 percent). Three of four of these are surgical 
                                                 




specialties (Table 17).  Again, these changes probably reflect the changes seen in 
workload at the MTFs.  
An examination of the relative workload by specialty, i.e., the amount of 
workload performed per uniformed physician specialty, shows some interesting trends 
(Table 31).  It would appear that the amount of overall work performed by general 
surgeons has remained fairly constant when comparing inpatient surgical workload to 
outpatient surgical workload. This means that while there has been a decrease in inpatient 
surgical workload of almost 18 percent between 1999 and 2002, there has been a 
corresponding increase in outpatient surgical workload (16 percent) per general surgeon. 
This trend cannot be shown for the surgical specialties of neurosurgery, ophthalmology, 
otolaryngology or orthopedics. All these specialties have seen a decrease in both 
outpatient workload and inpatient workload per provider over this same time frame 
(using the set of assumptions as outlined in Section B of Chapter IV). The urology 
specialty has seen a significant decrease in inpatient workload (-28 percent) but a 
moderate increase (8 percent) in outpatient workload between 1999 and 2002. Emergency 
Room physicians have seen a relative increase in workload of almost 13 percent while 
Internal Medicine physicians have seen a increase in inpatient workload of 19 percent 
over the same time period. 
When looking at a few of the nursing specialties between 1990 and 2002, we see a 
58 percent decrease in the end strength of Ambulatory Care nurses (Table 18).  This 
comes at a time when Navy Medicine is seeing an increasing number of outpatient visits 
in the ambulatory care setting. There have been substantial increases in end strength for 
Peri-natal nurses (34 percent), Medical/Surgical nurses (33 percent), Critical Care nurses 
(14 percent), and Peri-operative nurses (9 percent).  These increases in end strength for 
inpatient and Peri-operative nurses appear consistent with meeting the personnel 
requirements of the readiness mission.   
However, if viewed in light of workload trends  and a declining inpatient 
population,  these increases appear out of place. This could imply better nurse-to-patient 
ratios than in previous years. It could also mean that fewer nurses are at the point of 
direct patient care than in previous years. This distinction was impossible to make using 
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the data in this research. In apparent response to the peacetime mission workload, there 
have been increases in Emergency Room nurses (12 percent), Pediatric nurses (11 
percent), and Nurse Practitioners (adding all Family Nurse Practitioners, Pediatric Nurse 
Practitioners, OB/GYN Nurse Practitioners and Mid-Wives)  (84 percent).  
The decrease in surgical inpatient admissions reduces the number of clinical 
experiences to which the inpatient nursing staff is exposed and may reduce opportunities 
to develop crucial clinical skills. The analysis of overall nursing workload was limited 
because of the lack of a central, standardized reporting workload system for nursing.  
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
To some degree, the changes in workload and staffing identified here for the 
period 1990 to 2002 reflect the changing nature of the delivery of health care and in the 
Navy Medicine organization. These changes seem generally consistent with a resource 
constrained environment and the workload discussed. They are also sensible when 
considering the advantages and benefits (decreased incidence of illness, improved 
productivity, cost savings, etc.) that follow from efforts to improve the overall health of 
an organization. But do these changes signal a decreased focus on the readiness mission? 
Does this mean that the peacetime mission no longer supports the wartime mission? The 
data do not support that conclusion.  
 However, this increased focus on the development of a healthier population 
through population health and health promotion initiatives and improved business 
practices may be an indicator that there is an increased emphasis on the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities necessary to successfully operate the peacetime benefit mission when 
compared to those needed during war.  There may be a widening gap between the skill 
sets needed to provide the  health care required during peacetime and those needed to 
care for combat casualties likely to be faced during the wartime mission.  Based on 
previous testimony by the Congressional Budget Office, peacetime care does provide 
some training for wartime, “but most of the care provided during peacetime is not 
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relevant to even non casualty wartime patient loads.”175 Additionally, “peacetime care 
gives military medical personnel almost no chance to practice their war-related skills.”176  
It would appear that these “chances” may be decreasing when considering the changes to 
the workload seen in the peacetime benefit mission. 
Other studies have shown that there is a disparity between the type of medical 
care provided during the peacetime benefit mission and the medical care needed during 
wars as part of the readiness mission.  The question here is whether that disparity is 
widening. The Navy has undertaken a number of  steps to narrow this gap in training and 
experience of its personnel through training programs, use of simulators,  and residency 
initiatives working with the civilian sector.  It is not clear what the financial and 
productivity cost of these will be. They may not be  cheap, in that they require military 
personnel  to be absent from their normal duties of providing peacetime care.  There is 
also the opportunity cost of disrupting patient and provider relationships.  And the issue 
of sustainment training becomes a revolving door for these kinds of costs. At a time when 
a focus of Navy Medicine is customer service, separating providers from their patient 
population may decrease  beneficiary satisfaction.  
Over the last decade the increase in operations other than war  have been 
increasing opportunities to practice readiness skills. These are beneficial from a 
standpoint of developing critical skill sets and operational experience and are necessary 
for the organization. In addition, there have been revitalized and improved operational 
training initiatives (such as the Navy Trauma Training Center) along with organizational 
changes (implementation of Component UICs) that have focused efforts on the readiness 
mission. These efforts are to be applauded and continued  and increased in scope.  
In many ways the research for this thesis has been conducted from “the outside,” 
viewing the spectrum of clinical workload and staffing without any previous experience 
with this information or data. Many variables, nuances and facets of a complete analysis 
cannot be explained by just looking at the numbers from a distance. In order to have a 
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better understanding and interpretation of the measurements it is important to have some 
working knowledge of the data. This kind of understanding allows for necessary 
adjustments in data quality or manipulation. A working knowledge also affords differing 
approaches to looking at an issue.  
In attempting to look at all of Navy Medicine’s workload and end-strength data, 
the scope of this endeavor may have been too broad.  An alternative methodology would 
have been to choose a specific MTF and evaluate its workload and staffing over time. If 
this methodology would have proven effective in isolating important changes in 
workload, it could then be applied to a larger context to provide a more definitive 
analysis. The limitations of the study notwithstanding, it has revealed some important and 
interesting changes over time, developments that merit further investigation, description 
and analysis.   
With little change in the overall force structure of the Medical and Nurse Corps, 
the increasing costs of providing health care, and a changing military doctrine, it will 
become increasingly important for Navy Medicine to be able to demonstrate how the 
peacetime mission supports the wartime mission.  Historically, the Surgeon Generals and 
other experts have contended that providing peacetime care for a largely non-active duty 
population is the best way to train medical personnel for wartime.  The claim is  made 
that these peacetime training practices  also support goals such as attracting and retaining 
military physicians.177  These practices are critical, but a new military doctrine may be 
the catalyst for force structure changes that reduce the requirement for military medical 
personnel. 
The bottom line for this research is that an organization that is required to provide 
high quality support for such diverse missions using the same personnel and limited 
resources is unavoidably precarious. The vision of the MHS “is to attain world class 
stature as a health care system, one that meets all wartime and peacetime health and 
medical needs for the active military, retirees, their families, and others entitled 
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beneficiaries.”178 This is no small task. The risks, as RAND has stated for the Army, is 
that  that “decisionmakers, pressed by day-to-day demands of beneficiary care, could lose 
sight of important developments for future needs on the operational side.”179    
Navy Medicine’s strategic plan includes three goals to achieve readiness: (1) 
Optimize the health and fitness of the total force, (2) Minimize casualties through 
effective prevention and surveillance, and (3) Maximize readiness to deliver effective 
casualty care anywhere, every time. This third goal is the focus of this research. One of 
the objectives listed to reach these goals includes the assurance that  personnel are trained 
for their contingency roles. While it is not clear what is meant by “trained for 
contingency roles,” it is interpreted here as receiving the appropriate medical platform 
indoctrination and training to be functional.  If this is the case, there may be a role here 
for a more “reserve-like” medical force. There are nay-sayers to an increased emphasis 
on the reserves, and there are valid reasons for their concern. But is it possible that the 
day-to-day clinical exposure received in civilian medical centers would better prepare 
specific reserve medical personnel for their readiness roles than the routine of Navy 
MTFs?  This poses yet another question for future research.  
As part of its goal of training to requirements, Navy Medicine’s Strategic Plan 
indicates that it will align and train “its military, civilian and contract partners to support 
the Navy’s mission.”180 Readiness requirements generally imply uniformed personnel. If 
Navy Medicine is to align and train its military personnel and the peacetime workload is 
the primary source of this training, the workload must support this objective. However, 
that support may be diminishing.  
 As pointed out above, there may be opportunities to increase the reserve 
contribution to this readiness role of Navy Medicine. This would decrease the need for 
such a large active duty role. This would also imply increased and improved training 
requirements for operational platforms and improved “call up and readiness” metrics to 
implement, but might, in the long term, decrease medical expenditures.  
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While the dual missions have been the nature of the business of military medicine 
for many years, the call for transformation has been heard from the highest levels of 
government. If transformation is to occur with a more narrow focus on wartime 
readiness, this could be an opportune time to consider a new model. This model would 
allow military medicine to focus on the readiness mission entirely and to further integrate 
its peacetime benefit operations with those civilian organizations which focus on the 
delivery of health care in hospital and community based systems. This more specialized 
model may provide added benefits to providing improved medical care in the field and 
costing the taxpayer less. There may come a time and place where the medical benefits 
provided by the MHS will be cost prohibitive. A new, more narrow approach to a joint 
operational medical force and the provision of health care to active duty forces would 
narrow the mission, allow for more specialization, decrease manpower and infrastructure 
overhead, and provide the singular focus of meeting the combat health support mission.  
As stated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), the “readiness to 
provide combat health support to achieve our national military objectives is the heart and 
soul of our Military Health System.”181  If combat health support is the “heart and soul,” 
then the dual mission is too broad and a more specific and narrowly defined readiness 
mission must emerge to be  the focal point of  the MHS. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is apparent that over the last decade a new medical model has emerged. The 
driver for this new model has been the need to control costs. This is important in our 
resource constrained environment and particularly so with the prediction of increased 
costs in the years to come. It could be important for Navy Medicine to have, as part of a 
comprehensive set of readiness metrics,  one which views medical readiness using 
peacetime workload and staffing as variables. For example, one weakness shown in this 
study is that we could not identify how many uniformed providers with clinical 
subspecialties were actually spending time in direct patient care. A system of that would 
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account for the number of Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) of doctors, nurses, and others 
routinely involved in direct patient care would be helpful in this type of analysis. The 
newly tested Defense Medical Human Resources System – internet (DMHRi) may be 
useful in accomplishing this goal. This system aspires to “track and manage human 
resources” and to “capture and measure human resource utilization across the MHS 
enterprise.”182   
Additionally, if this type of metric could delineate the type of patient care the 
provider is involved in, it would be an added benefit to showing the line community, 
DoD, Congress and others how the work performed is related to, enhances, or adds value 
to the readiness mission. This would be beneficial to Navy Medicine.  This metric could 
be followed and trended over time, showing  the number of doctors, nurses or others 
involved in direct patient care and analyzing whether the relative workload is increasing, 
decreasing, or remaining constant. In this way, clinical workload could be viewed much 
more accurately for each specialty. This study has shown that we cannot determine how 
many uniformed FTEs are at the point of direct patient care.  Although some would say 
that they are as busy as ever in Navy Medicine, the question is what are they busy doing. 
Is it administrative workload, patient care workload, etc? A comprehensive metric such 
as this would help to ferret out some of this useful information.  Additionally, it could be 
used to show others the relevancy of peacetime work to the readiness mission. This will 
become increasingly important in the years ahead.  
That said, it is critically important that the collection of this type of data not 
increase the administrative workload of the clinicians. It must be built into the organic 
processes that are already present in the organization. The collection of data many times 
necessitates increased administrative burdens on the clinicians, encouraging resistance 
and frustrating clinicians. A system to integrate this form of data and metric collection 
with minimal impact on the administrative workload would require collaboration and 
direct input from and cooperation with the various clinical specialties and foresight into 
the future demands of health care providers.  
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In order to make relevant and pertinent changes in an organization, it is important 
that the proper metrics be utilized to establish a base line. If changes are to be 
implemented system wide, there needs to be a central reporting structure to input, track 
and follow these metrics.  Metrics require a tools for analysis. This research discovered 
that there is no systematic central tool or method for the Navy Medicine to track inpatient 
nursing workload. The tool currently used by some Navy MTFs is the Workload 
Management System for Nursing, but only a fraction of  MTFs use it to provide workload 
information to NMIMC.  Nor is this information being used to aid the organization’s 
efforts at manpower planning for the nursing community. Data from this study and 
statements from others indicate that continual utilization of specialty skills  remains a 
challenge for the Nurse Corps. A central information technology/decision support system 
with inpatient nursing workload information may prove beneficial in ensuring that the 
right person with the right training is meeting the peacetime needs of Navy Medicine.  
The proposed implementation of the decision support system “Requirements Toolbox” 
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APPENDIX A 
MEDICAL EXPENSE AND PERFORMANCE REPORTING SYSTEM CODES 





AA Medical Care AC  Obstetrical and Gynecological Care
AAA Internal Medicine ACA Gynecology 
AAB Cardiology ACB Obstetrics 
AAC Coronary Care Unit ACX OB/GYN Care Cost Pool 
AAD Dermatology ACZ OB/GYN NEC 
AAE Endocrinology ADA Pediatrics 
AAF Gastroenterology ADB Newborn Nursery 
AAG Hematology ADC Neonatal ICU 
AAH Medical ICU ADD Adolescent Pediatrics 
AAI Nephrology ADE Pediatric ICU 
AAJ Neurology ADX Pediatric Care Cost Pool 
AAK Oncology ADZ Pediatric Care NEC 
AAL Pulmo/Resp Disease AE Orthopedic Care 
AAM Rheumatology AEA Orthopedics 
AAN Physical Medicine AEB Podiatry 
AAO Clinical Immunology AEC Hand Surgery 
AAP HIV III - AIDS AEX Orthopedic Care Cost Pool 
AAQ Bone Marrow Transplant AEZ Orthopedic Care NEC 
AAR Infectious Disease AF Psychiatric Care 
AAS Allergy AFA Psychiatrics 
AAX Medical Care Cost Pool AFB Substance Abuse Rehab 
AAZ Medical Care NEC AFX Psychiatric Care Cost Pool 
AB Surgical Care AFZ Psychiatric Care NEC 
ABA General Surgery AG Family Practice Care 
ABB Cardio/Thoracic Surgery AGA Family Practice Medicine 
ABC Surgical ICU AGB Family Practice Surgery 
ABD Neurosurgery AGC Family Practice Obstetrics 
ABE Ophthalmology AGD Family Practice Pediatrics 
ABF Oral Surgery AGE Family Practice Gynecology 
ABG Otolaryngology AGF Family Practice Psychiatry 
ABH Pediatric Surgery AGG Family Practice Orthopedics 






ABJ Proctology AGX Family Practice Cost Pool 
ABK Urology AGZ Family Practice Care NEC 
ABL Organ Transplant BA Medical Care 
ABM Burn Unit BAA Internal Medicine Clinic 
ABN Peripheral Vascular Surgery BAB Allergy Clinic 
ABP Head and Neck Surgery BAC Cardiology Clinic 
ABQ Vascular & Interventional BAE Diabetic Clinic 
ABX Surgical Care Cost Pool BAF Endocrinology Clinic 
ABZ Surgical Care NEC BEB Cast Clinic 
BAG Gastroenterology Clinic BEC Hand Surgery Clinic 
BAH Hematology Clinic BEE Orthotic Laboratory 
BAI Hypertension Clinic BEF Podiatry Clinic 
BAJ Nephrology Clinic BEX Orthopedic Care Cost Pool 
BAK Neurology Clinic BEZ Orthopedic Care NEC 
BAL Nutrition Clinic BF Psychiatric and Mental Health Care
BAM Oncology Clinic BFA Psychiatric Clinic 
BAN Pulmonary Disease Clinic BFB Psychology Clinic 
BAO Rheumatology Clinic BFC Child Guidance Clinic 
BAP Dermatology Clinic BFD Mental Health Clinic 
BAQ Infectious Disease Clinic BFE Social Work Clinic 
BAR Physical Medicine Clinic BFF Substance Abuse Rehab Clinic 
BAS Radiation Therapy Clinic BFX Psychiatric and Mental Health Cost 
BAT Bone Marrow Transplant Clinic BFZ Psychiatric Clinics NEC 
BAU Genetic Clinic BG Family Practice Care 
BAX Medical Clinics Cost Pool BGA Family Practice Clinic 
BAZ Medical Care NEC BGX Family Practice Cost Pool 
BB  Surgical Care BGZ Family Practice NEC 
BBA General Surgery Clinic BH Primary Medical Care 
BBB Cardio/Thoracic Surgery Clinic BHA Primary Care Clinics 
BBC Neurosurgery Clinic BHB Medical Examination Clinic 
BBD Ophthalmology Clinic BHC Optometry Clinic 
BBE Organ Transplant Clinic BHD Audiology Clinic 
BBF Otolaryngology Clinic BHE Speech Pathology Clinic 
BBG Plastic Surgery Clinic BHF Community Health Clinic 
BBH Proctology Clinic BHG Occupational Health Clinic 
BBI Urology Clinic BHH TRICARE Outpatient Clinics 
BBJ Pediatric Surgery Clinic BHI Immediate Care Clinic 






BBL Pain Management Clinic BHZ Primary Medical Care Clinics NEC
BBM Vascular & Interventional BI Emergency Medical Care 
BBX Surgical Clinics Cost Pool BIA Emergency Medical Clinic 
BBZ Surgical Care NEC BIX Emergency Medical Cost Pool 
BC Obstetrical and Gynecological BIZ Emergency Medical Care NEC 
BCA Family Planning Clinic BJ Flight Medicine Care 
BCB Gynecology Clinic BJA Flight Medicine Clinic 
BCC Obstetrics Clinic BJX Flight Medicine Cost Pool 
BCX OB/GYN Clinics Cost Pool BJZ Flight Medicine NEC 
BCZ OB/GYN Care NEC BK Undersea Medicine Care 
BD Pediatrics Care BKA Undersea Medicine Clinic 
BDA Pediatrics Clinics BKX Undersea Medicine Clinic Cost 
BDB Adolescent Clinic BKZ Undersea Medicine NEC 
BDC Well Baby Clinic BL Rehabilitative Ambulatory 
BDX Pediatric Clinics Cost Pool BLA Physical Therapy Clinic 
BDZ Pediatric Care NEC BLB Occupation Therapy Clinic 
BE Pediatrics Care BLX Rehabilitative Ambulatory 
BEA Orthopedic Clinic BLZ Rehabilitative Ambulatory 
  CA Dental Services 
CAZ Dental Services NEC CAA Dental Care 
CB Dental Prosthetic  CAX Dental Care Cost Pool 
CBA Dental Laboratory DI Nuclear Medicine Care 
CBX Dental Laboratory Cost Pool DIA Nuclear Medicine 
CBZ Dental Prosthetics NEC DIX Nuclear Medicine Cost Pool 
DA Pharmacy Services DIZ Nuclear Medicine NEC 
DAA Pharmacy DJ Intensive Care 
DAX Pharmacy Cost Pool DJA Medical ICU 
DAZ Pharmacy NEC DJB Surgical ICU 
DB Pathology DJC Coronary Care Unit 
DBA Clinical Pathology DJD Neonatal ICU 
DBB Anatomical Pathology DJE Pediatric ICU 
DBD Cytogenetic Lab (AF & N Only) DJX Command, Mgmt, and Admin Cost 
DBE Molecular Genetic Lab (AF & N DJZ ICU NED 
DBF Biochemical Genetic Lab (AF & N EA Depreciation  
DBX Pathology Cost Pool EAA Inpatient Depreciation 
DBZ Pathology NEC EAB Ambulatory Depreciation 
DCA Diagnostic Radiology EAC Dental Depreciation 






DCZ Radiology NEC EAE Medical Readiness Depreciation 
DD Special Procedures Services EAZ Depreciation NEC 
DDA Electrocardiography EB Command, Mgmt, and Admin  
DDB Electroencephalography EBA Command 
DDC Electroneuromyography EBB Special Staff 
DDD Pulmonary Function EBC Administration 
DDE Cardiac Catheterization EBD Clinical Management 
DDX Special Procedures Services Cost EBE Graduate Medical Education 
DDZ Special Procedures Svcs NEC EBF Education/Training Program 
DE Central Sterile Supply and EBG Peacetime Exercise/Disaster 
DEA Central Sterile Supply EBH Third Party Collection 
DEB Central Material Service EBI Graduate Dental Education Support 
DEX Central Sterile Supply and EBX Command, Mgmt, and Admin Cost 
DEZ Central Services NEC EBZ Command, Mgmt, and Admin 
DF Surgical Services ED Support Services 
DFA Anesthesiology EDA Plant Management -
DFB Surgical Suite EDB Operation of Utilities -
DFC Post-Anesthesia Care Unit EDC Maintenance of Real Property -
DFX Surgical Services Cost Pool EDD Minor Construction -
DFZ Surgical Services NEC EDE Other Engineering Support -
DG Same Day Services EDF Lease of Real Property -
DGA Same Day Services EDG Transportation -
DGB Hemodialysis EDH Fire Protection -
DGD Peritoneal Dialysis EDI Police Protection -
DGE Ambulatory Nursing Services EDJ Communications -
DGX Same Day Services Cost Pool EDK Other MTF Support Svcs -
DGZ Ambulatory Procedures Visits EDX Supt Svcs - Funded/Reimbursable 
DH Rehabilitative Services EE Material Services 
DHA Inhalation/Respiratory Therapy EEA Material Services 
DHX Rehabilitative Services Cost Pool EEX Material Svcs Cost Pool 
DHZ Rehabilitative Services NEC EEZ Material Svcs NEC 
EFX Housekeeping Cost Pool EF Housekeeping 
EFZ Housekeeping NEC EFA Housekeeping 
EG Biomedical Equip Repair FBF Epidemiology Program 
EGA Biomedical Equip Repair  FBI Immunizations 
EGX Biomedical Equip Cost Pool FBJ Early Intervention Services (EIS) 
EGZ Biomedical Equip Repair NEC FBK Medically Related Services (MRS) 






EHA Laundry Service FBN Hearing Conservation Program 
EHX Laundry Service Cost Pool FBX Public Health Svcs Cost Pool 
EHZ Laundry Service NEC FBZ Public Health Svcs NEC 
EI Nutrition Management  FC Health Care Svcs Supt 
EIA Patient Food Operations FCA Purchased or Referred Care 
EIB Combined Food Operations FCB Guest Lecturer & Consultant 
EIC Inpatient Clinical Nutrition FCC CHAMPUS Beneficiary Support 
EIX Nutrition Management Cost pools FCD Support to Other Military 
EIZ Nutrition Management NEC FCE Support to Other Federal Agencies 
EJ Inpatient Affairs FCF Support to Non-Federal Activities 
EJA Inpatient Affairs FCG Support to Non-MEPRS Reporting 
EJX Inpatient Affairs Cost Pool FCH OCONUS Emergency and Activity 
EJZ Inpatient Care Administration FCZ Health Care Svcs Supt NEC 
EK Ambulatory Care Administration FD Military-Unique Medical Activities
EKA Ambulatory Care Administration FDB Base Operations- Medical 
EKX Ambulatory Care Admin Cost Pool FDC Non-patient Food Operations 
EKZ Ambulatory Care Administration FDD Decedent Affairs 
EL TRICARE and Managed Care FDE Initial Outfitting 
ELA TRICARE and Managed Care FDF Urgent Minor Construction 
ELX Cost Pool FDG TDY/TAD Enroute to PCS 
ELZ TRICARE and Managed Care FDH Military Funded Emergency 
FA Specified Health Related Programs FDI In-place Consecutive Overseas 
FAA Area Reference Laboratories FDX Cost Pools 
FAB Area Dental Prosthetic Lab FDZ Military Unique Med Activity 
FAC Ophthalmic Fabrication and Repair FE Patient Movement and Military 
FAD DoD Military Blood Program FEA Patient Transportation 
FAF Drug Screening and Testing FEB Patient Movement Expenses 
FAH Clinical Investigation Program FEC Transient Patient Care 
FAI Physiological Trng/Support FED Military Patients Personnel 
FAK Student Expenses FEF Aeromedical Staging Facilities 
FAL Continuing Health Education FEX Patient Movement/Admin Cost 
FAM GME Intern/Resident Expenses FEZ Patient Movement/Mil Patient 
FAN GDE Intern/Resident Expenses FF Veterinary Services 
FAO GME Fellowship/Resident FFA Dep Commander for Veterinary 
FAP GME Fellowship Expenses FFB Commissary Food Inspection 
FAQ GDE Fellowship Expenses FFC Troop Issues Supply Food 
FAX Specified Health-Related Prog FFD Supply Point Food Inspection 






FB Public Health Services FFF Origin Food Inspection 
FBB Preventive Medicine FFG Veterinary Laboratory 
FBC Industrial Hygiene Program FFH Animal Dz Prevention & Ctrl 
FBD Radiation Health Program FFX Veterinary Svcs Cost Pool 
FBE Environmental Health Program FFZ Veterinary Svcs NEC 
GAB Other Readiness Planning & GA Deployment Planning & 
GB Readiness Exercises GAA Deployment Planning & 
GBA Field or Fleet Readiness Exercises GE Readiness Logistics Management 
GD Unit or Personnel Deployments GEA Prepositioned War Reserve 
GDA Unit or Personnel Deployments GEB Contingency Patient Care Areas 
GEC Contingency Blocks/Packs   
GF Readiness Physical Training   
GFA Readiness Physical Training   
GG National Disaster Medical System   
GGA NDMS Planning & Administration   
GGB NDMS Exercises   
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APPENDIX C. 
SUMMARY TABLE OF MEPRS CODES OF INPATIENT WORKLOAD FOR FY 
1999-2002 
MEPRS MEPRS  Relative Weight Product Total Dispositions Total Days in Hospital 
CODE DESCRIPTION  1999 2000 2001 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 
AA Medical Care 17,754.28 18,996.35 18,669.33 19,766.61 15,264 16,174 16,616 17,197 59,758 64,132 64,820 66,693
AB Surgical Care 22,156.30 21,148.23 19,725.43 18,225.69 15,400 15,338 14,380 13,467 52,730 51,991 48,724 46,216
ABA General Surgery 9,274.63 9,983.47 9,248.59 9,475.89 7,569 8,247 7,768 9,476 25,964 28,865 26,564 27,319
ABB Cardio/Thoracic Surgery 2,451.40 2,243.88 2,143.67 1,042.41 671 648 612 331 4,306 4,247 4,005 2,282 
ABC Surgical ICU 868.44 801.31 741.41 664.51 265 57 63 09 2065 1738 2049 1885 
ABD Neurosurgery 2,921.16 2,075.48 1,958.98 2,116.91 1,476 1,088 1,108 1,101 4,858 3,955 3,568 4,051 
ABE Ophthalmology 94.13 105.58 67.65 78.06 123 131 94 108 337 403 239 298 
ABF Oral Surgery 802.77 853.91 808.18 964.69 713 655 627 668 1,250 1,207 1,011 1,211 
ABG Otolaryngology 1,846.60 1,790.09 1,677.04 1,326.55 1,778 1,682 1,582 1,331 3,576 3,380 2,947 2,595 
ABH Pediatric Surgery 170.24 271.27 335.94 352.04 206 268 336 380 560 811 1,091 1,040 
ABI Plastic Surgery 366.28 271.27 335.94 352.04 259 281 329 214
12
87 1166 1652 724 
ABJ Proctology 11.24 1.97 8.61 3.27 5 1 5 4 38 12 38 7 
ABK Urology 1,770.89 1,652.93 1,522.72 1,253.18 1,560 1,521 1,308 1,111 4,350 4,107 3,622 2,955 
ABL Organ Transplant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ABM Burn Unit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ABN Peripheral Vascular Surgery 1,578.52 995.72 682.64 641.92 775 558 347 350 4,138 2,099 1,936 1,848 
ABP Head and Neck Surgery 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ABQ Vascular & Interventional Radiology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ABX Surgical Care Cost Pool 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ABZ Surgical Care NEC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  Obstetrical and Gynecological Care 12,418.01 13,331.71 12,885.14 13,226.01 20,808 22,399 21,817 22,503 51,206 55,998 54,492 57,127
AD Pediatrics 10,962.81 11,610.53 10,347.47 10,809.08 20,928 21,981 21,284 22,180 62,533 66,597 65,109 68,648
ADC Neonatal ICU 4,083.39 3,799.22 4,290.33 4,219.88 1,212 1,132 1,302 1,326 17,832 16,142 19,562 20,017
ADE Pediatric ICU 592.74 663.60 634.78 672.81 421 587 554 578 1,369 1,629 1,479 1,422 
AE Orthopedic Care 7,079.22 6,779.18 6,371.75 5,705.38 5,241 5,063 4,736 4,042 15,080 15,947 15,558 13,734
AF Psychiatric Care 3,097 2,070 2,076 1,949 3,943 3,880 3,881 3,435 29,283 27,279 24,210 19,930
AG Family Practice Care 4,934.44 5,367.00 5,630.61 5,657.50 10,077 10,653 11,210 11,463 23,680 25,162 29,087 26,260
AGB Family Practice Surgery 39.46 22.77 9.16 19.36 2 11 22 128 54 17 98 
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APPENDIX D 
Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement Allocation Substitution 
Policies for the Medical Corps as of FY 1999. Source: Deputy Director, Data 
Management Division, Manpower/Personnel, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (M-14B). 
MEDICAL CORPS REQUIREMENT: MEDICAL CORPS SUBSTITUTION: 
PSUB AQD SPECIALTY PSUB AQD SPECIALTY SUB PCT
16R0  Internist/General 16R1  Internist/Spec 100% 
   16V0  Peds/Gen 33% 
   16Q0  Fam Phys/Gen 33% 
   16P0  Emerg Med/Gen 33% 
16R1 62C Internist/Critical Care 16R0  Internist/Gen 33% 
   16V1 62C Peds/Critical Care 33% 
   16V1 6VG Peds/Cardiologist 33% 
   16T1 62C Neuro/ Critical Care 50% 
16R1 6RG Internist/Cardiology 16R0  Internist/Gen 33% 
   16V1 6VG Peds/Cardiologist 50% 
16R1 6RL Internist/Gastroenterology 16V1 6VL Peds/Gastroenterology 50% 
 6RN/O Internist/Heme/Onc 16V1 6VN Peds/Heme/Onc 33% 
 6RR/62C Internist/Pulmonary Critical Care 16V1 6VR Peds/Pulmonary 50% 
 62B Internist/Allergy 16V1 62B Peds/Allergy 100% 
 XXX Internist/Spec (any type) 16V1 XXX Peds/Equivalent Spec 50% 
 6RP Internist/Inf Disease 16V1 6VP Peds/Inf Disease 100% 
     16R0  Internist/Gen 50% 
   16Q0  Fam Phys/Gen 20% 
   16V0  Peds/Gen 20% 
16U0  UMO/General 16U0 6UM UMO/Submarine 100% 
16U1  UMO/Spec 16U1 6UM UMO/Submarine 100% 
16U1 6UE UMO/Occ Med 16U1  UMO/Spec 100% 
16Q0  Fam Phys/Gen 16Q1  Fam Phys/Spec 100% 
   16R0  Internist/Gen 50% 
   16R1  Internist/Spec 20% 
   16P0  Emerg Med/Gen 50% 
   16V0  Peds/Gen 20% 
   16V1  Peds/Spec 10% 
16V0  Peds/Gen 16V1  Peds/Spec 100% 
16P0  Emerg Med/Gen 16R0  Internist/Gen 20% 
   16R1  Internist/Spec 20% 
   16Q0  Fam Phys/Gen 33% 
   16Q1  Fam Phys/Spec 20% 
   16V0  Peds/Gen 20% 
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MEDICAL CORPS REQUIREMENT: MEDICAL CORPS SUBSTITUTION: 
PSUB AQD SPECIALTY PSUB AQD SPECIALTY SUB PCT
   16V1 62C Peds/Critical Care 10% 
15A0  Aviation Med/Gen 15A1  Aeromed/Spec 100% 
16X0  Psych/Gen 16X1  Psych/Spec 100% 
16Y0  Radiology/Gen 16Y1 6YD Diag Radiol 100% 
15K0  Prev Med/Gen 15A1  Aeromed/Spec 100% 
   15K2  Occ Med/Gen 100% 
15C0  Gen Sgn 15C1  Sgn/Spec 100% 
   15E0  Obster-Gyn/Gen 33% 
   15E1 6EG/6EJ Obster-Gyn/Spec 50% 
   15J0  Urology/ Gen 33% 
   15J1  Urology/Spec 33% 
15C1  Sgn/Spec 15C0  Gen Sgn 33% 
   15E1 6EG/6EJ Obster-Gyn/Spec 50% 
   15J1  Urologist/Spec 20% 
15E0  Obster-Gyn/Gen 16Q1 6Qf Fam Phsy/OB 33% 
15H0  Ortho/Gen 15H1  Ortho/Spec 100% 
15J0  Urology/ Gen 15J1  Urology/Spec 100% 
   15E1 6EJ Obster-Gyn/Spec 50% 
15B0  Anesthesia/Gen 15B1  Anesthesia/Spec 100% 
15D0  Neurosurgery/Gen 15D1  Neurosurgery/Spec 100% 
15G0  Opthalmology/Gen 15G1  Opthalmology/Spec 100% 
15I0  Otolaryngology/Gen 15I1  Otolaryngology/Spec 100% 
   15C1 6CJ Plastic Sgn 20% 
15L0  PM&R 15L1  PM&R/Spec 100% 
15M0  Pathology/Gen 15M1  Pathology/Spec 100% 
16N0  Dermatology/Gen 16N1  Dermatology/Spec 100% 
   16Q0  Fam Phys/Gen 33% 
   16R0  Internist/Gen 33% 
   16V0  Peds/Gen 33% 
16T0  Neurology/Gen 16T1  Neuro/Spec 100% 
   15L1  PM&R/Gen or Spec 50% 
   16Q0  Fam Phys/Gen 33% 
   16R0  Internist/Gen 33% 
   16V0  Peds/Gen 33% 







Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement Allocation Substitution 
Policies for the Nurse Corps as of FY 1999. Source: Deputy Director, Data Management 
Division, Manpower/Personnel, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (M-14B). 
 





1900 General Nurse  ALL PLATFORMS:  
  1901 Nursing Administrator 100% 
  1903 Nursing Education 100% 
  1920 Maternal-Child Nurse 100% 
  1922 Pediatric Nurse 100% 
  1930 Psychiatric Nurse 100% 
  1940 Community Health Nurse 100% 
  1974 Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 100% 
  1976 Family Nurse Practitioner 100% 
  1980 OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner 100% 
  1981 Nurse Midwife 100% 
  1806 Health Care Administrator 100% 
  0033 Manpower 100% 
     
1910 Medical-Surgical Nurse ALL PLATFORMS:  
  1901 Nursing Administrator 100% 
  1903 Nursing Education 100% 
  1920 Maternal-Child Nurse 100% 
  1922 Pediatric Nurse 100% 
  1930 Psychiatric Nurse 100% 
  1940 Community Health Nurse 100% 
  1974 Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 100% 
  1976 Family Nurse Practitioner 100% 
  1980 OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner 100% 
  1981 Nurse Midwife 100% 
  1806 Health Care Administrator 100% 
  0033 Manpower 100% 
  0037 Education & Training Mgmt 100% 
     
1945  ER/Trauma Nurse  OCONUS AUGMENT  
   (no substitutions other platforms)  
  1910 Medical-Surgical Nurse 40% 
  1960 Critical Care Nurse 100% 
  1974 Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1976 Family Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1980 OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1981 Nurse Midwife 40% 
     
1960  Critical Care Nurse T-AH (not more than 25% of total 1960's)  
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If the requirement You may substitute: 
  
  1910 Medical-Surgical Nurse 25% 
  1974 Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 25% 
  1976 Family Nurse Practitioner 25% 
  1980 OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner 25% 
  1981 Nurse Midwife 25% 
     
1960  Critical Care Nurse Fleet Hospital (not more than 40% of total 
1960 )
 
  1910 Medical-Surgical Nurse 40% 
  1974 Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1976 Family Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1980 OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1981 Nurse Midwife 40% 
     
1960  Critical Care Nurse USMC Augment (not more than 40% of total 
1960 )
 
  1910 Medical-Surgical Nurse 40% 
  1974 Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1976 Family Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1980 OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1981 Nurse Midwife 40% 
     
1960  Critical Care Nurse CRTS  No SUBSTITUTIONS  
     
1960  Critical Care Nurse OCONUS (not more than 40% of total 1960's)  
  1910 Medical-Surgical Nurse 40% 
  1974 Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1976 Family Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1980 OB/GYN Nurse Practitioner 40% 
  1981 Nurse Midwife 40% 
     
1972  Nurse Anesthetist  No Substitutions Any Platform  
171 
APPENDIX E 
Mapping and aggregation of old SSP1 codes to new codes and General Category 
for Medical Corps 






Flight Surgeon Aviation Medicine 15A0   1602 15A0 
Preventive Medicine 
Officer Aerospace Aerospace Medicine 15A1   1624 15A1 
Anesthesiologist Anesthesia, General 15B0   1540 
 Anesthesia, Subspecialty 15B1   1541 
15B 
General Surgeon Surgery, General 15C0   1500 
 Surgery, Subspecialty 15C1    
 Thoracic & CDV Surgeon  
Surgery Subspecialty 
Cardio thoracic 
Surgery 6CD 1507 
 C/Rectal Surgeon  
Surgery Colon & 
Rectal Surgery 6CE 1501 
 Pediatric Surgeon  
Surgery Pediatric 





Vascular Surgery 6CI 1503 
 Plastic Surgeon  
Surgery Plastic 
Surgery 6CJ 1520 
 Surgical Oncology  Surgery Oncology 6CL 1560 
 Trauma  
Surgery Trauma 




General 15D0   1515 
 
Neurological Surgery, 
Subspecialty 15D1    
 
Complex Spinal 
Neurosurgery    1570 
 








General 15E0   1510 
 
Obstetrics/Gynecology 
Subspecialty 15E1    
 Gynecologic Oncology    1562 
15E 
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 Maternal Fetal Medicine  
OB/GYN Gynecologic 





Fetal Medicine 6EH 1512 
 
General Medical Officer General Medicine 15F0   1600 15F 
Ophthalmologist Ophthalmology, General 15G0   1524 
 
Ophthalmology, 
Subspecialty 15G1    
 
Comprehensive 
Ophthalmologist    1580 
 




Comprehensive 6GD 1526 
 Glaucoma  
Ophthalmology 
Subspecialty Cornea & 






Glaucoma 6GF 1578 
 Oculoplastics  
Ophthalmology 
Subspecialty Neuro-
Opthalmology/Surgery 6GG 1529 
 Ophthalmologic Pathology  
Ophthalmology 
Subspecialty 
Oculoplastics 6GH 1585 








General 15H0   1516 
 
Orthopedic Surgery, 
Subspecialty 15H1    
 Trauma Surgery    1545 
 Hand Surgery  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Faculty 
Development 62D 1517 
 Foot and Ankle Surgery  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Hand 
Surgery 62F 1550 
 Musculoskeletal Oncology  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Foot & 
Ankle Surgery 6HD 1559 
15H 
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 Pediatrics Orthopedics  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty 
Orthopedic Oncology 6HF 1519 
 Spine Surgery  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Pediatric 
Orthopedic Surgery 6HG 1518 
 Sports Medicine / Surgical  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Spine 
Surgery 6HH 1535 
 Total Join  
Orthopedic Surgery 
Subspecialty Sports 
Surgery 6HI 1513 
 






Development 26D  
 
Facial Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgery    1521 




Reconstructive 6ID 1590 
15I 
Urologist Urology, General 15J0   1508 
 Urology, Subspecialty 15J1    
 Urology Fellowship    1563 
 Pediatric Urology  
Urologic Subspecialty 
Pediatric Urology 6JG 1509 
15J 
Preventive Medicine 
Officer Preventive Health 
Preventive Medicine, 




General 15K2   1626 
15K 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 
Physical Medical and 
Rehabilitation, General 15L0    
 
Physical Medical and 
Rehabilitation, 
Subspecialty 15L1    
 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehab.    1634 
15L 
Pathologist Pathology General 15M0   1680 
 Pathology Subspecialty 15M1    
 Ophthalmic Pathology    1690 
15M 
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 Anatomic Pathology  
Pathology 
Subspecialty Anatomic 
Pathologist 6MB 1682 
 Clinical Pathology 
Pathology 
Subspecialty Clinical 
Pathologist 6MC 1681 
 Cytopathology  
Pathology 
Subspecialty 
Cytopathologist 6MF 1691 
 Dermatopathology  
Pathology 
Subspecialty 
Dermatopathologist 6MG 1684 
 Forensic Pathology  
Pathology 
Subspecialty Forensic 
Pathologist 6MH 1685 
 Hematopathology  
Pathology 
Subspecialty Hemato-
Pathologist 6MI 1686 
 Immunopathology  
Pathology 
Subspecialty Immuno-
Pathologist 6MJ 1688 
 Neuropathology  
Pathology 
Subspecialty Neuro-
Pathologist 6MK 1683 
 
Dermatologist Dermatology, General 16N0   1618 
 
Dermatology, 




General 16P0   1616 
 
Emergency Medicine, 
Subspecialty 16P1   1635 
16P 
Family Practitioner Family Medicine General 16Q0   1610 
 
Family Medicine 
Subspecialty 16Q1    
 





Specialist 62A 1609 
 Family Practice Obstetrics  
Family Medicine 
Subspecialty Faculty 
Development 62D 1640 
16Q 
Internist Internal Medicine, General 16R0   1612 
 
Internal Medicine, 
Subspecialty 16R1    
16R 
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 Adolelescent Medicine    1644 




Specialist 62A 1652 
 Critical Care Medicine  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Allergy/Immunologist 62B 1699 
 Imnunology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Critical 
Care 62C 1653 
 Cardiology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Allergy 
Immunologist  6RF 1643 
 Cardiac Electrophysiology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Cardiology General 6RG 1659 
 Interventional Cardiology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty Cardiac 
Electrophysiologist 6RH 1658 




Cardiologist 6RI 1654 
 Gastroenterology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Endocrinologist 6RK 1647 
 Hematology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Gastroenterologist 6RL 1648 
 Medical Oncology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Hematologist 6RN 1649 
 Infectious Disease  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Oncologist 6RO 1641 




Specialist 6RP 1655 
 Pulmonary Disease  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Nephrology 6RQ 1642 
 Rheumatology  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Pulmonologist 6RR 1656 
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 Tropical Medicine  
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
Rheumatologist 6RS 1645 
 
Neurologist Neurology, General 16T0   1620 
 Neurology, Subspecialty 16T1 
Neurology 
Subspecialty Faculty 
Development 62D  






Neurologist 6TD 1668 




Ophthalmologist 6TF 1669 
16T 
Undersea Medical Officer 
Undersea Medicine, 
General 16U0   1605 
 
Undersea Medicine, 
Subspecialty 16U1    
 
Undersea Occupational 
Med.    1606 




Medicine 6UE 1632 
16U 
Pediatrician Pediatrics, General 16V0   1614 
 Pediatrics, Subspecialty 16V1    
 Developmental Pediatrics    1611 







Care 6VI 1661 
 Pediatric Cardiology  
Pediatrics 
Subspecialty Pediatric 
Gastroenterologist 6VL 1660 




Oncologist 6VN 1615 
16V 
Nuclear Medicine 
Specialist Nuclear Medicine 16W0   1678 
 Nuclear Radiologist    1673 
16W 
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Psychiatrist Psychiatry, General 16X0   1622 
 Psychiatry, Subspecialty 16X1    
 Child Psychiatry    1623 





Subspecialty 6XH 1698 
16X 
Radiologist (Diagnostic) Diagnostic Radiology 16Y0   1670 
 Radiology, Subspecialty 16Y1    
 Imaging Radiology    1675 
 Neurologic Radiology  
Radiology 
Subspecialty Imaging 6YD 1672 




Subspecialty 6YF 1671 
Radiologist (Therapeutic) Radiation Oncology 16Y2    
 Theraputic Radiology    1676 




Rad 6YE 1677 
16Y 
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APPENDIX F 
Listing of Subspecialty Codes used for Nurse Corps data. 
Subspecialty Title Numeric Code 
Professional Nursing 1900 
Nursing/Healthcare Administration 1901 
Education 1903 
Quality Assurance 1907 
Medical / Surgical Nursing 1910 
Medical Nursing 1911 
Surgical Nursing 1912 
Cardiovascular Nursing 1913 
Oncology Nursing 1916 
Perinatal Nursing 1920 
Obstetrical Nursing 1921 
Pediatric Nursing 1922 
Newborn Nursing 1923 
Psychiatric Nursing 1930 
Orthopedic Nursing 1935 
Ambulatory Care Nursing 1940 
Emergency/Trauma Nursing 1945 
Perioperative Nursing 1950 
Critical Care Nursing 1960 
Surgical Intensive Care Nursing 1961 
Medical Intensive Care Nursing 1962 
Coronary Care Nursing 1963 
Neonatal Intensive Care Nursing 1964 
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Subspecialty Title Numeric Code 
Post-Anesthesia Care Nursing 1968 
Nurse Anesthesia 1970 
Pediatric Nurse Practitioner 1974 
Adult Health Nurse Practitioner 1975 
Obstetrical and Gynecological Nurse 
Practitioner 
1980 
Nurse Midwife 1981 
Plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence 1805 
Health Care Management 1806 
Management 0030 
Manpower, Personnel, and Training Analysis 0033 
Education and Training Management 0037 
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APPENDIX I 
2nd Level MEPRS Code Workload Summary using Simple RVU 
for All Same Day Surgery 








BA Medical Care 15034.76 15915.0328495.32 39138.25 160.32%
BB Surgical Care 178414.66163043.47153074.2178692.15 0.16%
BC OB/GYN 26284.45 26994.2126060.76 23900.46 -9.07%
BD 
Pediatric 
Clinic 301.38 342.04 291.99 469.88 55.91%
BE Orthopedics 95944.08 99565.25 93745.8102293.28 6.62%
BG 
Family 


















Year Specialty Clinic 
E/S of Surgical 
Specialty 
Ratio of Work per Specialty 
Surgeon 




Clinic (BBC5) 15D   
1999 5600.89 17 329.46  
2000 6430.03 19 338.42  
2001 1689.17 23 73.44  
2002 2932.88 26 112.80  
    -65.76% 
 
Ophthalmology 
Clinic (BBD5) 15G   
1999 33510.58 81 413.71  
2000 26042.24 78 333.87  
2001 24310.15 79 307.72  
2002 26599.43 81 328.39  
    -20.62% 
     
 
Otolaryngology 
Clinic (BBF5) 15I   
1999 51928.67 82 633.28  
2000 49068.39 78 629.08  
2001 45438.74 75 605.85  
2002 45272.06 80 565.90  
    -10.64% 
     
     
 
Urology Clinic 
(BBI5) 15J   
1999 18210.67 52 350.21  
2000 17414.01 53 328.57  
2001 14972.95 49 305.57  
2002 19336.8 51 379.15  
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